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This thesis examines the theoretical foundations of Kant's moral philosophy. I argue that 
Kant's moral ideal of a kingdom of ends is to be identified with the theoretical idea of a 
community, and that this idea can be traced back to the category of community 
introduced in his table of categories. In particular I argue that, for the mature Kant, (a) the 
only application of the theoretical idea of community is the moral idea of a kingdom of 
ends, (b) the only way we can conceive of a kingdom of ends is as a political community 
governed by juridical laws, and (c) the only way we can conceive of a member of  a 
community is as an autonomous agent. 
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Many scholars working on Kant's ethics have been influenced by Rawl’s claim that Kant 
should be read as a moral constructivist. According to this interpretation, our moral 
ideas, such as the idea of a kingdom of ends, are constructed by practical reason, which is 
understood to be a faculty entirely distinct from theoretical reason. Practical reasoning is 
governed by what Rawls and his followers call the Categorical Imperative (CI) 
Procedure, and our moral ideas are somehow constructed using this procedure. On such 
an interpretation the categorical imperative (procedure) is logically prior to the idea of a 
kingdom of ends, and we can investigate the nature of this procedure without engaging 
with Kant's theoretical philosophy. Rawls’ interpretation has been extremely influential, 
and many of his former students are now prominent Kant scholars. One result of this 
influence has been the practice of studying Kant's ethics divorced from his theoretical 
work. I believe that such a divorce has led to an impoverished understanding of Kant's 
ethics.  
 
I reject the claim that Kant is a moral constructivist, instead I maintain that he should be 
understood as a moral idealist. I argue, in contrast to Rawls and his followers, that our 
moral ideas are theoretical ideas, and that they are independent of, and logically prior to, 
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the categorical imperative.1 In particular I argue that the idea of a kingdom of ends is a 
particular theoretical idea, namely the pure idea of a community, which can be traced 
back to the category of community introduced in the table of categories of the Critique of 
Pure Reason.  
 
As a result of this, the idea of a member of a kingdom of ends is also a theoretical idea; it 
is the idea of a member of a community. This theoretical idea, however, presents itself to 
us practically as an ideal, that is as something of extreme value that we should strive to 
instantiate. The categorical imperative is merely the practical recognition by our 
conscience of the theoretical idea (of a member of an ideal community) as an ideal. For 
the categorical imperative commands us to strive to be a member of a kingdom of ends. 
Kant is a moral idealist and, in contrast to the moral constructivist, believes that our 
moral ideas are logically prior to the categorical imperative, for the command “be a 
member of a kingdom of ends!” presupposed that we understand the idea of a kingdom of 
ends. 
 
In the Groundwork Kant argues that to be virtuous is to strive to be a member of an ideal 
kingdom of ends, and I argue that the idea of a kingdom of ends is the idea of an ideal 
political community, governed by juridical laws. The reason for this is because the idea 
of a kingdom of ends is the idea of a community, and the idea of community is an idea of 
pure reason, being derived from the category of community, the third category of 
relation. For Kant the idea of community is the idea of a whole the parts (or members) of 
                                                 
1 And would be logically prior to the CI Procedure if Kant believed there was such a thing. 
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which are simple (indivisible) and logically prior to the whole, and which mutually limit 
and resist one another. I explain why the idea community has these features by examining 
Kant's logical and metaphysical works. The fact that the idea of community is defined in 
these terms implies two things: (a) that the idea of a member of a community can only be 
the idea of an autonomous individual, and (b) our idea of a community is the idea of a 
political community governed by juridical laws. 
 
(a) As a whole, our idea of a community must be unified, and if the whole is to be a real, 
as opposed to an ideal, whole the source of the unity must be intrinsic to the community. 
And as a community consists merely of its members, which are logically prior to the 
whole, the members of a real community must be the source of the unity of the 
community. Now, Kant believes that,  a community can only be unified by laws, and so 
in a real community the members of the community must be the source of the laws that 
provide the community with its unity, that is the members of a real community must be 
autonomous. 
 
(b) The reason our pure idea of a real community must be the idea of a political 
community governed by juridical laws is because a community must not only be unified, 
but the members of the community, if they are to be capable of real interaction, must 
resist one another, for Kant believes that inter-substantial action can only be understood 
in terms of the withdrawal of resistance, and the source of the unity must also be the 
source of this resistance. Now, what unifies a community are laws given by the members 
of the community, and so these laws must also be the source of the resistance between the 
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members of the community. The only type of laws, however, that can create resistance 
between individuals are juridical laws. Juridical laws assign rights to use objects, and 
these rights imply corresponding duties in others to not interfere with, or resist, my use of 
these objects. Such laws give individuals a legitimate right to resist others use of objects. 
This is why our pure idea of a real community must be the idea of a political community 
governed by juridical laws. Juridical laws, then, are the source of intelligible resistance, 
and this is the only possible basis of intelligible interaction between individuals. 
 
This dissertation is divided into two parts. In part one (chapters one to four) I examine 
the role of the concept of community in Kant’s ethical work. In part two (chapters five to 
eight) I examine Kant’s theoretical account of the concepts of community and interaction. 
In my final chapter (chapter nine) I return to Kant’s practical philosophy and show how 
this understanding of Kant’s theoretical account of community and interaction can help 
us understand Kant’s theory of property as laid out  in the Metaphysics of Morals. 
 
PART ONE - ETHICS 
 
In chapter one I focus upon explaining and justifying two claims: firstly, that Kant 
should be understood as a moral idealist and, secondly, that, for Kant, the primary 
function of moral philosophy is to arrive at a clearer theoretical understanding of what it 
is we are striving to be insofar as we recognize the demands of morality. The chapter is 
divided into seven sections. In section one I compare my approach with that of Rawls 
and his followers who argue that Kant should be understood to be a moral constructivist. 
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The moral constructivists argue that our moral ideas, including the idea of a kingdom of 
ends, are practical (as opposed to theoretical) ideas that are constructed on the basis of a 
practically rational procedure. In section two I explain my interpretation of Kant’s 
strategy in the Groundwork. In opposition to the moral constructivists, who argue that 
Kant’s strategy in the Groundwork is to discover the implicit procedure of practical 
rationality (the “CI-procedure”) and then show how the idea of a kingdom of ends can be 
constructed by means of this procedure, I argue that Kant’s goal in the Groundwork is to 
arrive at a clearer theoretical understanding of what it is that our conscience demands that 
we become, and that his strategy is to begin by examining our pre-philosophical moral 
intuitions to show that what the person who listens to their conscience is striving to be is 
a member of an ideal community. Such a person does not necessarily understand 
theoretically that this is what they are doing, and Kant's goal in the Groundwork is to 
provide such a person with a clearer theoretical understanding of what they are 
attempting to be when they listen to the judgment of their conscience. In section three I 
explain Kant’s account of the relationship between the notions of virtue and holiness. I 
argue that Kant believes that it is our duty to be holy, and that to be virtuous is, by 
definition, to strive to be holy. Given Kant’s belief that ought implies can, the fact that 
we have a duty to be holy implies that it is possible for us to be holy. I explain how the 
postulates of practical reason introduced in the Critique of Practical Reason are intended 
to explain this possibility. In section four I examine Kant’s disagreements with Wolff 
and Baumgarten, two of his rationalist predecessors who advocated a rationalist and 
perfectionist morality. I argue that Kant himself should be understood as being both a 
rationalist and a perfectionist, and that what he objects to is their formalistic formulation 
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of rationalism and perfectionism, and I suggest that he would reject moral constructivism 
on similar grounds. In section five I examine a number of passages in the Critique of 
Practical Reason that seem to offer support for a moral constructivist reading of Kant. In 
particular Kant, famously, insists that it is “the moral law that first determines and makes 
possible the concept of the Good” (5:64). I argue that these passages do not have the 
implications they seem to have at first sight, for after making such remarks, Kant makes 
it clear that this priority is merely methodological and not ontological, for he believes that 
although the categorical imperative is the ratio cognoscendi of the idea of being a 
member of a kingdom of ends, the idea of being a member of a kingdom of ends is the 
ratio essendi of the categorical imperative. In the final section of the chapter, I examine 
Kant’s account of the value of engaging in moral philosophy.  Kant is not an 
intellectualist, for he believes that to be virtuous all we have to do is listen to our 
conscience, so a clearer theoretical understanding of what our conscience demands of us 
is not necessary in order to be moral. Given his rejection of intellectualism, however, it is 
not immediately clear why arriving at a clearer theoretical understanding of what 
morality demands has any practical value. I argue that the theoretical clarification that 
moral philosophy provides has motivational benefits. The reason for this is because 
immorality is always the result of choosing not to listen to the judgment of our 
conscience, and this happens, Kant believes, when we listen to excuses for not living up 
to the moral ideal, and these excuses are themselves the product of theoretical 
speculation. A clearer theoretical understanding of the moral ideal will not, in itself, make 
us more moral, but it will make it harder for us to give ourselves excuses for not living up 
to the ideal. Engaging is moral philosophy, then, quietens the excuse giving voice, the 
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voice of the defense attorney in the court of conscience, which makes it easier for us to be 
attentive to the voice of the judgement of conscience. 
 
 
In chapter two I  argue that, for Kant, to be virtuous is to strive to be a member of a 
kingdom of ends understood as the idea of a world or community. I argue, (a) that Kant’s 
moral ideal is the (pure) idea of being a member of a world, (b) that our idea of a world is 
the idea of a community of individuals in interaction with one another and, (c) that the 
only way of conceiving of a community of individuals as in interaction is if we conceive 
of each individual member of the community as autonomous. 
 
The (pure) idea of a world could also be called an intelligible world, so I am suggesting 
that, for Kant, the moral ideal is the idea of being a member of a/the intelligible world. In 
talking of an ‘intelligible world’, at least in the ethical context, Kant is not referring to 
some other, ontologically distinct world. Instead, when he talks of the idea of an 
intelligible world all he really means is our pure idea of a world, that is our idea of a 
world insofar as it is an object of the pure intellect. 
 
I also argue in this chapter that Kant Should be understood as offering an ‘ethics of 
interaction’. I call Kant’s ethics an ‘ethics of interaction’ because Kant’s moral ideal is 
the idea of being an individual member of a world of individuals, and, for Kant, a world 
is only really a world, as opposed to a mere aggregate, if the individual beings that 
constitute the world are in interaction.  
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In chapter three I examine the genesis of Kant’s moral theory. I argue that Kant first 
started to think of morality in terms of striving to be a member of a kingdom of ends, 
understood as an ideal community, in the early 1760s, and that he was influenced in this 
by his encounter with the Swedish mystic Emanuel Swedenborg. Swedenborg wrote 
volumes about his visions of heaven and hell, and in 1766 Kant published a book on 
Swedenborg, Dreams of a Spirit Seer, a commentary on Swedenborg’s magnum opus, 
Heavenly Secrets. Most commentators take Kant's attitude towards Swedenborg to have 
been entirely negative, and argue that, at the most, Kant's encounter with him had a 
purely negative impact upon his development, inducing him to reject certain of his early 
metaphysical positions. I argue, however, that Swedenborg had a positive influence upon 
Kant's development, particularly upon his ethics, for Kant’s conception of a kingdom of 
ends is modeled upon Swedenborg’s conception of heaven as a community of spirits 
governed by moral laws. In other words, I argue that Kant’s idea of a kingdom of end is 
the idea of a spiritual community, and that reading Swedenborg had a major impact on 
the development of Kant’s ethics because it provoked him to conceive of ethics in terms 
of striving to be a member of an ideal spiritual (or later in his development: “intelligible”) 
world. 
 
Although Kant’s ethics may have been provoked by his reading of Swedenborg, his 
mature conception of a kingdom of ends is a radical advance on the simple idea of a 
community of spirits Kant was toying with in the early 1760s. In particular, the idea of a 
kingdom of ends is the idea of community of autonomous individuals. In chapter four I 
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examine the development of this idea of an ideal moral/spiritual community in more 
detail. In the early 1760s Kant was thinking of ethics in terms of striving to be a member 
of an ideal spiritual community, and he was conceiving of such a community as a 
community of individuals governed by pneumatic (spiritual) laws. At this stage in his 
development, however, he did not seem to have thought it to be important that these laws 
must be thought of as given by the members of the community. The mature Kant, in 
contrast, conceives of such a community as governed by moral laws and believes that the 
only type of individuals that can really be members of a community are autonomous 
agents. The reason for this is that an individual can only be a member of a unified 
(intelligible) world if the individual itself is the ground (or more precisely if it is the 
concurrent ground) of the intelligible relations between individuals that constitute the 
world, because for a world to be a world it must be unified and the principle (or source) 
of its unity must be intrinsic to the world. And this is only possible if the individuals that 
constitute the world are the source of the unity of the world. Now, what unifies a world, 
and makes the world a world, are the relations (or laws) that hold between its individual 
members. So for a world really to be a world the individual members of the world must 
be the source of the laws that provide the world with its unity. Thus the idea of a member 
of a world is the idea of a being who “gives”, or legislates, the laws of the world. As a 
consequence, the only type of being that has the capacity to be (or become) a member of 
a ‘world’, strictly speaking, is a being that is aware of potential laws and chooses to 
actualize these laws, and this is, by definition, an autonomous agent. 
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PART TWO - METAPHYSICS 
 
In chapter 5 I examine the place of the idea of a world in Kant's theoretical philosophy. I 
explain the status of rational cosmology in both his pre-critical and critical theoretical 
philosophy. Kant is famous for claiming that we can know nothing about the intelligible 
world. When Kant claims that we can know nothing of the intelligible world he is not 
claiming that we can say nothing interesting or useful about our idea of an intelligible 
world. Instead of banishing all metaphysical speculation as meaningless, he merely 
wishes to clarify the epistemic import of such speculation. Such speculation cannot 
provide us with any knowledge. The reason for this is that pure thought, governed by the 
law of non-contradiction, provides us with no criterion of real possibility. The fact that a 
concept does not contain a contradiction merely implies that the concept is thinkable. The 
fact that a concept is thinkable, however, does not imply that there actually is, or even 
could be, an object corresponding to the concept. Thinkability, then, is not an adequate 
criterion for real possibility. This commitment is the basis for Kant’s radical break with 
the rationalist tradition.  For if pure thought provides us with no criteria for real 
possibility we must posit some other, distinct, faculty (the faculty of intuition) that can 
explain how we are able to make such judgments. 
 
In chapter six deals with Kant’s theory of interaction. I place Kant’s account of 
interaction in it’s historical context. By the time Kant began his philosophical career, 
there were three standard theories of interaction: pre-established harmony, occasionalism 
and physical influx or influence. There are various ways of characterizing the difference 
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between these three positions. The simplest is to explain it in terms of a finite substance’s 
responsibility for (internal and external) change. The theory of (physical) influence 
asserts that individuals can cause changes both in themselves and in others – that is, they 
can cause both internal and external change. The theory of occasionalism denies that 
finite substances are the cause of change either in themselves or in others. The theory of 
pre-established harmony asserts that finite substances are the cause of changes in 
themselves, but not in others. In addition, it should be noted that in the early eighteenth 
century the dominant account of ‘physical influx’ involved (as the name suggests) the 
idea of the accidents of one substance ‘flowing into’ another substance. Following Kant I 
refer to this position as the theory of crude physical influence. I argue that Kant, although 
he rejects crude physical influx, can be understood as advocating a version of physical 
influx. 
 
Chapter seven examines Kant’s theory of action. Kant has a problem conceptualizing 
action because, like Leibniz, he is committed to what I call the Principle of Active 
Inherence. According to this principle, an accident (or what Kant refers to as a 
‘determination’) can only truly inhere in or belong to a substance if the substance is the 
active cause or ground of the accident. A determination, then, is only the determination of 
a particular individual if the individual is somehow the ‘ground’ of the determination. I 
have named this doctrine the Principle of Active Inherence.  If we accept the principle of 
active inherence, though, it is not clear how one individual can ever be the cause of any 
change in another individual. If a determination can only be a determination of individual 
b if b is the active ground or cause of the determination, how can another substance ever 
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be the cause of a change in b? Leibniz’s solution was to admit defeat and conclude that 
one substance cannot be the cause of a change in another. Kant’s solution to this problem 
will be to claim that we can understand the idea of an individual being acted upon, 
without appealing to the untenable notion of accidents flowing into the individual, in 
terms of the agent “determining the active power of the substance being acted upon” . 
This account of action does not violate the Principle of Active Inherence, because the 
patient’s determination inheres in the patient because it is a result of the patient’s power. 
This power, however, has been determined by the agent. The model Kant introduces to 
clarify the notion of one individual determining the power of another is that of the 
withdrawal of resistance. Individuals, on this model, already resist one another. And one 
individual substance (the agent) is the ‘cause’ of a change in another individual substance 
(the patient) if the change in the patient is the result of the agent withdrawing its 
resistance. The patient remains, however, essentially active, for the determination is the 
result of its power. Thus each individual is essentially active in that everything that 
happens to a particular individual (everything a particular individual suffers) is the result 
of its own power or potentiality. On this model of action, however, individuals can only 
act upon one another if they are already resisting one another, and Kant argues that 
individual can only resist one another if they are members of a community.  
 
In chapter eight I examine the logical basis of Kant’s idea of community in greater 
detail. The chapter is divided into three sections. In (8a), I examine his account of the 
concept of community, introduced in the table of categories in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. I explain how this category is related to the disjunctive form of judgment and 
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argue that the category of community is the concept of a whole the parts (or 
members) of which mutually exclude one another.  In addition I explain what Kant 
means in claiming that the concept of resistance is a predicable of the category of 
community. This claim, that Kant makes in passing, is often overlooked by 
commentators. However, given the role the concept of resistance plays in his model of 
action examined in chapter seven, this claim is highly significant, for it explains why and 
how Kant believes that action (and interaction) is intelligible. In (8b), I explain how the 
idea of community is to be distinguished from the concept. I begin by examining his 
general account of the distinction between concepts and ideas and I argue that the idea of 
community is distinguishable from the category of community in, at least, three ways: in 
the case of the idea of a community: (i) its parts/members must be logically prior to 
the whole, (ii) its parts/members must be simple (i.e. they cannot themselves have 
parts) and, (iii) it must an absolute whole, in the sense of being a whole that is not 
itself part of any other whole. In (8c), I explain Kant’s distinction between the idea of 
an ideal community and that of a real community. Our idea of a real community is the 
idea of a real as opposed to an ideal whole. This distinction has to do with the nature of 
the unity of the whole. An ideal whole is a whole whose unity exists merely in the mind 
of the observer, say God. A real whole, on the other hand, is a whole whose unity is 
intrinsic to the whole, in the sense that the whole itself is the source of its unity. For 
Kant, a community is unified by inter-substantial laws, where laws are thought of as 
intelligible relations that bind the members of the community together. In the case of an 
ideal community there will be a harmony between the change of state of one substance 
and that of another. An ideal observer could recognize regularities between the change of 
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state of one substance and that of another and could formulate inter-substantial laws to 
capture these regularities. The individual substances themselves, however, are not 
governed by these laws, nor are they the source of the laws, for the laws only exist in the 
mind of the observer, and so although the observer experiences the individuals as a whole 
they are not, in themselves, a whole as there is nothing that unifies them. In a real 
community, on the other hand, the community itself must be the source of the laws. Now, 
as the community just is its members, then the members of the community themselves 
must be the source of the laws that provide the community with its unity. This is why a 
real community must consist of autonomous agents. For an autonomous agent is, by 
definition, an individual that “gives” (i.e. “is the source of”) laws.  
 
In the final chapter, chapter nine, I demonstrate how understanding Kant’s theoretical 
account of community and interaction can help us understand his practical philosophy. I 
do this by showing how Kant’s theoretical understanding of community and interaction 
underlies his theory of property.  
 
I have claimed that Kant argues: (a) An individual a acts upon another individual b if a 
withdraws some impediments which allows a change to occur in b. According to this 
model of action, the patient is the ground of both determinations, but the agent is the 
ground of the change of determinations. (b) Real interaction is only possible between 
members of a real community. And, (c) a real community is only possible if each 
individual member of the community has ‘given’ the laws that unify the community. This 
account of interaction is highly abstract. In chapter eight I offer a concrete illustration. 
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Kant's account of property in the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysical of Morals is 
based upon an analysis of the ideal of “the civil condition” and I will show that Kant 
conceives of the ideal of a “civil condition” as community understood in these terms, and 
that his account of property (and in particular his account of the transferal of property) 
has to be read in the context of his metaphysical analysis of interaction and the idea of 
community. 
 
Recognizing that Kant conceives of the ideal of a civil condition as the idea of a real 
community, derived from the category of community, helps us understand Kant's account 
interactions between individuals involving property. Individuals can interact in two ways 
with regard to property: they can assert rights against one another, and property rights can 
be transferred from one individual to another. In this chapter I examine both kinds of 
interaction involving property, paying particular attention to Kant’s account of the 
transferal of property.  
 
In this concluding chapter I attempt to bring together a number of claims made in the two 
halves of this dissertation. In the first part of the dissertation I argued that the idea of a 
good will or autonomous individual is the idea of a member of an ideal community, and 
that to be virtuous is to strive to be such an individual. In the second part I argued that for 
Kant the pure idea of a community is the idea of a real whole the members (or parts) of 
which are simple and logically prior to the whole and which mutually limit or resist one 
another. I also argued that such resistance is necessary for interaction between 
individuals. In the concluding chapter I argue that Kant believes that our idea of a 
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political community governed by juridical laws (or what Kant often calls the “civil 
condition”) is the idea of a community in this sense. Indeed, I suggest that Kant believes 
that the only way we can conceive of a real community is as a political community. If I 
am right then Kant believes that the idea of a kingdom of ends is the idea of an ideal 
political community, and that to be virtuous is to strive to be a member of such an ideal 
political community. Kant’s moral ideal, then, is the idea of an ideal political community. 
 
If my interpretation is correct it implies a radical re-evaluation of Kant’s ethics, and in 
particular a reevaluation of the relationship between the Doctrine of Right and the 
Doctrine of Virtue. On the standard reading of Kant's moral philosophy his ethics is more 
basic than his ‘political philosophy’. Thus Rosen (1993) remarks that, “for a long time it 
was fashionable to regard Kant's political writings as minor works” (p.1). If I am correct, 
however, Kant's political philosophy stands at the heart of his ethics because the idea of a 
kingdom of ends is, and can only be, conceived of as a political community governed by 
juridical laws. For this reason Kant's ethics is based upon his so called ‘political 
philosophy’, for his doctrine of rights provides his ethics with its content. This is why the 
Doctrine of Right precedes the Doctrine of Virtue, for to be virtuous is to strive to be a 
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influence has been the practice of studying Kant's ethics divorced from his theoretical 
work. I believe that such a divorce has led to an impoverished understanding of Kant's 
ethics.  
 
I reject the claim that Kant is a moral constructivist, instead I maintain that he should be 
understood as a moral idealist. I argue, in contrast to Rawls and his followers, that our 
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moral ideas are theoretical ideas, and that they are independent of, and logically prior to, 
the categorical imperative.2 In particular I argue that the idea of a kingdom of ends is a 
particular theoretical idea, namely the pure idea of a community, which can be traced 
back to the category of community introduced in the table of categories of the Critique of 
Pure Reason.  
 
As a result of this, the idea of a member of a kingdom of ends is also a theoretical idea; it 
is the idea of a member of a community. This theoretical idea, however, presents itself to 
us practically as an ideal, that is as something of extreme value that we should strive to 
instantiate. The categorical imperative is merely the practical recognition by our 
conscience of the theoretical idea (of a member of an ideal community) as an ideal. For 
the categorical imperative commands us to strive to be a member of a kingdom of ends. 
Kant is a moral idealist and, in contrast to the moral constructivist, believes that our 
moral ideas are logically prior to the categorical imperative, for the command “be a 
member of a kingdom of ends!” presupposed that we understand the idea of a kingdom of 
ends. 
 
The moral ideal, then, is the idea of a member of a kingdom of ends. The content of this 
ideal is a theoretical idea that can be understood and analyzed theoretically. The value 
that we place on this idea, however, is purely practical, for however much we analyze 
theoretically the pure idea of a community we will never discover the value that our 
conscience places upon the idea of being a member of a community. However, although 
                                                 
2 And would be logically prior to the CI Procedure if Kant believed there was such a thing. 
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the value our conscience places upon the idea of being a member of a kingdom of ends is 
beyond any understanding, the idea of a kingdom of ends is something that can be fully 
understood theoretically. The bulk of this dissertation will be concerned with justifying 
my interpretation of Kant as a moral idealist, and with explaining Kant's analysis of what 
is involved in the pure idea of a community or kingdom of ends. In addition, I will 
examine the genesis of Kant's belief that morality consists in striving to be a member of 
an ideal community. I will argue that this can be traced back to Kant's engagement with 
Swedenborg, the Swedish spirit-seer, in the early 1760s, for Kant's idea of a kingdom of 
ends is modeled upon Swedenborg’s vision of heaven as a community of spirits in 
interaction. 
 
There is a strong tendency amongst contemporary philosophers to regard ethics as an 
autonomous discipline and what lies behind this tendency is the belief that one can, and 
should, do ethics without engaging with traditional theoretical or metaphysical questions. 
Such beliefs and tendencies are also prevalent in the field of Kant studies, and many Kant 
Scholars believe that we can do Kantian ethics without reference to his theoretical works. 
One of the primary goals of arguing that Kant should be understood as a moral idealist is 
to combat this tendency.  
 
I maintain, then, that, for Kant to be virtuous is to strive to be a member of an ideal 
community, and I will argue that Kant believes that if we examine our pure idea of a 
community we will discover that the only way we can conceive of a member of a 
community is as an autonomous individual. This is why, for Kant, to be moral (or 
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virtuous) is to strive to be an autonomous individual. We possess, he believes, the pure 
idea of what it is to be such an individual, and to be virtuous is to make this idea the 
object of our will, or what Kant calls our faculty of desire. The fact that Kant believes 
that to be moral involves making a particular pure idea the object of our faculty of desire, 
suggests a role for traditional metaphysical inquiry beyond that of mere conceptual game 
playing. For, insofar as a pure idea is to serve as a guide for our conduct it is important 
that we grasp the idea clearly. In the first few sections of this chapter I will attempt to 
justify my claim that, for Kant, the idea of a good will is a theoretical idea, logically 
independent and prior to the categorical imperative, and that Kant's primary task in the 
Groundwork is to analyze this idea. 
 
It is not immediately apparent what value such a theoretical analysis of or moral ideas 
actually has, for Kant, in contrast to intellectualists such as Wolff and Baumgarten, 
believes that we do not need to have a clear understanding of the moral ideal in order to 
act ethically. He believes that even the pre-philosophical individual, with an obscure 
(theoretical) understanding is perfectly capable of acting morally. A clearer theoretical 
understanding of the idea of a member of a kingdom of ends does not effect how this idea 
appears to our conscience as an ideal. In the final section of this chapter I will attempt to 
explain why Kant believes that theoretical clarification of the idea of a good will is of 
practical significance.  
 
Kant wishes to steer a middle path between intellectualism and voluntarism. The 
intellectualist believes that the good is irresistible and that we always act under the aspect 
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of the good. As a consequence of this he believes that all immoral behavior is a result of a 
false (theoretical) understanding of what constitutes the good. The voluntarist, in contrast 
believes that we can freely choose either the good or the bad. Kant agrees with the 
intellectualist that the good is irresistible, but he also agrees with the voluntarist that 
choosing the bad is the result of free choice and not faulty understanding, for we can 
(theoretically) understand the right thing to do and yet freely choose not to do it. On the 
face of it, these two commitments seem incompatible. Kant's answer is that that although 
the good is irresistible, in so far as we pay attention to it, we are free to not pay attention. 
To understand what Kant could mean by this we must examine his account of conscience. 
For Kant, the conscience is like a court and the voice (or judge) of conscience is our 
practical awareness of the value of the (theoretical) idea of being a member of a kingdom 
of ends. The voice of conscience, then, commands us to strive to be a member of an 
(ideal) kingdom of ends. This voice is like that of a siren, for, insofar as we listen to it, it 
is irresistible. Our freedom (in the negative sense) consists in the fact that we can refuse 
to listen to this voice. We can try to plug our ears, or to drown out its call by focusing our 
attention on other competing voices. For the court of conscience resembles a court, not 
only by having a judge, but also in the fact that there is a defense attorney. The defense 
attorney in the court of conscience is, Kant believes, like an internal voice that competes 
with the voice of the judge for our attention in the court of conscience, and it does this by 
constantly offering excuses. Immorality is, Kant believes, the result of freely choosing to 
listen to the voice of the defense attorney rather than the voice of the judge. 
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This model of the conscience helps us understand the value of moral philosophy. The 
purpose of moral philosophy is to clarify our moral ideas theoretically. Such theoretical 
clarification is not necessary for morality; we do not need to do philosophy, or listen to 
moral philosophers, in order to be virtuous. To be virtuous, all we need to do is pay 
attention to the voice of conscience. Engaging in moral philosophy, however, can make 
such attentiveness easier. For Kant believes that (theoretical) clarification of the idea of a 
good will, “makes it shine forth more brilliantly”; such clarification makes the idea more 
noticeable and easier to pay attention to. Such clarification, in effect, amplifies the voice 
of the judge in the court of conscience, and makes it harder for us to be distracted by 
competing voices. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, such conceptual 
clarification can help us quiet the voice of the defense attorney. This voice, Kant 
believes, offers excuses and these excuses are the product of theoretical reasoning. For 
example, the voice of the defense attorney tells us that it is either physically or logically 
impossible (for us) to be truly autonomous. A clearer theoretical understanding of the 
idea of an autonomous individual makes it harder for us to give ourselves excuses for not 
living up to this ideal; engaging in such clarification quiets the voice of the defense 
attorney, and in so doing makes it easier for us to listen to the voice of the judge. 
 
In his pre-critical period, Kant was attempting to develop a monadology, but, unlike 
Leibniz, one in which there was real interaction. By the mid 1770s he had come to realize 
that such metaphysical speculation could not provide us with knowledge or cognition. He 
did not, however, abandon such speculation, for although such metaphysical speculation 
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cannot provide us with a picture of the way the world is in itself, it can provide us with an 
‘image’ of what we can become.  
 
I maintain, then, that Kant should be understood to be a moral idealist. On this 
interpretation, the idea of a kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, namely the idea of a 
community of individuals in real interaction, and this idea is derived from the category of 
community, the third category of relation of the table of categories of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. An analysis of the idea of community reveals that the only way we can conceive 
of a member of a community is as an autonomous individual, for each individual member 
of a community must be the source of the laws that provide the community with its unity. 
This (theoretical) idea of being an individual member of a community (or, what amounts 
to the same thing, an autonomous individual) presents itself to our conscience as an ideal, 
as something of supreme value that we should strive to instantiate. Although the content 
of the idea of a kingdom of ends is purely theoretical, the value we place on the idea of 
being a member of such a community is purely practical, and no amount of theoretical 
analysis will ever reveal the importance our conscience places on striving to be a 
potential member of a kingdom of ends. Its value is, quite literally, unintelligible.  
 
In this chapter I shall focus upon explaining and justifying two claims: firstly, that Kant 
should be understood as a moral idealist and, secondly, that, for Kant, the primary 
function of moral philosophy is to arrive at a clearer theoretical understanding of what it 
is we are striving to be insofar as we recognize the demands of morality.  
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In section one I compare my approach with that of Rawls and his followers who argue 
that Kant should be understood to be a moral constructivist. The moral constructivists 
argue that our moral ideas, including the idea of a kingdom of ends, are practical (as 
opposed to theoretical) ideas that are constructed on the basis of a practically rational 
procedure. In section two I explain my interpretation of Kant’s strategy in the 
Groundwork. In opposition to the moral constructivists, who argue that Kant’s strategy in 
the Groundwork is to discover the implicit procedure of practical rationality (the “CI-
procedure”) and then show how the idea of a kingdom of ends can be constructed by 
means of this procedure, I argue that Kant’s goal in the Groundwork is to arrive at a 
clearer theoretical understanding of what it is that our conscience demands that we 
become, and that his strategy is to begin by examining our pre-philosophical moral 
intuitions to show that what the person who listens to their conscience is striving to be is 
a member of an ideal community. Such a person does not necessarily understand 
theoretically that this is what they are doing, and Kant's goal in the Groundwork is to 
provide such a person with a clearer theoretical understanding of what they are 
attempting to be when they listen to the judgment of their conscience. In section three I 
explain Kant’s account of the relationship between the notions of virtue and holiness. I 
argue that Kant believes that it is our duty to be holy, and that to be virtuous is, by 
definition, to strive to be holy. Given Kant’s belief that ought implies can, the fact that 
we have a duty to be holy implies that it is possible for us to be holy. I explain how the 
postulates of practical reason introduced in the Critique of Practical Reason are intended 
to explain this possibility. In section four I examine Kant’s disagreements with Wolff 
and Baumgarten, two of his rationalist predecessors who advocated a rationalist and 
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perfectionist morality. I argue that Kant himself should be understood as being both a 
rationalist and a perfectionist, and that what he objects to is their formalistic formulation 
of rationalism and perfectionism, and I suggest that he would reject moral constructivism 
on similar grounds. In section five I examine a number of passages in the Critique of 
Practical Reason that seem to offer support for a moral constructivist reading of Kant. In 
particular Kant, famously, insists that it is “the moral law that first determines and makes 
possible the concept of the Good” (5:64). I argue that these passages do not have the 
implications they seem to have at first sight, for after making such remarks, Kant makes 
it clear that this priority is merely methodological and not ontological, for he believes that 
although the categorical imperative is the ratio cognoscendi of the idea of being a 
member of a kingdom of ends, the idea of being a member of a kingdom of ends is the 
ratio essendi of the categorical imperative. 
 
In section six, the final section of the chapter, I examine Kant’s account of the value of 
engaging in moral philosophy.  Kant is not an intellectualist, for he believes that to be 
virtuous all we have to do is listen to our conscience, so a clearer theoretical 
understanding of what our conscience demands of us is not necessary in order to be 
moral. Given his rejection of intellectualism, however, it is not immediately clear why 
arriving at a clearer theoretical understanding of what morality demands has any practical 
value. I argue that the theoretical clarification that moral philosophy provides has 
motivational benefits. The reason for this is because immorality is always the result of 
choosing not to listen to the judgment of our conscience, and this happens, Kant believes, 
when we listen to excuses for not living up to the moral ideal, and these excuses are 
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themselves the product of theoretical speculation. A clearer theoretical understanding of 
the moral ideal will not, in itself, make us more moral, but it will make it harder for us to 
give ourselves excuses for not living up to the ideal. Engaging is moral philosophy, then, 
quietens the excuse giving voice, the voice of the defense attorney in the court of 
conscience, which makes it easier for us to be attentive to the voice of the judgement of 
conscience. 
 
(1a) Moral Constructivism & Moral Idealism 
 
In his influential paper, “Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy”, Rawls (1993) argues that, 
for Kant “the basic moral concepts of the right and the good, and the moral worth of 
persons, are not analyzable in terms of non-moral concepts” (p.303). According, to 
Rawls, then, our basic moral concepts are not theoretical concepts. Instead he argues that 
Kant should be understood to be a moral constructivist. According to this interpretation, 
moral concepts, including the idea of a member of a kingdom of ends, are not theoretical 
ideas, but practical ideas that are constructed by practical reason. “Practical reason” 
Rawls (2000) argues, “constructs for the will its own object out of itself” (p.230). To 
reason practically is to implicitly follow a certain procedure, and Rawls calls this 
procedure the Categorical Imperative (CI) Procedure, and he maintains that (at least some 
of) our moral ideas are produced by means of this procedure. 
 
Although Rawls is famous for advocating moral constructivism, he has indicated, 
especially in his more recent work, that he believes that certain fundamental moral ideas 
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are not constructed. For example, in Political Liberalism he argues that “the conceptions 
of society and person as ideas of reason are not, certainly, constructed any more than the 
principles of practical reason are constructed” (p.108). A number of his followers, most 
notably Korsgaard, however, have explicitly argued for moral constructivism “all the way 
down”, believing that all of our moral ideas are constructed by practical reason. Although 
Rawls himself places limits on his own constructivism, he himself is at the very least 
committed to the view that, for Kant, the idea of a kingdom of ends is constructed. Thus, 
he argues in his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (2000) that, 
The realm of ends is an (ideal) object – a social world – the moral 
constitution and regulation of which is specified by the totality of precepts 
that meet the test of the CI-procedure (when these precepts are adjusted 
and coordinated by the requirement of complete determination). (p.225)3 
 
According to the moral constructivists, then, the idea of a kingdom of ends cannot be 
defined independently of the CI-procedure. The notion of a moral world is, by definition, 
the idea of a world that satisfies the requirements of the CI-procedure, and this formal 
procedure is logically and definitionally prior to the idea of a kingdom of ends. 
Accordingly, Kant's primary aim in the Groundwork is to clarify what is involved in this 
procedure. When I criticize moral constructivist interpretations of Kant in this paper, my 
objections are primarily directed towards the “all the way down” constructivism of some 
of his followers, such as Korsgaard, and my arguments in this paper do not rule out the 
possibility that Kant believes that some of our, less central, moral concepts may be 
                                                 
3 Or, as Rawls (1993) explains it in ‘Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, the realm of ends “is simply the 
social world that would come about (at least under favorable conditions) if everyone were to follow the 
totality of precepts that result from the correct application of the CI-procedure”  (p.301). 
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constructed.4 I do, however, reject Rawls’  claim that our idea of a kingdom of ends is, 
itself, constructed.5 
 
In claiming that Kant should be understood as a moral idealist I argue, in opposition to 
the moral constructivists, that our fundamental moral ideas, including the idea of a 
kingdom of ends, are independent of, and logically prior to, the notion of the categorical 
imperative or that of a CI-procedure. The categorical imperative demands that we strive 
to be a member of a kingdom of ends, and so the notion of the categorical imperative is 
definitionally dependent upon the idea of a kingdom of ends. Any theoretical 
understanding of the categorical imperative presupposes an understanding of the idea of a 
kingdom of ends. 
 
One of the reasons for rejecting moral constructivism, especially the “all the way down 
constructivism” of Korsgaard, is that such a position makes it difficult to explain the 
unity of theoretical and practical reason. For, according to the moral constructivist, 
                                                 
4 Although, ultimately, I am unsympathetic to any interpretation of Kant that suggests that moral ideas are 
constructed procedurally. The reason for this is because I believe that there is no such thing as the CI 
procedure. Instead of identifying a certain procedure, the first formulation of the categorical imperative 
identifies a certain capacity. As beings with what Kant calls a predisposition to morality, we must possess 
the capacity to “give” universal laws. On this interpretation, to be practically rational (that is, to obey the 
categorical imperative) is not to follow a certain procedure (the CI procedure), but to realize a certain 
capacity (the capacity to “give” universal laws). 
5 As we have seen, Rawls argues in Political Liberalism that the idea of “society” is not morally 
constructed, however he argues in his Lectures that the idea of a “realm [kingdom] of ends” is constructed. 
I agree with Rawls that our idea of society is not constructed, however  I believe that, for Kant, the idea of a 
kingdom of ends just is the a priori theoretical idea of society, or what he calls community. Onora O’Neill 
(2003), argues that what distinguishes Rawls’ account of justice from Kant’s is that, “Kant’s public is not 
the Rawlsian public, consisting only of fellow citizens in a bounded, liberal democratic society: it is 
unrestricted. Hence, Kant’s conception of ethical method takes a cosmopolitan rather than an implicitly 
statist view of the scope of the ethical concern” (p.362). I suggest that the basis of this disagreement is that 
Kant identifies the idea of a kingdom of ends with our (unconstructed) theoretical idea of society (in 
general) whereas Rawls distinguishes between these two ideas 
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practical and theoretical reason are two distinct faculties governed by distinct procedures. 
At the very least the moral constructivist needs to give some account to explain why we 
are justified in calling both of these faculties reason. On my interpretation, in contrast, 
there is only one faculty of reason, the faculty Kant discusses in the Transcendental 
Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. The objects (or products) of this faculty are the 
ideas of pure reason, and these ideas can have either a theoretical or a practical 
application. They can be applied theoretically to our faculty of intuition, and practically 
to our faculty of volition, or what Kant himself calls the faculty of desire or will. Both the 
human faculty of intuition and the human faculty of volition have a certain subjective 
form. The form of our faculty of intuition is space/time. The subjective form of our 
faculty of desire is act upon maxims. Theoretically, the ideas of pure reason can have 
only a regulative use, for no objects can be given in intuition, in space or time, 
corresponding to these ideas. Practically, however, these ideas can have a constitutive 
application, for ideas of pure reason, although they cannot be objects of intuition, can be 
objects of volition, for an idea of pure reason can be the object of a maxim. In particular, 
I can make it my fundamental maxim to be a member of a community.. On my 
interpretation, then, practical rationality is not, as the moral constructivists argue, to be 
defined procedurally; rather, one is practically rational if one chooses to make an idea of 
pure reason the object of one’s volition. This is what one does if one listens to ones 
conscience and chooses to be a member of a kingdom of ends. 
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Kant frequently stresses his moral idealism. For example, in lectures on ethics from 1785, 
a lecture course given around the time of the publication of the Groundwork he explains 
that, 
to expound morality in its full purity is to set forth an Idea of practical 
reason. Such Ideas are not chimeras, for they constitute the guideline to 
which we must constantly approach. . . We have to possess a yardstick by 
which to estimate our moral worth, and know the degree to which we are 
faulty and deficient. . . An ideal is the representation of a single thing, in 
which we depict such an idea to ourself in concreto. All ideals are fictions. 
We attempt, in concreto, to envisage a being that is congruent with the 
idea. In the ideal we turn the ideas into a model. . . The ideal is a 
prototypon of morality. (Ethik Mrongovius, 29:604-5)6 
  
 
Here Kant makes it clear that morality demands that we strive to instantiate an idea. The 
reason for this is that we need some yardstick by which to estimate our moral worth, and 
the only thing that can adequately fulfill this function is an idea that can serve as a model 
or prototype. In this passage, Kant refers to this idea as an idea of practical reason. I 
claim that what Kant here calls an idea of practical reason is, in fact, a theoretical idea 
that is derived from the table of categories. Textual support for such an interpretation is 
provided in the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason.  
 
In the Dialectic, Kant introduces the three ideas of practical reason: the “ideas of God, of 
an intelligible world (the kingdom of God), and of immortality” (5:137), and he makes it 
                                                 
6 In other lectures he argues that the moral ideal, the yardstick by which we estimate our moral worth, is the 
idea of an ideal man. And he explains that “we conceive of man first of all as an ideal, as he ought to be 
and can be, merely according to reason, and call this Idea homo noumenon; this being is thought of in 
relation to another, as though the later were restrained by him; this is man in the state if sensibility, who is 
called homo phenomenon. The latter is the person, and the former merely a personified idea; there, man is 
simply under the moral law, but here he is a phenomenon, affected by the feelings of pleasure and pain, and 
must be coerced by the noumenon into the performance of duty” (Ethik Vigilantius, 27:593). 
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quite clear that these practical ideas are the products of pure reason, being derived from 
the table of categories. As such it is clear that they should not be understood as the 
product of some distinct faculty of practical reason. For example, in the course of 
introducing these three ideas, Kant argues that,  
Every use of reason with respect to an object requires pure concepts of the 
understanding (categories), without which no object can be thought. These 
can be applied for the theoretical use of reason, that is, for cognition of 
that kind, only insofar as intuition (which is always sensible) is also put 
under them, and therefore merely in order to represent by means of them 
an object of possible experience. But here [i.e. in the critique of practical 
reason] ideas of reason, which cannot be given in any experience at all, 
are what I would have to think by means of categories in order to cognize 
an object.  Here, however, our concern with these ideas is not for the sake 
of theoretical cognition of their objects but only with whether they have 
objects at all. Pure practical reason provides this reality, and theoretical 
reason has nothing further to do in this than merely to think those 
objects through categories, and this, as we have elsewhere clearly 
shown, can be done quite well without needing intuition (whether sensible 
or supersensible) because the categories have their seat and origin in 
the pure understanding solely as the faculty of thinking, 
independently of and prior to any intuition, and they always signify 




Here Kant makes it explicit that our moral ideas are thought by theoretical reason through 
the categories and are not the product of some distinct faculty of practical reason.7 In 
addition, I argue that the second of these ideas, the idea of “an intelligible world (the 
kingdom of God)” is to be identified with the idea of a kingdom of ends. Support for this 
                                                 
7 I agree, then, with Brandt (1995) that, “whatever metamorphoses [his] other doctrines undergo, Kant 
never doubts the categories and thus the table of judgments as the foundation of his system as a whole. . . 
All critique, transcendental philosophy, and metaphysics (of morals and of nature) has its foundation in the 
table of judgments” (p.1). I will argue that the moral notion of an autonomous agent is the idea of a 
member of an intelligible world, and that Kant conceives of such a world as a community. Community is, 
Kant argues, the third category of relations, and so we should be able to explain our idea of autonomy in 
terms of this category and the corresponding (disjunctive) form of judgment. I will attempt to do this in 
chapter 8. 
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interpretation is provided by the fact that Kant parenthetically identifies the idea of an 
intelligible world with “the kingdom of God”  [“dem Reiche Gottes”], a phrase that he 
normally treats as equivalent to “the kingdom of ends”.8 
 
Elsewhere in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant identifies these three ideas as the 
ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. Kant, then, seems to regard the idea of freedom 
and the idea of the intelligible world as interchangeable. The reason for this is because 
Kant believes that our idea of an intelligible world is, by definition, the idea of a 
community9, and he is committed to the view that the idea of a member of a community 
can only be the idea of a free (i.e. autonomous) individual. A defense of this claim is 
beyond the scope of this paper. I mention it now, however, because there will be 
occasions in this paper when my interpretation rests upon assuming this identification. 
 
(1b) Kant's Strategy in the Groundwork  
  
There has been much debate amongst Kant scholars about the relationship between the 
three formulations of the categorical imperative introduced in Groundwork II. Rawls and 
his followers stress the first formulation, the formula of universal law. Other 
commentators, most notably Wood and Guyer, stress the second formulation, the formula 
of humanity. I argue that the third formulation is primary, that Kant believes that it is our 
                                                 
8 Elsewhere I offer a fuller defense of this claim, offering textual evidence from the Cosmology sections of 
his lectures on metaphysics. 
9 For textual evidence for the claim that Kant identifies the idea of an intelligible world with that of a 
community, see: 28:657, 29:851-3, 28:196, 28: 581-2, 28:45, 29:868 & 29:1006-7. In these passages Kant 
distinguishes between our idea of a world and that of a mere multitude and argues that our idea of a world 
is the idea of a multitude of individuals in community with one another. 
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duty to be a member of a kingdom of ends, and that the virtuous person is striving to be a 
member of such a kingdom. However, although the virtuous person is striving to be a 
member of such a kingdom, she does not necessarily understand, theoretically, that this is 
what she is doing. The strategy of the Groundwork is to provide such an individual with 
the theoretical understanding of what they are trying to do. In terms of a theoretical 
understanding of what duty demands, the third formulation is primary. 
Phenomenologically, however, the first formulation is primary, for Kant believes that 
even the philosophically uneducated can recognize that they have a duty to only act upon 
maxims that can be universalized, although they do not understand (theoretically) that the 
reason this is important to them is because they recognize the value of being a member of 
an ideal community. 
 
The following analogy might help to clarify my account of Kant's goal and strategy in the 
Groundwork: A professor issues the following command to one of his students: “Shane! 
Pay thirty-five dollars and sign here!” The student can follow this order without really 
understanding what he has been ordered to do. Later, however, perhaps after discussing 
the matter with his roommate, he might come to understand that he has been ordered to 
join the American Philosophical Association. The student is immediately aware that he 
has been ordered to sign a piece of paper, just as the common human understanding is 
immediately aware that she should only act on maxims that can be universalized.  When 
the student realizes that he has been ordered to join the APA, he has a clearer theoretical 
understanding of what he has just been ordered to do. The virtuous individual who listens 
to their conscience, and who only acts upon maxims that can be universalized is, so to 
speak, applying to join a kingdom of ends, without necessarily understanding 
theoretically that this is what they are attempting to do. Kant’s goal in the Groundwork is 
to provide the common human understanding with such a theoretical understanding.  
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Instead of attempting to discover which actions are right, Kant's primary aim in the 
Groundwork, then, is to explain what it is that a virtuous human being (that is, one 
motivated by duty) is striving to be. And he begins by examining the moral 
consciousness of the pre-philosophical individual. Such an individual recognizes that she 
should only act upon maxims that can be universalized. At the start of Groundwork I, 
Kant explains his objective. He writes that, 
We have, then, to explicate (entwickeln) the concept of a will that is to be 
esteemed in itself and that is good apart from any other purpose, as it 
already dwells in natural sound understanding and needs not so much 
to be taught as only to be clarified – this concept that always takes first 
place in estimating the total worth of our actions and constitutes the 
condition of all the rest. In order to do so, we shall set before ourselves the 
concept of duty, which contains that of a good will though under certain 
subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from 
concealing it and making it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast 
and make it shine forth all the more brightly. (4:397 – my bolding) 
 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that we already possess the concept of a good will and that this 
concept dwells in natural sound understanding, and that what Kant proposes to do in the 
Groundwork is to explicate and to clarify this concept. The conclusion he will reach at 
the end of Groundwork II is that the concept of a good will is the (theoretical) idea of a 
member of a community, and that this is equivalent to the idea of an autonomous 
individual. In claiming that the concept of a good will “already dwells in natural sound 
understanding” he means that the concept of a good will is a theoretical idea that can be 
understood theoretically. The concepts of duty “contains that of a good will” because it is 
our duty to be a good will, for when we understand the CI we understand that it is our 
duty to strive to be a member of an ideal kingdom of ends. The aim of the Groundwork, 
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then, cannot be to teach us this ideal, for it is an idea that we are already aware of, albeit 
obscurely. Instead, the aim of the Groundwork is to explicate and clarify this concept. 
Kant is more explicit about this in the Metaphysics of Morals, where he writes that 
no moral principle is based, as people sometimes suppose, on any feeling 
whatsoever. Any such principle is really an obscurely thought metaphysics 
that is inherent in every human being because of his rational 
predisposition, as a teacher will readily grant if he experiments in 
questioning his pupil socratically about the imperative of duty and its 
application to moral appraisal of his actions. The way the teacher 
presents this (his technique) should not always be metaphysical nor his 
terms scholastic, unless he wants to train his pupil as a philosopher. 
But his thought must go all the way back to the elements of metaphysics, 
without which no certitude or purity can be expected in the doctrine of 
virtue, nor indeed any moving force. (6:376) 
 
 
To teach ethics is to clarify an obscure metaphysics, and to do it philosophically involves 
doing it in scholastic terms. Although Kant's ultimate aim in the Groundwork is to clarify 
the idea of a good will, he begins with an examination of the concept of duty, which will 
somehow help us clarify the concept of a good will. For Kant believes that the pre-
philosophical consciousness of one’s duty is a subjective, felt consciousness of the moral 
ideal. The consciousness of duty or obligation is a consciousness that has a certain idea as 
its object. Thus, if we want to clarify what is involved in this idea we must start by 
examining our consciousness of duty, for it is an (obscure) consciousness of the idea.  
  
Our subjective consciousness of the categorical imperative, then, is the way the 
(theoretical) idea of a good will (that is, idea of an autonomous individual or a member of 
kingdom of ends) subjectively presents itself to our conscience. The categorical 
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imperative, then, is based upon a subjective and obscure consciousness of the pure idea of 
a good will. Kant’s aim in examining this consciousness of obligation, then, is to ‘clarify’ 
what is involved in the pure idea of a good will. Our common moral judgments are 
always based upon an obscure representation of duty. Most people couldn’t explain what 
is involved in the idea of duty, but they know how to act upon it. In Groundwork I & II 
Kant investigates our subjective consciousness of duty. The formulations of the 
categorical imperative are attempts to provide the reader with a clearer understanding of 
what is involved in the concept of duty. This clarification of what is involved in duty, 
however, is not, in itself, the aim of the Groundwork. Duty itself has an object, and this, 
ultimately, is what Kant is interested in. It is our duty to choose to be a particular type of 
being. Our obscure consciousness of duty involves an obscure consciousness of the type 
of being we have a duty to choose to be. To clarify our consciousness of the concept of 
duty is to clarify our concept of this being, until it shines forth as the idea of a member of 
the intelligible world. 
 
What does it mean for a concept to be obscure? 
 
Kant explains that his task in the Groundwork is to “explicate” and “clarify” the concept 
of a good will (4:397). To ‘clarify’ a concept is to move from an obscure to a clear 
understanding. ‘Explication’ is the (or at least a) way to clarify a concept, for to 
‘explicate’ a concept is to make facts that are analytically true of the concept explicit.10 
                                                 
10 In his Jäsche Logic Kant distinguishes between two different types of identity in analytic judgments.  
The identity can either be ‘explicit’ or ‘implicit’. If the identity is ‘explicit’ then the analytic judgment is 
tautological and as a result is ‘empty’ or ‘fruitless’. For example, ‘a dog is a dog’ is tautological for the 
identity between the concept ‘dog’ and ‘dog’ is clear to everyone. “Propositions that are identical implicite, 
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That is, to explicate a concept is to become conscious of propositions which are 
analytically true of a concept but which we were previously not conscious of. Now, it is 
only possible not to be conscious of an analytic truth concerning a particular concept if 
we actually possess the concept but do not clearly see all the ‘marks’ of the concept. That 
is, for explication of a concept to be possible we must possess the concept, but our 
awareness of it must be obscure. In the process of explication then, an obscure concept 
becomes clearer. Kant explains the distinction between clarity and obscurity in the Jäsche 
Logic. He explains it in the following terms: 
In every cognition we must distinguish matter, i.e. the object, and form, 
i.e. the way in which we cognize the object. If a savage sees a house from 
a distance, for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he 
admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as 
someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling 
establishment for men. But as to the form, this cognition of one and the 
same object is different in the two. With one it is mere intuition, with the 
other it is intuition and concept at the same time. // The difference in the 
form of cognition rests on a condition that accompanies all cognition, on 
consciousness. If I am conscious of the representation, it is clear; if I am 
not conscious of it, obscure. (9:34) 
 
 
The ‘savage’, then, sees something when he looks at the house, but his consciousness (of 
the form) of the house is obscure because he has no concept of a house. He intuits the 
matter of the house but does not understand its form. In claiming that our idea of a good 
will needs to be ‘clarified’ Kant suggests that our pre-philosophical consciousness of the 
idea of a good will is analogous to the ‘savage’s’ awareness of the house. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
on the other hand, are not empty of consequences or fruitless, for they make clear the predicate that lay 
undeveloped (implicite) in the concept of the subject through explication (explicatio)” (9:111). 
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Kant has something like the following analogy in mind. In having the consciousness of 
duty we all, so to say, practically ‘intuit’ the pure idea of a good will, but this is not the 
same as to possess a clear theoretical understanding of the idea.11 Kant begins the 
Groundwork from the perspective of innocent popular moral consciousness, and such a 
consciousness involves a consciousness of the pure idea of a good will in the same way 
that a ‘savage’ is conscious of a house. The ‘savage’ can recognize the house, and is able 
to identify and reidentify it, and could presumably find his way there, but he does not 
know what it is.  Analogously the ‘moral savage’, or the common human understanding, 
can recognize the concept of a good will but does not really know what the idea of a good 
will is an idea of. The morality of the innocent common human understanding which 
bases its ethics on the obscure consciousness of duty and obligation, and which is Kant’s 
subject in Groundwork I, has, then, a similar relationship to the pure idea of a good will 
as the ‘savage’ has to the house. To provide a ‘savage’ with clarity would be to teach him 
the concept ‘house’. To bring clarity to the common human understanding, then, involves 
teaching such an understanding the pure concept of a good will. This involves changing 
the consciousness of the idea of a good will from an obscure consciousness into a true 
understanding. 
 
(1c) Virtue and Holiness 
 
Kant distinguishes between the ideas of virtue and holiness and argues that it is our duty 
to be holy. I argue that the idea (of a good will) that Kant wishes to ‘explicate’ in the 
                                                 
11 As we have seen, I suggest that there are certain structural similarities between our faculty of intuition 
and our faculty of volition. Both have ‘objects’ and both have a certain subjective, human form. 
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Groundwork is the idea of a holy will, and his conclusion is that the idea of a holy will is 
the idea of an autonomous individual. To be virtuous is to strive to be such an 
individual.12  
 
The idea of a holy will is the idea of a non-sensible and non-sensuous individual. As the 
idea of a non-sensible individual it is the idea of an intelligible individual, that is, it is the 
idea of an individual in so far as it is thought of as not a (possible) object of spatio-
temporal intuition. It is an idea of a non-sensuous individual in the sense that it is the idea 
of a being that is not motivated by sensuous needs. It is the idea of a being that is not 
necessitated. For in thinking of such an ideal being, we are conceiving  a being for whom 
morality is not a matter of demands, or imperatives, for such a being has no needs 
conflicting with laws of the community it is a member of; such a being wills these laws 
gladly. 
  
In the Groundwork and elsewhere, Kant makes it clear that the idea of a good will, the 
practical ideal he wishes to analyze in the Groundwork, is the idea of a holy will and not 
that of a virtuous will. Thus, in the Metaphysics of Morals, he argues that, 
Virtue so shines as an ideal that it seems, by human standards to eclipse 
holiness itself, which is never tempted to break the law. Nevertheless, this 
is an illusion arising from the fact that, having no way to measure the 
degree of a strength except by the magnitude of the obstacles it could 
overcome. . . we are led to mistake the subjective conditions by which we 
                                                 
12 Kant famously begins Groundwork I with the claim that, “[i]t is impossible to think of anything at all in 
the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will” 
(4:393). It is my contention that the idea of a good will (i.e. the idea of an autonomous being or member of 
a kingdom of ends) is the idea of a holy will, and to be virtuous is to strive to be holy. One could say that 
the moral constructivist believes that virtue is logically prior to holiness, for we can define holiness as: 
“that what a virtuous individual strives to be”. The moral idealist believes that the idea of holiness is 
logically prior to virtue, for a virtuous individual is defined as: “an individual who strives to be holy”. 
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assess the magnitude for the objective conditions of the magnitude itself. 
(6:397) 
 
Similarly, in Groundwork II, Kant argues that, 
A perfectly good will would. . . equally stand under objective laws (of the 
good), but it could not on this account be represented as necessitated to 
actions in conformity with law, since of itself, by its subjective 
constitution, it can be determined only through the representation of the 
good. Hence no imperatives hold for the divine will and in general for a 
holy will: the “ought” is out of place here, because volition is of itself 
necessarily in accord with the law. Therefore imperatives are only 
formulae expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to 
the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, for 
example, of the human will. (4:414) 
 
Here Kant makes it quite clear that the idea of a good will is the idea of a holy will and 
not the idea of a virtuous human will that is “necessitated” and acts out of duty.13 The 
idea (of a good will), then, that Kant wishes to explicate in the Groundwork is not the 
idea of a (human) being that acts out of duty and obeys imperatives. In the Groundwork, 
Kant is attempting to provide the foundations for the analysis of the idea of such a holy 
individual, for he believes that the idea of such a holy will is an ideal which must serve, 
as we have seen, as a yardstick by which we can judge our own moral worth. 
  
We can find passages in which Kant seems to give priority to the idea of virtue rather 
than that of holiness. For example, in the Critique of Practical Reason he argues that, 
                                                 
13 Further evidence for this is provided in his lectures from the early 1790s. In these lectures he argues that 
we have the idea of what it is to be a human being within us, and he argues that “humanity itself, if we 
wished to personify it, actually lacks any inclination to evil, but the more a man compares himself 
therewith, the more he finds out how far away he is from it” (Ethik Vigilantius, 27:609). As we have seen, 
the idea of a being that lacks any inclination to evil is a holy being. As we shall see in the following 
chapter, Kant often refers to the moral ideal as the idea of humanity personified. This passage should make 
it clear that our idea of ‘humanity personified’ is the idea of what he calls a holy being. 
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The moral level on which a human being (and, as far as we can see, every 
rational creature as well) stands is respect for the moral law. The 
disposition incumbent upon him to have in observing it is to do so from 
duty, not from voluntary liking nor even from an endeavor he undertakes 
unbidden, gladly and of his own accord; and his proper moral condition, in 
which he can always be, is virtue, that is, a moral disposition in conflict, 
and not holiness in the supposed possession of a complete purity of 
dispositions of the will. (5:84) 
  
 
Here Kant seems to suggest that it is “incumbent upon us” to try to be virtuous and not 
holy. This seems to undermine my claim that the idea of a good will is the idea of a holy 
will. Here Kant seems to suggest that holiness is not even something we should strive for. 
However, this suggestion is uncharacteristic. Indeed, on the previous page Kant argued 
that 
That law of all laws. . . like all moral precepts of the Gospel, presents the 
moral disposition in its complete perfection, in such a way that as an ideal 
of holiness it is not attainable by any creature but is yet the archetype 
which we should strive to approach and resemble in an uninterrupted but 
endless progress. (5:83) 
 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that the moral ideal is the idea of being holy, which suggests 
that the moral law, or categorical imperative, commands us to strive towards holiness.14 
Indeed, the moral law cannot command us: be virtuous! For, as Kant argues in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, “virtue itself, or possession of it, is not a duty (for then we would 
have to be put under obligation to duties)” (6:405). Instead, Kant believes that to be 
virtuous is to strive towards holiness and that another formulation of the categorical 
                                                 
14 And he adds that, “if a rational creature could reach the stage of thoroughly liking to fulfill all moral laws 
he would have achieved this ideal” (5:83). 
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imperative is: be holy! I believe that this is Kant's considered position. He makes it clear 
that this is his position in the ethics lectures he delivered at the time he was working on 
the Groundwork. In these lectures he proclaims that, 
The ideal of the gospels has the greatest moral purity. The ancients had no 
greater moral perfection than that which could come from the nature of 
man, but since this was very defective, their moral laws were also 
defective. . . The principles of morality are [in Christianity] presented in 
their holiness, and now the command [i.e. Imperative] is: You are to be 
holy. (Ethik Collins, 27:252 – my emphasis) 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that it is his belief that it is our duty to be holy.15 Similar 
passages are not hard to find.16    
 
The duty to be holy, “ought implies can” and the postulates of practical reason 
 
In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant introduces two postulates of practical reason. He 
argues that, for practical reasons, we must assume our immortality and the existence of 
God. The reason we must make these assumptions is because we have a duty to be holy, 
and Kant believes that ought implies can, and so this duty implies that it is not impossible 
for beings such as ourselves to achieve holiness. However, this is only possible if we 
assume that our duration in time is endless and that there exists an omnipotent, 
omniscient and just ruler of the world. 
                                                 
15 And in this passage he is clearly advocating what he calls “Christian” morality, for he makes it clear that 
he believes that the pre-Christian laws (or principles) were “defective”. 
16 For example, in the same lectures he argues that “the principle we draw from the weakness of human 
nature is this: moral laws must never be laid down in accordance with human weakness, but are to be 
presented as holy, pure and morally perfect, be the nature of man what it may. . . the moral law is the 
archetype, the yardstick and the pattern of our actions [i.e. it is what Kant calls an ideal]. But the pattern 
must be exact and precise. . . The highest duty [of the moral philosopher?] is therefore to present the moral 
law [this ideal] in all its purity and holiness, just as the greatest crime is to subtract anything from its 
purity” (Ethik Collins, 27:294). 
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Kant, then, believes that it is our duty to be holy, for the moral ideal is the idea of a holy 
being. He also, famously, believes that ought implies can. Taken together, these two 
commitments seem to imply that Kant must believe that it is possible for us to become 
holy. There are good reasons, however, for thinking that it is impossible for beings such 
as we are to be holy. In this section I will briefly examine how Kant attempts to avoid 
this seeming contradiction. His response is to appeal to divine assistance. This is the 
function of the postulates of practical reason. Kant explains his general strategy in his 
lectures on ethics, explaining that, 
The ideal of holiness. . . is the most perfect ideal for it is an ideal of the 
greatest purely moral perfection, but because such a thing is unattainable 
by man, it is based upon a belief in divine assistance. (Ethik Collins, 
27:521) 
 
Here, once again, Kant clearly identifies the moral ideal with the ideal of holiness, and he 
suggests that not only must we strive for holiness, but that we can legitimately hope to 
attain it, albeit with divine assistance. Our hope that it is possible to achieve holiness can 
be broken down into two components. To demonstrate that this hope is not irrational, 
Kant must demonstrate (a) that it is not contradictory to hope that we are capable of 
perfect virtue and (b) given the conceivability of perfect virtue, it is not contradictory to 
hope that, with divine assistance, we could achieve holiness. 
 
(a) Given our temporal nature, it seems impossible for us to think of ourselves as 
perfectly virtuous, let alone as potentially holy beings. At any particular moment in time, 
the most we can say is that up until now we have acted out of duty, and indeed, we are all 
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aware that there have already been times when we have neglected our duty.  At the most, 
then, we can think of ourselves as becoming more and more virtuous, but it is impossible 
for us to think of ourselves being perfectly virtuous, let alone holy. Once again, if ought 
implies can, it is difficult to see how Kant can consistently maintain that we ought to 
make it our aim to be holy, for he seems to believe that we cannot even hope to be 
perfectly virtuous. Kant's response to this problem once again involves an appeal to God, 
but this time not to his will (assistance) but to his intuition. For although we must 
experience our character as developing in time, as becoming more and more virtuous, we 
can hope that our existence in time is infinite and that God can experience what we can 
only experience as our never-ending increase of virtue as a perfectly virtuous disposition. 
Thus Kant argues in the Critique of Practical Reason that, 
the eternal being, to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in what 
is to us an endless series the whole of conformity with the moral law, and 
the holiness his command inflexibly requires in order to be 
commensurable with his justice in the share he determines for each in the 
highest good is to be found whole in a single intellectual intuition of the 
existence of rational beings. . . [The human being] cannot hope, either here 
or in any foreseeable future moment of his existence to be fully adequate 
to God’s will. . . he can hope to be so only in the endlessness of his 
duration (which God alone can survey). (5:123) 
 
 
Just as we can grasp that the series 1 + ½ +1/4 + etc. converges on one, we can hope that 
God can grasp our ever increasing virtue as converging on perfect virtue. In so doing, 
Kant believes that we can reasonably hope that it is possible for us to be perfectly 
virtuous, at least in the eyes of God. 
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(b) This, however, brings us to a second problem. For even if Kant can convince us that 
there is nothing contradictory in hoping to be perfectly virtuous, such perfect virtue 
cannot be equated with holiness, for even if we are capable of always doing our duty it is 
not within our power to guarantee that we will always do it gladly, for we are beings with 
needs, and there are times when these needs conflict with morality. Even if we always do 
our duty, then, these needs make it impossible for us to do our duty “gladly” and with a 
“voluntary liking”.17 As we have seen, however, a holy being is good gladly. A holy 
being, then is both good and happy. It not only does what is good, but it is glad to be 
doing it. Kant's response is to argue that if we do our duty we can hope to be happy, but 
that this hope can only be based upon the hope of divine assistance, for we must hope that 
there is a God who assigns happiness in proportion to virtue. If this were the case then a 
perfectly virtuous individual would be perfectly happy, and would not merely obey the 
law, but do so gladly. This is Kant’s doctrine of the highest good.18 As Kant explains this 
in the Religion: 
If the strictest observance of the moral laws is to be thought of as the 
ushering in of the highest good (as end), then, since human capacity does 
not suffice to effect happiness in the world proportionate to the worthiness 
to be happy, an omnipotent moral being must be assumed as ruler of the 
world, under whose care this would come about. (6:8) 
 
 
A human being who always acted from duty does not have a holy disposition if she, at 
times, does not do her duty gladly. This will be the case whenever our duty is in conflict 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that if we necessarily did our ‘duty’ gladly it would not be duty. 
18 Although I believe that Rawls is wrong to suggest that our idea of a kingdom of ends is constructed 
practically, I believe a stronger case could be made for the claim that Kant believes that our idea of the 
“highest good” is constructed practically. 
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with our sensuous needs. Kant, however, believes that there is nothing contradictory in 
the idea of a being who brings it about that human beings are happy in proportion to their 
worthiness to be happy. An individual who is perfectly virtuous, that is, an individual 
who always does her duty, deserves perfect happiness. Such an individual, however, can 
only be perfectly happy if everything she does, she does gladly, so in hoping that there 
exists an omnipotent being who decrees that happiness be rewarded in proportion to 
virtue, we are hoping that the world is so organized so that a perfectly virtuous individual 
will always do her duty gladly. This is to hope that if we always do our duty all of our 
needs will (necessarily) be met. Thus, if it is possible for us to be perfectly virtuous, it is 
possible for us to believe that we can have a holy disposition. There is, Kant believes, 
nothing contradictory in this hope.  
 
(1d) Kant’s Disagreement with Baumgarten & Wolff 
 
To understand Kant’s ethical project, and to justify my interpretation, it is helpful to look 
at the contrasts he draws between his own position and that of Wolff and Baumgarten. 
Wolff and Baumgarten are (a) rationalists and (b) perfectionists. They believe that being 
moral is synonymous with being rational and that the principle of morals is to seek 
perfection wherever one can. Although Kant attacks their position, he himself can also 
legitimately be regarded as a moral rationalist and perfectionist. For he identifies the idea 
of a good will with that of a rational being and he believes that we should take holiness, 
i.e. the idea of something perfect, as our moral ideal. His main complaint against their 
rationalism and perfectionism is that it is merely formal and lacks content. Understanding 
 48 
what Kant means by this and how he differentiates his own brand of rationalism and 
perfectionism from that of Wolff and Baumgarten will help us to understand his own 
position. It will also provide us with additional grounds for rejecting the moral 




Kant agrees with Wolff and Baumgarten in their identification of morality with 
rationality. To be moral would be to be perfectly rational. Kant’s criticism of Wolff and 
Baumgarten is that they do not give any account of what it is (or more accurately, what it 
would be) to be perfectly rational. This is why he accuses them of formalism. Many 
commentators find it ironic that Kant accuses others of formalism, because this is one of 
the most common criticism to be leveled against Kant’s own ethics. Kant, however, 
believes that his moral theory is not ‘formalistic’ in the sense that Wolff and 
Baumgarten’s is, for he believes that he can give a non-formal definition of what it is for 
a human being to be practically rational; for Kant a practically rational human being is 
one who strives to be a member of an ideal kingdom of ends. For Wolff, to have a 
rational will is merely to will in a certain way, namely rationally. For Kant, in contrast, 
practical rationality is defined in terms of the object of volition. A perfectly rational 
faculty of desire would be a faculty of desire that chooses as its object the idea of being 
an autonomous individual; and the idea of an autonomous individual is an idea of pure 
reason. Kant, then, criticizes Wolff for offering a purely formal definition of a rational 
will. He objects, then, to their purely formal characterization of the object of rational 
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desire. In contrast he believes that he can provide a material definition of what it is (or 
would be) to have a perfectly rational will.  
 
The distinction between Kant's ethics and Wolff’s is analogous to the distinction 
between transcendental and general logic 
 
Towards the end of his Preface to the Groundwork, Kant compares his introduction to 
moral philosophy with that of Wolff, noting that, 
Just because it was to be a universal practical philosophy it [Wolff’s 
propaedeutic to moral philosophy] took into consideration, not a will of 
any special kind, such as one that would be completely determined from a 
priori principles without any empirical motives and that could be called a 
pure will, but rather volition generally, with all the actions and conditions 
that belong to it in this general sense; and by this it differs from a 
metaphysics of morals in the same way that general logic, which sets 
forth the actions and rules of thinking in general, differs from 
transcendental philosophy, which sets forth the special actions and rules 
of pure thinking, that is, of thinking by which objects are cognized 
completely a priori. For the metaphysics of morals has to examine the 
idea and the principles of a possible pure will and not the actions and 
conditions of human volition generally, which for the most part are drawn 
from psychology. (4:391) 
 
Kant makes a similar point in his ethics lectures, lectures delivered at roughly the same 
time as he was writing the Groundwork (1785). Here Kant explains that, 
Baumgarten and Wolff say that duty is the necessity of an action 
according to the greatest and most important grounds of motivation. Now 
to them it is all one, whether these grounds are from inclination or from 
reason. It is thus no pure philosophy that they have in view here, but 
rather a general practical philosophy. The latter treats of concepts and 
all actions that proceed from willing. How we ought to act it does not 
consider. It makes no mention of the determinations of our willing by pure 
motivating grounds of reason, but speaks in general of the determinations 
of the will. In general practical philosophy, nothing of morality must 
appear. (Ethik Mrongovius, 29:599 – my emphasis)  
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In both of these passages Kant suggests that the distinction between his own ethics and 
Wolff’s is analogous to the distinction between transcendental and general logic he has 
introduced in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Introduction to the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant explains that,  
general logic abstracts from all contents of the cognition of the 
understanding and of the difference of its objects, and has to do with 
nothing but the mere form of thinking. (A54/B78) 
 
In so far as Wolff’s ethics is general, then, it abstracts from all contents of the faculty of 
desire and has to do with the mere form of willing. Transcendental logic, on the other 
hand, does not abstract from the content of thinking, but examines the a priori 
relationship between the faculty of thinking (the understanding) and the faculty through 
which objects are given to us (intuition). Thus Kant writes that, assuming there can be 
concepts that may be related to objects a priori, not as pure or sensible 
intuitions but rather as acts of pure thinking, that are thus concepts but of 
neither empirical nor aesthetic origin [that is, that there are pure concepts], 
we provisionally formulate the idea of a science of pure understanding and 
of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we think objects 
completely a priori. Such a science, which would determine the origin, the 
domain and the objective validity of such cognitions, would have to be 
called transcendental logic. . . (A57/B81)19 
 
The difference, then, between general and transcendental logic is that whereas general 
logic is purely formal, transcendental logic is concerned not only with the form of 
thought but with (a priori) objects of thought. Thus Pozzo (1998) explains that, 
                                                 
19 Kant also explains this distinction in his lectures, claiming that transcendental logic “distinguishes itself 
from general pure logic in this, that the latter occupies itself with the mere form of the use of our 
understanding, but the former concerns the determination of the pure cognition of objects through the mere 
understanding. A pure concept of the understanding is a pure cognition of the object through the mere 
understanding, and the full opposite <oppositum> of the empirical concept, in that it is entirely thought 
purely a priori” (Metaphysic Vigilantius, 29:984). 
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“transcendental logic differs only slightly from general logic, but in its core; the former 
has no object at all, the latter has an object, a very general one, but always an object” 
(p.301-2).20 As a consequence of this, Kant believes that general logic can only provide 
us with a negative criterion for truth, for truth does not have to do with the purely logical 
relationship between concepts, but has to do with the relationship between concepts and 
objects. The principle of general logic is the principle of non-contradiction, and Kant 
believes that “although a cognition may be in complete accord with [general] logical 
form, i.e., not contradict itself, yet it can still always contradict the object” (A59/B84). As 
a result of this Kant believes that principle of general logic can only provide us with a 
negative criterion of truth. What Kant means by this is that general logic can only tell us 
whether a concept (or proposition) is self-contradictory or not. Whether or not a concept 
is self-contradictory (or whether or not a proposition implies a contradiction), however, is 
not an adequate criterion of truth, for it may be the case that although proposition does 
not contain a contradiction, the proposition is not true because there cannot (in fact) be an 
object corresponding to the subject concept. In other words, although general logic can 
determine whether a concept is thinkable (which is to determine whether or not it 
contains a contradiction) it cannot tell us whether a thinkable concept has what Kant calls 
objective reality or validity, for inspecting a concept cannot tell us whether or not there 
could actually be an object corresponding to the concept. Transcendental logic, in 
                                                 
20 Pozzo convincingly argues that Kant's distinction can be traced back to the traditional distinction 
between general and special logic, a distinction that can be traced back to Averroes’ commentaries upon  
Aristotle’s Organon. General logic examines the rules of thought in general, rules, Kant explains, “without 
which there can be no employment of the understanding” (A52/B76). Special logics, in contrast, examine 
the rules of thought about particular objects. Kant's distinction between general and transcendental logic is 
derived from this distinction, with transcendental logic being the most general special logic, concerned with 
the a priori relationship of thought (the understanding) to the faculty through which objects are given 
(intuition).  
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contrast, can be “a logic of truth” (A62/B87), for it has to do with the a priori 
relationship between concepts (the understanding) and objects in general. There can be a 
“logic of truth” because the faculty through which objects are given to us (intuition) has a 
certain form that we are aware of a priori.  Thus, (the positive part of) transcendental 
logic examines a priori the relationship between the faculty of concepts (the 
understanding) and the faculty through which objects are given (intuition). Such a logic 
can provide us with a positive touchstone for truth because there are certain things we 
know a priori about what type of objects can be given in intuition, for our form of 
intuition is, Kant maintains, a priori. As a result of this, we can know a priori that an 
object can exist corresponding to certain concepts if the object is the sort of thing that can 
be given in space and/or time.  
 
We can now return to Kant's distinction between Wolff’s ethics and his own, a distinction 
that is analogous to the distinction between general and transcendental logic. A ‘general’ 
ethics will be one that is purely formal and does not concern the relation of the faculty of 
desire to any object. In addition, its principle will be a principle that provides us with a 
purely negative criterion for morality in the same way that the principle of non-
contradiction (the principle of general logic) provides us with a purely negative criterion 
of truth. An ethics, like Kant's, that is analogous to transcendental logic will, in contrast, 
be an ethics that has some a priori content, in that it will examine a priori the relationship 
between the faculty of desire and the faculty through which objects are given to us. 
Transcendental theoretical philosophy examines the a priori relationship between the 
intellect and the faculty of intuition. Transcendental practical philosophy examines the a 
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priori relationship between the faculty of desire (volition) and the intellect. For, just as 
the faculty of intuition provides the intellect with its objects, the (faculty of) intellect can 
provide the faculty of desire (volition) with its objects, for ideas can be objects of 
volition. Such a “transcendental” (as opposed to a “general”) ethics, then, will examine 
the way in which ideas can be objects of volition, and this examination can be done a 
priori. 
 
We are now in a better position to understand the distinction Kant draws between his 
ethics and Wolff’s. The difference between Kant’s way of proceeding and Wolff’s is that 
Kant thinks that the idea of a good will is a pure idea which can be defined purely from a 
priori principles and that its definition can be given purely in terms of a priori concepts 
and will not involve any reference to (or abstraction from) empirical motives or to any 
particular human capacity or faculty. The difference between this approach and Wolff’s 
is that Wolff believes that we can explain what it is to be a good faculty of desire merely 
in terms of explaining how such a faculty of desire wills, without explaining what it is 
that a good faculty of desire wills.  
 
Another way to understand how Kant’s rationalism differs from Wolff’s is to examine 
Kant’s distinction between the idea of a perfectly rational human being (what I shall call 
a ‘being that has a perfectly rational faculty of desire’) and the idea of what he calls a 
rational being as such. A perfectly rational human being is one who always acts out of 
duty. The idea of a rational being as such, however, cannot be defined in terms of duty, 
because it is only a contingent fact about our nature that makes ethics a matter of duty for 
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us, and an account of what it is to be moral should be an account which is applicable to 
all conceivable (rational) beings, and not just to human beings. For to act out of duty is to 
obey an imperative and Kant believes that not all (conceivable) moral agents are bound 
by imperatives. Thus what it is to be moral cannot consist in acting out of duty. For, as 
Kant argues in the Groundwork, 
no imperatives hold for the divine will and in general for a holy will: the 
‘ought’ is out of place here, because volition is of itself necessarily in 
accord with the law. Therefore imperatives are only formulae expressing 
the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective 




According to Kant, then, our definition of a ‘rational being as such’ (or what he calls ‘a 
good will’ in the Groundwork) is logically prior to, and must be independent of, the 
definition of a ‘being that has a rational faculty of volition’, for Kant defines ‘a being 
which has a rational faculty of desire’ as ‘a being that desires to be a rational being as 
such’. For us to have the capacity to be rational, then, we must possess the idea of what it 
is to be a rational being as such. We can only understand the notion of  ‘a perfectly 
rational faculty of desire’ (that is, a good faculty of willing) by appealing to this pure idea 
of a good will.  For a perfectly rational faculty of desire is a faculty of desire that has 
chosen to make the idea of a good will the object of its choice or desire. What it is to 
have a ‘perfectly rational faculty of desire’, then, is defined in terms of the object such a 
faculty of desire takes. 
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A good (or rational) will, then, is not defined as a will (faculty of desire) that possesses 
“practical rationality” in the Rawlsian sense of being guided by the CI procedure. A good 
flute player can be defined as a flute player who plays the flute well. A good will, 
however, is not to be defined, as Wolff defines it, as a (human) will that wills well. 
Instead a will (faculty of desire) that wills well is to be defined as a will that takes the 
idea of a good will (the idea of an autonomous being)21 as its object. A ‘good will’ then is 
an idea, an idea that a human being can (hope to) instantiate if it takes it (the idea) as the 
object of its faculty of desire. Kant's criticisms of Wolffian rationalism demonstrate that 
he is not a moral constructivist. An examination of his arguments against Wolff and 






Kant’s criticism of Wolff and Baumgarten’s perfectionism is similar to his criticism of 
their rationalism. Once again the problem he points to is that their formulation of the 
principle of perfection lacks any content. Kant agrees with them that we must aim at 
perfection, for our moral ideal must be something perfect or holy. Thus, for example, he 
explains in the Critique of Practical Reason that the 
law of all laws, like all the moral precepts of the Gospel, presents the 
moral disposition in its complete perfection, in such a way that as an ideal 
of holiness it is not attainable by any creature but is yet the archetype 
which we should strive to approach and resemble in an uninterrupted but 
endless progress. (5:841) 
 
                                                 
21 Which is the idea of a member of an intelligible world. 
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Kant, then, does not deny that morality demands that we seek perfection. He believes, 
however, that the principle “seek perfection” lacks content. Their principle of perfection 
is merely a negative criterion of morality in the same way that the principle of non-
contradiction is merely a negative criterion of truth. 
 
Kant customarily began his lectures on ethics by providing a taxonomy of competing 
ethical theories, amongst which he includes perfectionism. He traces this position back to 
Wolff, arguing that, “the principle of perfection, or the harmonizing of the manifold into 
one, comes from Wolff” (Ethik Mrongovius. 29:622). Wolf explains perfection in the 
following terms: 
The agreement of the manifold constitutes perfection. For example, we 
judge the perfection of a watch by its ability to show correctly the hour 
and its divisions. It [the watch] is made of many parts assembled together, 
and these as well as the assembly are aimed at enabling the hands to tell 
correctly the hour and its divisions. Thus in a watch we find a multitude of 
things all of which agree with one another. . . The conduct of man consists 
of many actions and if these all agree with one another, so that they are all 
finally grounded in one general goal, then the conduct of man will be 
perfect. (German Metaphysics, #157) 
 
 
Following Leibniz, Wolff argues that perfection involves unity in manifoldness, and he 
believes that this implies that perfection is relative to kind, for he believes that unity is 
provided by a thing’s function or goal. What it is to be a perfect watch is different from 
what it is to be a perfect laptop computer. A perfect watch is one that tells the time 
perfectly. In such a watch we find unity in manifoldness. The components of which a 
perfect watch are made are put together in such a way that they all work towards the 
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same function, telling the time well. Human perfection can be explained in similar terms. 
Humans have many drives and desires, and do many particular things. A perfect human is 
one who unifies this manifold of actions and desires, and this can be achieved if they are 
all directed to one end. Like Kant, then, Wolff maintains that the ethical life involves 
self-mastery. Kant’s objection is that for Wolff it does not seem to matter what goal we 
set ourselves as long as we follow it rigorously,22 and this seems to run against our ethical 
intuitions. If, for example, one succeeded in subordinating all of one’s inclinations to the 
goal of being a serial killer one would, presumably, be perfect in Wolff’s sense – a 
perfect serial killer. 
 
Kant makes it clear that this is the reason for his rejection of perfectionism in his lectures 
on ethics of 1793. Vigilantius, the note-taker, notes that, 
In his practical philosophy #39-46, Baumgarten has put forward various 
formulae which, as imperatives, are supposed to serve for the general 




The third of Baumgarten’s putative moral principles to be dismissed by Kant is the 
principle: Quaere perfectionem, quantum potes (seek perfection as much as you can), and 
Kant argues that this supposed principle is, 
A formula that contradicts the nature of duty. Perfection is a variable 
concept. By perfection in general we understand everything we take to be 
complete, e.g. a perfect liar, a complete villain. . . [etc.]. (27:518) 
  
                                                 
22 A defender of Wolff, however, could object to such a characterization of Wolff’s position, for, like 
Aristotle, Wolff will argue that human beings have a natural goal (or ergon), namely happiness.  
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The principle of perfection tells us to be good is to be perfect, but a perfect what? This 
principle is the practical twin of the principle of non-contradiction. Just as the principle of 
non-contradiction provides us with a merely negative touchstone of truth, the principle of 
perfection provides us with a merely negative touchstone of morality. We know, Kant 
believes, that a good will must be perfect, just as a true concept must not contain a 
contradiction. However, just as the fact that a concept (or proposition) does not contain a 
contradiction does not mean that the proposition is true (or the concept possible), the fact 
that something is perfect does not mean that it is good. The principle of morality, the 
principle we hear when we listen to the voice of conscience, is a principle that provides 
us with a positive criterion of morally. We recognise, Kant believes, that to be moral is to 
be perfect, but we also know what type of perfect being we must be.   
  
Kant’s own ethics, then, escapes the charge of formalism he levels at Wolff because his 
aim is to give an account of what the object of ‘perfect’ volition actually is. Wolff on the 
other hand fails to explain what the object of a perfectly rational volition would be, and 
as a consequence his account doesn’t end up telling us anything interesting about what is 
involved in perfectly rational volition. Kant, on the other hand, thinks he is telling us 
something informative about the nature of perfect rational volition. Perfect volition is 
volition that has as its goal the idea of being an autonomous agent. 
  
 
(1e) An Objection to My Interpretation   
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I have argued that Kant’s chief complaint against Wolff and Baumgarten is that their 
ethics is merely formal. Kant then believes that ethics must have some content. Kant’s 
own position is not formal because he believes that to be virtuous is to make a particular 
idea the object of one’s faculty of desire. What it is to be virtuous can be defined in terms 
of this idea, and it would not be out of place to call this idea ‘the concept of the good’, for 
according to Kant our concept of an autonomous agent (which is the idea of a member of 
an intelligible world) is our concept of a good will. I have argued that, for Kant, to 
engage in ethical enquiry is to attempt to clarify theoretically the ‘the concept of the 
good’, and that what it is to listen to the categorical imperative is to attempt to instantiate 
this concept. There are important passages in the Critique of Practical Reason, however, 
in which Kant seems to explicitly argue that the good must be defined with reference to 
the categorical imperative rather than vice versa, and moral constructivists appeal to these 
passages to support their interpretation. As I shall show, however, such an interpretation 
is based on taking these passages out of context, for Kant makes it clear that the priority 
he gives to the categorical imperative is purely methodological and not ontological or 
definitional. 
 
Many readers of Kant may be surprised by my characterization of Kant as a moral 
idealist, for Kant himself is famous for rejecting consequentialism and he himself seems 
to argue that the foundation of ethics must be formal. Thus, in the Critique of Practical 
Reason he begins a long paragraph by explaining that, 
This is the place to explain the paradox of method in a Critique of 
Practical Reason, namely, that the concept of good and evil must not be 
determined before the moral law (for which, as it would seem, this 
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concept would have to be made the basis) but only (as was done here) 
after it and by means of it. (5:63 – Kant’s italics, my bolding)  
 
 
Here Kant explains that we must begin by examining the (purely formal) moral law, and 
only afterwards define the concept of the good by means of it. Such passages seem to 
support Rawl’s claim that Kant must be interpreted as a moral constructivist, for they 
seem to imply that Kant believes the moral law, or CI-procedure, is what makes the 
concept of the good (say, the idea of being a member of a kingdom of ends) possible. 
Kant concludes the paragraph by making the same point in even stronger terms, arguing 
that, 
instead of the concept of the good as an object determining and making 
possible the moral law, it is on the contrary the moral law that first 
determines and makes possible the concept of the good. (5:64) 
 
 
Here Kant seems to explicitly deny that the idea of the good can be the basis of ethics. 
Instead the concept of the good is a secondary notion, parasitic upon the purely formal 
idea of the moral law, or categorical imperative. However, if we read on, it becomes clear 
that these passages do not have the import they seem to have at first sight, for Kant 
himself is quick to qualify these claims, making it clear that the priority he wishes to give 
to the first formulation of the Categorical imperative is purely methodological. Thus he 
begins the following paragraph by explaining that the previous “remark . . . concerns 
only the method of ultimate moral investigation” (5:64 – my emphasis). These claims, 
then, about the relationship between the concept of the good and the moral law are 
merely methodological. Methodologically, we must start by examining the purely formal 
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notion of duty, and this will point us to the concept of the good, which is the object of 
duty. This qualification makes it clear that these passages are not meant to imply that the 
concept of the good is logically or ontologically dependent upon the categorical 
imperative. 
 
Further support for this interpretation is provided in the Preface to the Critique of 
Practical Reason. Here Kant writes that “among all the ideas of speculative reason 
freedom is also the only one the possibility of which we know a priori, though without 
having insight into it, because it is the condition of the moral law, which we do know” 
(5:4 – my emphasis). Kant, then, makes it clear that he believes that the theoretical idea 
of freedom is a condition of the moral law (or the categorical imperative). And I argue 
that in these passages when he talks of freedom he means the idea of an autonomous 
individual.23 The reason for this is because the categorical imperative orders us to be 
autonomous, and so the concept of autonomy is a condition for the possibility of the 
imperative. In a famous footnote to this passage, Kant explains the relationship between 
the concept of freedom and the moral law in more detail. He writes:  
Freedom [and I am assuming that Kant here means ‘the idea of an 
autonomous individual’] is indeed the ratio essendi of the moral law [the 
categorical imperative]; the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of 
freedom. (5:4) 
     
Our consciousness of the categorical imperative, then, is the ratio cognoscendi of the 
concept of the good, but the concept of the good is the ratio essendi of the categorical 
imperative. What it is to be virtuous is to be defined in terms of the object of volition. For 
                                                 
23 And not merely the idea of freedom in the negative sense. 
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Kant, to be virtuous is to strive to be an autonomous being; this is what the categorical 
imperative demands. The idea of an autonomous being is an ideal and, as such, it is the 
idea of a holy being. Our awareness of the categorical imperative involves a 
consciousness of this ideal, albeit an obscure one. Autonomy cannot be defined in terms 
of acting out of duty, for, as we have seen, Kant believes that there is nothing 
contradictory in the idea of an autonomous being that does not act upon imperatives. 
Rather, it is our duty to be an autonomous agent. This is what Kant means when he 
claims that, “freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law”.  Because the categorical 
imperative demands that we be autonomous, to avoid circularity in our definition, the 
idea of an autonomous being (a good will) must be defined without reference to the 
notion of duty, and Kant attempts to provide such a definition in Groundwork II. The idea 
of a good will is the idea of a member of a kingdom of ends (or intelligible world) and 
this idea is an idea of pure reason. This idea is, as we have seen, the idea of what Kant 
elsewhere calls a holy being, and so we can say that although virtue is the ratio 
cognoscendi of holiness, holiness is the ratio essendi of virtue. For, what it is to be 
virtuous is to strive for holiness. This is why holiness is the ratio essendi of virtue, 
because if we did not have the idea of holiness we could not strive towards it. Virtue is 
the ratio cognoscendi of holiness because the voice of conscience makes us immediately 
aware of our duty, but provides us with an obscure representation of the object of our 
duty, which is to be holy. The imperative commands us to be holy. As such it must 
involve a consciousness (albeit and obscure on) of what it is to be holy. An investigation, 
then, of the demands the categorical imperative presents us with can help us clarify what 
is involved in our idea of a holy being. 
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In claiming that Kant is a moral constructivist, Rawls is, in effect, claiming that Kant 
believes that the CI-procedure is both the ratio cognoscendi and the ratio essendi of the 
idea of a kingdom of ends. He confuses what is a methodological issue with an 
ontological or logical issue. Kant begins the Groundwork examining the procedures a 
virtuous will (implicitly) acts upon. He begins by examining what Rawls calls practical 
rationality, and he reaches the conclusion that a person who is practically rational is 
striving to be a member of a kingdom of ends. This, however, is merely Kant's method of 
investigation, and he does not draw the conclusion that this fact about the appropriate 
order of investigation implies that the idea of (a member of) a kingdom of ends is 
logically dependent upon an understanding of practical rationality (the CI Procedure), as 
Rawls believes.  Instead, in claiming that freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, 
Kant means that practical rationality is to be defined in terms of autonomy. A practically 
rational human being is defined as a human being who strives to be an autonomous 
individual, and to avoid circularity we must be able to give an account and definition of 
what it is to be an autonomous individual without appealing to the notion of practical 
rationality. We can do this, I believe, by examining the concept of community, and this 
was one of the principle goals of my dissertation. 
 
(1f) The Value of Moral Philosophy 
 
The moral philosopher is concerned with providing theoretical clarification of our moral 
ideas. The question I wish to address in the remainder of this paper is: what is the 
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practical value of such an undertaking? The reason this is a pressing question is because 
Kant believes that we do not need a clear theoretical understanding of our moral concepts 
in order to be virtuous. The obscure consciousness provided by our conscience is 
perfectly adequate as a guide to action; if we listen to our conscience we cannot fail to be 
virtuous. What then is the value of a theoretical investigation of our moral concepts? I 
will argue that although we do not need conceptual clarity in order to be virtuous, such 
clarification can help us to be virtuous in so far as it can help us to really listen to the 
voice of conscience. 
 
Many readers of Kant’s ethical writings take him to be primarily concerned with offering 
guidelines for action. At the very least, they write about Kant as if this were the purpose 
of his ethical writings. For example, Korsgaard (1996), in her influential article on Kant's 
strategy in Groundwork I writes that 
The argument of Groundwork I is an attempt to give what I call a 
“motivational analysis” of the concept of a right action, in order to 
discover what that concept applies to, that is, which actions are right. 
(p.47 – my emphasis)24 
 
This, however, is a fundamentally misguided way of reading Kant, for he repeatedly 
asserts that we do not need to do moral philosophy in order to “discover” which actions 
are right. We all already know how to behave morally, and so do not need philosophers to 
tell us this. “Common human reason”, Kant argues in the Groundwork, “knows very well 
how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in 
                                                 
24 I’m not sure that Korsgaard actually meant to say this, and I suspect that upon reflection she would have 
chosen her words more carefully, however she does say it, and similar remarks abound in the secondary 
literature, and even if they do not necessarily reflect the authors considered opinion, they do suggest that 
the author has a certain conception of the function of moral philosophy at the back of their mind. 
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conformity to duty or contrary to duty” (4:404). The pre-philosophical understanding, 
then, knows perfectly well how to act morally. Unlike the Wolffians, and many other 
traditional moral philosophers in the western tradition, Kant is not an intellectualist; he 
denies that immoral behavior is the result of mistaken beliefs about the good. It is 
instructive to compare Kant’s conception of moral philosophy with Wolff’s. Wolff is an 
intellectualist and believes that if we knew what was good for us we would do it. He 
believes that there is no gap between recognizing an act as good and willing it. Thus, he 
can claim that: 
The knowledge of good is a motive [Bewegungsgrund] of the will. . . it 
cannot happen that one does not will an inherently good act if one 
distinctly conceives it. . . So if we do not will [such acts], there is no other 
cause than that we do not recognize them [as good]. (Reasonable Thoughts 
about the Actions of Men, #6) 
 
As a result of this Wolff maintains that the only way we can become better human beings 
is by improving our knowledge of the good. Unfortunately, discovering the truth about 
the good is an arduous task, and Wolff is worried that “perhaps someone will wonder 
how it will go with the pursuit of good and the omission of bad if so much is required in 
order to distinguish good from bad” (Reasonable thoughts about the Actions of Men, 
#150). His response is to suggest a division of labor. It is not necessary that all people 
spend time putting in the work to distinguish the good from the bad; this job can be left to 
the philosophers. Thus Wolff writes that, 
Here it will do to respond that we are not speaking only of those who are 
to generate from their own reflections the rules according to which men 
are to judge their free actions in different conditions of life, that is, of the 
discoverers of the truths that belong to a doctrine of morals. But it is not 
necessary that all men be discoverers. It is enough if some among the 
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learned devote themselves to discovery, whose findings the others can 
afterwards learn, which is much easier. (ibid.) 
 
According to Wolff, then, the function of the moral philosopher is to discover the truth 
about good and bad and to communicate this truth to those who do not have the time, 
inclination or capacity to think about such matters.25 The function of moral philosophy is, 
from this perspective, to communicate moral knowledge to the ignorant so that they can 
lead more virtuous lives. 
 
Kant, in contrast, has far more respect for the moral capacities of common men and 
women, and as a result of this he believes that there is “no need of science and 
philosophy to know what one has to do to be honest and good, and even wise and 
virtuous” (Groundwork, 4:404).26 If, however, we do not need to do moral philosophy to 
know what one has to do in order to be good, why do we need moral philosophy? Any 
serious interpretation of Kant’s ethics must be able to answer this question, for Kant 
believes that the moral philosopher does have an important role to play.  
 
Intellectualism and Voluntarism 
 
                                                 
25 Wolff argues that this is the primary reason he writes his ethical works.  Thus, he writes: “Because not 
everyone is skilled in discovery and because one is not to live for oneself alone but to care also for others, 
these to whom God has lent the strength and opportunity to carry out this work better than others are 
obligated to share in books for the others what they have learned about the soul. From this urge there came 
what I have written in my Reasonable Thoughts about God the World and the Human Soul and what else I 
shall put in this book” (Reasonable Thoughts about the Actions of Men, #233). 
26 This respect for the moral capacities of common people may be traceable to Rousseau’s influence, thus 
Kant writes in 1763 that, “there was a time. . . when I despised the masses, which knew nothing. Rousseau 
has set me right. This blind prejudice disappears; I learn to honor men. . .” (8:624). Schilpp (1938), 
however, in his influential study on Kant’s pre-critical ethics, suggests that Kant had probably already been 
“indoctrinated with the notion of the inherent worth of every human being as a youthful Pietist” (p.49). 
 67 
To understand Kant's account of the role and value of moral philosophy it is necessary to 
understand his account of moral motivation and his explanation of the possibility of 
immorality. He wishes to steer a middle course between the Scylla of voluntarism and the 
Charybdis of intellectualism. The intellectualist maintains that the good is irresistible, for 
we always act under the aspect of the good. As a result of this the intellectualist claims 
that all immoral behavior is a result of not having a clear enough understanding of the 
good. The voluntarist, in contrast, maintains that, however clearly we understand the 
good we are always free to choose the bad. Kant agrees with intellectualist that the good 
is irresistible. However, he also agrees with the voluntarist that we are free to choose the 
bad.  And, in addition, he believes that all of us, possessing a conscience, have an 
adequate understanding of the good. On the face of it these commitments seem to be 
incompatible, for if our conscience provides us with an adequate understanding of what is 
involved in being good, and the good is irresistible, it is not clear how, and in what sense, 
we can choose to be bad. Kant's solution will be to argue, against the intellectualist, that 
our consciousness of the good is not directly through the intellect, but through the 
conscience.27 The judgment of conscience is, Kant maintains, infallible and, in so far as 
we choose to listen to it, irresistible. As a result of this, if we were truly attentive to the 
voice of conscience we would always behave morally. We often, however, fail to pay 
attention to this voice, and this failure is, Kant believes, always the result of a free choice. 
In so far as we pay attention to the judgment of conscience we will be virtuous; we are 
                                                 
27 Although our consciousness of the ‘good’ is through the conscience and not the intellect, I will argue that 
for Kant, the object of the conscience is intelligible, being an idea of pure reason that presents itself to our 
conscience as a practical ideal. 
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free, however, not to listen. This is the locus of our freedom.28 The moral law, then, is 
like the Siren’s voice; in so far as we choose to listen to it, it is irresistible. We are free, 
however, to plug our ears or to drown it out with competing voices. 
 
This account of the locus of free choice helps us understand Kant's conception of the role 
of moral philosophy. As we have seen, Kant claims that his goal in the Groundwork is to 
“clarify” the concept of a good will. If Kant were an intellectualist, realizing this goal 
would serve an obvious moral function. For the intellectualist believes that immoral 
behavior is always, and only, a failure to truly understand the good, and so the clearer our 
understanding of what is good, the better we will be. Kant, however, is not an 
intellectualist; indeed, he believes that even the pre-philosophical human understanding 
has a good enough understanding of the good to always act rightly. For Kant, knowing 
the good and doing the good are two distinct things. Kant himself claims that he wishes 
to clarify our understanding of the concept of a good will so that it will “shine forth more 
brightly”. And this, I believe, provides us with a clue for understanding why Kant 
believes that engaging in moral philosophy has some practical value. For the brighter 
something shines, the more noticeable it is, the harder it is to fail to pay attention to it. 
Engaging in moral philosophy, and clarifying the idea of a good will, helps us to pay 
attention to the moral ideal. It does this in two ways. Firstly, in making the concept of a 
good will “shine forth more brightly”, it amplifies the volume of the judgment of 
conscience. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it makes it harder for us to give 
ourselves excuses; for excuses are, Kant believes, like voices that compete with the voice 
                                                 
28 And here I am talking about what Kant calls freedom in the negative sense. 
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of conscience for the attention of our will. This explains the practical value of engaging 
in moral philosophy.  
 
The court of conscience 
 
The primary role of the moral philosopher, then, is to provide us with a tool that we can 
use to help ourselves pay attention to the judgment of conscience. For Kant the 
conscience is like an internal court that operates both prior to and after our actions. Thus 
he explains in his ethics lectures that, “consciousness of an internal court in a human 
being (“before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another”) is conscience” 
(27:168), and he distinguishes between what he calls a conscientia antecedens (which 
operates before we act) and a conscientia consequens (which comes into operation after 
we act). This conscience is like a court and involves, 
The assumption of an accuser, who seeks to arouse the conscience; a 
defender, who tries as an advocate to assuage it; and a judge, who assesses 
the action by the laws of duty and establishes the consequences. (ibid.) 
  
When we behave, or plan to behave, immorally we fail to listen to the judgment of this 
court. This judgment, Kant believes, cannot err: the notion of “an erring conscience”, he 
writes in the Metaphysics of Morals, “is an absurdity” (6:401).29  When we behave 
immorally it is not that our conscience has erred. Nor is it the case that our conscience 
has failed to make a judgment, for the judgment of conscience is “an unavoidable fact” 
(6:400). “Unconscientiousness”, then, “is not lack of conscience but propensity to pay no 
                                                 
29 And “if someone is aware that he has acted in accordance with his conscience, then as far as guilt or 
innocence is concerned nothing more can be required of him” (6:401). See also, Ethik Collins, 27:354-5. 
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heed to its judgment” (6:401).30 When we behave immorally we attempt to give excuses 
to ourselves before this court for not living up to our moral ideal; we choose to listen to 
the defense attorney and try to block out the voice of the judge.31  
 
The voice of the judge of conscience is like the voice of a siren; in so far as we listen to 
it, it is irresistible. Kant calls this irresistibility of the voice of the judgment of conscience 
our “moral predisposition”.   As a result of our predisposition to morality, Kant believes 
that we can only fail to be guided by the voice of our conscience if we stop up our ears or 
drown it out with other voices. Thus, in the Religion, Kant argues that,  
The human being (even the worst) does not repudiate the moral law, 
whatever his maxims, in rebellious attitude (be revoking obedience to it). 
The law rather imposes itself on him irresistibly, because of his moral 
predisposition; and if no other incentive were at work against it, he would 
also incorporate it into his supreme maxim as sufficient determination of 
his power of choice, i.e. he would be morally good. (6:36 – my emphasis) 
 
The judgment of conscience is irresistible and, insofar as our inner ear is open, our 
faculty of desire will be determined [bestimmt] by the law.32 Morality, for Kant, like the 
Stoic, is a matter of attentiveness, and immorality is the result of a, freely chosen, 
distraction. Engaging in moral philosophy  helps us avoid distraction by “providing 
access” (4:437) to the law. 
 
                                                 
30 “So when it is said that a certain human being has no conscience, what is meant is that he pays no heed to 
its verdict” (6:400). 
31 As Kant points out, “The defending or consoling conscience may work very much to our disadvantage” 
(27:619). 
32 It is interesting to note the prevalence of aural metaphors in Kant’s ethics, and in general in his account 
of reason. The primary activity of reason is, I believe, what Kant calls “determination” [Bestimmung], and 
the etymologically it is related to “Stimme” (Voice). In the eighteenth century, “Bestimmung” could also 
mean “vocation” or “calling”. 
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Having said this, the purely intellectual activity of clarifying the idea of a good will does 
have some practical effect, for the clearer our theoretical understanding of the moral 
ideal, the more difficult it becomes for us to give ourselves excuses for not living up to it 
in practice. The reason for this is that the excuses we provide ourselves with in the court 
of conscience are themselves products of the intellect. Clarifying the concept of a good 
will can help us quiet the voice of the defense attorney in this court, and it is this voice 
that distracts our attention from the voice of the moral judge.  
 
Kant believes, then, that although the moral ideal infallibly serves as a “compass” for our 
actions, and one that we all have “always before our eyes” (4:403), we often deliberately 
squint when we are taking directions. The moral philosopher cannot stop us squinting; he 
can, however, point out to us that we are squinting, which makes it more difficult for us 
to give excuses to ourselves if we choose to head in the wrong direction. The purpose of 
the moral philosopher, then, is to help us focus our attention on the moral ideal. 
Clarifying the moral ideal is to amplify the voice of the judge within, which is in danger 
of being drowned out by the pleading voice of the defense attorney in the court of 
conscience. Engaging in moral philosophy, then, can help us promote a particular duty, 
namely, 
the duty to cultivate one’s conscience, to sharpen one’s attentiveness to the 
voice of the inner judge and to use every means to obtain a hearing for it. 





Kant believes that we all know what it is to do the right thing. Even the least educated 
peasant knows how to be moral; the judgment of conscience is the same for him as for the 
enlightened philosopher. The problem with the philosophically uneducated is that they do 
not clearly grasp theoretically what it is to be moral. Their representation of what it is to 
be moral is ‘obscure’. This obscure representation of what it is to be moral is a good 
enough guide to action. This obscure representation is what provides the common human 
understanding with its moral know-how.  
 
Imagine going for a walk in the country with a friend. At one point you decide to split 
ways and your friend points to a building in the distance, a house on a hill, and tells you 
that he will meet you there in three hours.  You vaguely make out something in the 
distance through the mist, but it is too far away to make out what it is. But you know that 
if you pay attention to where you are going you will have no problem finding your way 
there. You wander off and become distracted by the view and the fresh country air, and 
stop paying attention to where you are heading and suddenly there are two hills in front 
of you, one with a house on top and one with a pub. And you end up waiting for your 
friend in the pub, quite happily drinking a few beers with the locals, occasionally 
checking your watch and wondering where he is. Just before closing time he storms into 
the pub, soaking wet, having spent the last three hours waiting for you, outside the house. 
And he’s not happy. You tell him that you’re really sorry, but that he shouldn’t blame 
you or be angry with you because you honestly thought you were in the right place, and 
in some sense it is true that you didn’t know that you were waiting in the wrong place. 
Trying to convince your friend, or yourself, that you are entirely blameless, however, is 
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in bad faith. It is true that you didn’t choose to make it your maxim to stand up your 
friend.33 If someone had come into the pub and told you that your friend was waiting 
outside in the rain for you, you would have jumped up and gone to find him. Your being 
in the wrong place, however, is willful in that you chose not to pay attention to where you 
were going and your friend can legitimately be angry with you, for having (at least in 
some sense) violated some ideal of friendship. If you had really cared about (meeting) 
him you would have paid attention to where you were going. 
 
What Kant calls the common human understanding has an analogous relationship to the 
idea of a good will as my traveler has to the house on the hill.  The common human 
understanding knows how to be moral just as my traveler knows how to get to his 
meeting point. The common human understanding, however, cannot really give an 
adequate description of what it is to be moral. And this makes it a lot easier for it to give 
itself excuses when it fails to reach its destination. Kant’s purpose in the Groundwork is 
to exhibit this pure idea (the idea of a good will) in all its purity. He wants us to be in a 
position that when we part ways, and arrange to meet, our friend can tell us: “let’s meet 
outside that house over there, on the hill opposite the King’s Arms pub”. I can still end up 
in the pub instead of waiting outside the house, but if I’ve been given such instructions 
it’s much harder for me to give my friend, or myself, excuses. If my friend has given me 
such clear instructions it will be much harder to convince him, or myself, that I honestly 
cared about the meeting if I end up in the wrong place. This analogy helps us understand 
                                                 
33 And my inattentive traveler is analogous to Kant’s conception of an (immoral) human being in this 
regard too. For Kant does not believe in the possibility of a diabolic will. That is, he does not believe in the 
possibility of a will governed by an evil principle. See the discussion of the notion of a diabolic will in 
Religion.   
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the role of the moral philosopher and teacher. The role of the moral teacher is not to tell 
us how to be moral; we already know that. The role of the moral educator is to make our 
obscure understanding of what it is to be moral shine out more brightly. This clearer 
understanding will not make us moral, but it will make it harder for us to listen to the 
sweet words of the defense attorney in the court of conscience. 
 
Kant often suggests that there are two principal excuses we give ourselves when we act, 
or plan to act, immorally. Engaging in moral philosophy, makes it harder for us to give 
ourselves these excuses, for these excuses always have a basis in the intellect and thus 
can be combated by theoretical enquiry. 
 
(1) The first type of excuse is a result of a willful corruption of our pure moral ideal.34 
(2) The second type of excuse involves willfully convincing ourselves that our moral 
ideal is impossible, either in itself or as an idea that can serve as an ideal for beings like 
us. This is despair.  
 
(1) In the first case when we choose to act immorally we, in effect, choose to be guided 
not by a pure ideal but by a watered down version of it. This is what happens, Kant 
believes, when we take happiness as our ideal35, or when we take another particular 
individual as our ideal, comparing ourselves not to the pure idea of a good will, but with 
                                                 
34 Thus Kant writes that “a metaphysics of morals is. . . indispensably necessary, not merely because of a 
motive to speculation – for investigating the source of the practical basic principles that lie a priori in our 
reason – but also because morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as we are 
without that clue and supreme norm by which to appraise them correctly.” (Groundwork, 4:389-9). 
35 For happiness is an ideal, but, as Kant explains in the Groundwork, it “is not an ideal of reason but the 
imagination” (4:418). An account of the way in which happiness is an imperfect ideal is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. 
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another, imperfect, human being, and taking that person’s imperfect behaviour as our 
standard. Choosing to imitate another person rather than taking the pure idea of an 
autonomous individual as our moral archetype, is one of the most common causes of 
excuses.36 For it allows us to excuse all sorts of behavior as ‘excusably’ human.  
Conceptual clarity about what is involved in our pure idea of a good will makes it easier 
for us to avoid the temptation of substituting the corrupted pseudo-ideal of happiness for 
the pure idea of a good will or of imitating others. 
 
(2) In the second case we willfully convince ourselves that it is impossible for us to live 
up to the ideal, either because we convince ourselves that the idea of an autonomous 
agent is itself impossible, or because we convince ourselves that it is impossible for 
creatures such as us to live up to such an ideal. There are two forms of despair. The first 
type of despair is a result of a recognition of our weakness as sensuous beings who have 
needs. When we give in to such despair we tell ourselves that there are certain needs we 
have that it is physically impossible not to satisfy.37 The second type of despair is a result 
of the fact that we necessarily experience ourselves as phenomenal spatio-temporal (and 
hence conditioned)  beings, whereas our moral ideal is an idea of pure reason, and as such 
                                                 
36 Thus Kant explains, in his ethics lectures he gave at the time he was working on the Groundwork, that, 
“an example is when a general proposition of reason is exhibited in concreto in the given case. . . No 
examples are needed in matters of religion and morality. There is thus no pattern in religion, since the 
ground, the principum of behavior, must lie in reason and cannot be derived a posteriori. . . The examples, 
therefore, must be judged by moral rules, not morality and religion by the examples. The archetype lies in 
the understanding” (Ethik Collins, 27:332-3). One of the targets of this attack is almost certainly the pietist 
culture around him. Perhaps the most popular genre of 18th century pietist literature was the conversion 
narrative. In these autobiographical narratives pietists told the story of their own rebirth. Such narratives 
were extremely popular and were presented as models to be followed. Thus Semler (1781), a contemporary 
of Kant's, could write that, for the pietists “the story of ones own experience and edification became the 
rule to follow exactly” (quoted from Fulbrook 1983, p.171).  
37 Often such despair is the result of inauthenticity in the heideggerian sense. Instead of saying: I have 
chosen to do x, we tell ourselves that ‘one’ acts like this in these circumstances. 
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it is the idea of a being that is unconditioned. When we give in to this form of despair we 
tell ourselves that it is logically impossible for a phenomenal being to be an autonomous 
individual. There is a natural tendency in human beings towards such despair, for there is 
a natural tendency to believe that every object of experience  (including ourselves) must 
be causally conditioned and divisible. For every object experienced in space/time is 
experienced as infinitely divisible and causally determined. Our moral ideal, however, is 
the idea of an autonomous individual, and the idea of an autonomous individual is, as 
autonomous, the idea of a being that is not causally determined, and, as an individual, it is 
the idea of a being that is simple, in the sense of being indivisible. Hence no object of 
experience can be experienced as an autonomous individual. Indeed, if we believed that 
space and time were conditions for the possibility of objects, and not merely conditions 
for our experience of objects, we would be justified in concluding that no object (of 
experience) could possibly be an autonomous individual. If this were the case, then our 
despair would be justified. Kant, however, believes that transcendental idealism offer a 
way out of this despair, for the transcendental idealist maintains that just because we 
must experience objects as essentially causally conditioned and divisible this does not 
imply that we cannot think of objects of experience (and, in particular, of ourselves and 
other human bodies) as autonomous individuals without contradiction. Another function 
of the moral philosopher, then, is to explain how it is possible for us to think of 




The moral philosopher can help us avoid both forms of despair. He can help us avoid the 
first kind of despair by convincing us that we are free and that, in addition, it is not 
unreasonable to hope that there is a just and benevolent God who ensures that happiness 
in allocated in proportion to virtue, so if we rigidly follow our duty it is not unreasonable 
to hope that our needs will be met. He can help us avoid the second type of despair by 
convincing us that although we intuit ourselves as essentially causally determined 
(conditioned) beings, there is nothing contradictory in thinking of ourselves as 
autonomous (unconditioned) individuals. The moral philosopher can do this by 
convincing us of the plausibility of transcendental (or formal) idealism. Formal idealism 
makes a distinction between the form and matter of the objects of intuition, and claims 
that although the matter of the objects of intuition is real, the (spatio-temporal) form of 
these objects is ideal and subjective. If we accept transcendental idealism it allows us to 
think of objects of intuition, including ourselves, as unconditioned without contradiction. 
For although an object of experience cannot be thought of as unconditioned and simple 
qua object of experience there nothing contradictory in thinking of such an object as 
unconditioned and simple in itself.38 
 
To conclude: Engaging in metaphysical speculation and working out clearly what is 
involved in the idea of a member of an intelligible world, and recognizing that there are 
no contradictions involved in it, cannot make us virtuous; to be virtuous, al we need to do 
is to listen to our conscience. Kant believes that grasping the idea of a good will in its 
purity is neither necessary nor sufficient for us actually to be good. Having grasped the 
                                                 
38 This argument will be examined in more detail in chapter five. 
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idea in its purity we are still faced with the choice of whether or not to recognize it as a 
practical ideal and to choose to instantiate it. Grasping the idea in its purity, however, can 
make the choice to be good easier, or at the very least, it makes it more difficult for us to 
give ourselves excuses for not living up to it.  Thus, the conceptual clarity that arises as a 
result of engaging with traditional metaphysical questions about the nature of the 
intelligible world cannot provide us with knowledge, but it can help us avoid temptation 
and despair. It can help us avoid the temptation of replacing our pure idea with a 
corrupted watered-down impure, pseudo-ideal (such as the ideal of happiness) and it can 
help us avoid the despair of convincing ourselves that there is no such ideal or that it is 
impossible for us to live up to or instantiate such an ideal. 
  
To summarize: (1) Kant’s ethics is grounded on the pure idea of a pure will, and this is 
the idea of a holy will. And, (2) this idea is pure in the sense that it is an idea of the pure 
intellect and as such it can be completely determined (in the sense of being defined) 
purely in terms of a priori principles and concepts. (3) We all already possess this idea 
and our consciousness of duty involves an obscure and subjective awareness of this idea 
as the standard of our action. (4) This obscure awareness of the idea of a good will is 
analogous to a ‘savage’s’ awareness of a house. The ‘savage’ sees the house well enough 
to be able to find his way there, but he does not know what it is. Similarly the ‘common 
human understanding’ or innocent pre-philosophical individual ‘sees’ the idea of a good 
will when she is aware of her duty, and this pre-philosophical grasp of the idea is good 
enough as a guide for action. Such an understanding, however, does not have a clear 
understanding of this idea. (5) The function of the moral philosopher is to help us 
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understand clearly what the idea of a good will is an idea of. Thus, Kant’s primary aim in 
his ethical writings is to clarify the idea of a good will, in the sense of making us 
conscious of what pure (theoretical) idea the idea is. In so doing Kant hopes to lead us 
from a subjective consciousness of this idea to an objective one, from an obscure 
consciousness to clear understanding. (6) The reason this is important is that the clearer 
our understanding of the moral ideal (which is the object of duty), the harder it is for us to 
give excuses to ourselves for not living up to it. 
 
In his lectures, Kant explains that, 
Necessitation is conceivable only where a contravention of moral laws is 
possible, and hence a thing can be morally necessary without being a duty, 
which would happen if the subject were at all times to act without 
necessitation in accordance to the moral law; for then a duty or obligation 
so to act would not be present; hence this does not hold of a morally 
perfect being, in that such a being acts solely from holiness. . . Where 
there is no necessitation, there also no moral imperative, no obligation, 
duty, virtue, ought or constraint is conceivable. Hence the moral laws are 
also called laws of duty, because they presuppose an agent subject to the 
impulses of nature. . . Like an angel, a being of this kind [a morally 
perfect being] can in no way be thought of existing, but to the 
philosopher is merely an idea. (Ethik Vigilantius, 27:489-9 – my 
emphasis) 
 
My claim, then, is that Kant believes that for us to be moral (virtuous), is to choose to be 
such a morally perfect being. It is, in other words, our duty to become such a being. A 
morally perfect being cannot be thought of as existing, at least as an object of experience, 
but we do have an idea of such a being. The bulk of this dissertation will be devoted to 
justifying this claim, and explaining in detail what this idea is an idea of. I argue that this 
idea is an idea of pure reason, and in particular an idea of rational cosmology, for it is the 
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idea of a member of an intelligible world. And the idea of an intelligible world can only 
be the idea of a political community of autonomous individuals subject to juridical 
laws. Our idea of a holy will is the idea of a member of such a community. This may, at 
this stage, seem a pretty odd claim. Hopefully, by the end of this dissertation it will make 
more sense. 
 
In addition to explaining the moral ethical position of the mature Kant, I will also give an 
account of how his position developed. In the previous citation, Kant identifies the idea 
of a morally perfect being with the idea of an angel. Thus, if my interpretation is correct, 
one could say that the highest moral imperative is: be an angel! This seems a pretty 
bizarre claim to make. It was, however, precisely the moral position of the eighteenth 
century Swedish mystic and visionary Emanuel Swedenborg. Swedenborg believed he 
had had his spiritual eyes opened by God and that he had been allowed to visit both 
heaven and hell. He describes heaven as a community of angels governed by moral laws 
(of benevolence) and believes that all angels were at one time men, and that we are 
ourselves members of a spiritual community, and it is our choice whether to join the 
community of heaven or the community of hell. This choice, Swedenborg believes, is the 
choice of our moral character, and a choice that we must make in this world. Kant read 
Swedenborg in the early 1760s, and this was time most commentators believe he first 
began to formulate his mature ethical position, and in 1766 he published a book on 
Swedenborg, Dreams of a Spirit Seer. I will argue that Kant was deeply influenced by his 
engagement with Swedenborg, for in the process of his engagement with the Swedish 
seer he to came to conceive of morality in terms of being a member of a (spiritual) 
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community. I suggest, then, that Kant's idea of a kingdom of ends has its genesis in 
Swedenborg’s vision of heaven as a community of spirits governed by divine laws of 
benevolence. In chapter three I will attempt to justify this claim. My account of Kant's 
development, if correct, suggests that, at least historically, the idea of being a member of 
a kingdom of ends is more basic to Kant's ethics than the idea of being autonomous. 
Indeed, I will argue that autonomy is ultimately important for Kant because the only way 
we can conceive of a kingdom of ends, as a real community, is as a community of 
autonomous agents. Autonomy, then, is important for Kant in the sense of being part of 
the citizenship requirements for a possible kingdom of ends. 
 
Although the genesis of Kant's position can be traced back to his engagement with 
Swedenborg, Kant's ultimate ethical position is significantly different. Firstly, although 
Swedenborg conceives of heaven as a community of spirits governed by moral laws, he 
does not suggest these laws must be given by the members of the community themselves. 
In Chapter four I will explain why Kant came to see that our idea of such a community 
must be the idea of a community of autonomous individuals. The heart of his argument is 
that a community can only be really unified, and hence can only be a community, if the 
individual members of the community are the source of the laws that provide the 
community with its unity. In other words a community can only be a community if the 
members of the community are autonomous. 
 
Secondly, Swedenborg conceives of heaven as a community of angels governed by laws 
of love, or what Kant would call laws of benevolence. The mature Kant, in contrast, 
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conceives of the kingdom of ends as a political community, governed not by laws of 
benevolence, but by juridical laws. Thus, in the Religion he praise Jesus as a moral 
teacher and explains that, 
The teacher of the Gospel manifested the Kingdom of God on earth to his 
disciples only from its glorious, edifying and moral side, namely in terms 
of the merit of being citizens of a divine state; and he instructed them as to 
what they had to do, not only that they attain to it themselves, but that they 
be united in it with others of like mind, and if possible with the whole 
human race. (6:135) 
 
Our idea of a good will, or holy individual, is, I suggest, the idea of a “citizen of a divine 
state”. To be virtuous is to strive to be a member of such an ideal state. The categorical 
imperative tells us what we have to do to be eligible for citizenship in such a state.  
 
In Chapters seven, eight and nine, I will defend the claim that, for Kant, the idea of a 
Kingdom of ends is the idea of an ideal state. I will explain how he believes it is possible 
for us to have the idea of such a state a priori39, and why we can only conceive of such a 
state as governed by juridical laws. 
                                                 
39 I will argue that that this idea can be derived from the category of community, which is based upon the 
disjunctive form of judgment. 
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Chapter Two 




Central to my interpretation of Kant’s ethics is the belief that Kant should be understood 
both as (a) a ‘moral idealist’ and as (b) advocating an ‘ethics of interaction’. I call Kant’s 
ethics an ‘ethics of interaction’ because Kant’s moral ideal is the idea of being an 
individual member of a world of individuals, and, for Kant, a world is only really a 
world, as opposed to a mere aggregation, if the individual beings that constitute the world 
are in interaction. The focus of this chapter will be on explaining and defending my claim 
that Kant’s moral ideal is the idea of being a member of a/the intelligible world. 
 
(2a) Kant’s Moral Idealism. 
 
The ideal man 
 
By labeling Kant a moral idealist I mean that a pure ideal stands at the heart of his ethics 
and that to be moral is (or would be) to take this ideal as the object of our choice; it is our 
duty to become such an individual. Kant makes this clear in his lectures on ethics from 
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1785, a lecture course given around the time of the publication of the Groundwork. Here 
he explains that, 
to expound morality in its full purity is to set forth an Idea of practical 
reason. Such Ideas are not chimeras, for they constitute the guideline to 
which we must constantly approach. . . We have to possess a yardstick by 
which to estimate our moral worth, and know the degree to which we are 
faulty and deficient. . . An ideal is the representation of a single thing, in 
which we depict such an idea to ourself in concreto. All ideals are fictions. 
We attempt, in concreto, to envisage a being that is congruent with the 
idea. In the ideal we turn the ideas into a model. . . The ideal is a 
prototypon of morality. (Ethik Mrongovius, 29:604-5) 
 
Elsewhere in the same lectures he argues that, “The principle of morality is. . . the Idea of 
a will, insofar as it is a law unto itself” (29:628). This practical archetype, then, is the 
idea of an autonomous agent. In other passages he argues that the moral ideal, the 
yardstick by which we estimate our moral worth, is the idea of an ideal man. And he 
explains that, 
We conceive of man first of all as an ideal, as he ought to be and can be, 
merely according to reason, and call this Idea homo noumenon; this being 
is thought of in relation to another, as though the later were restrained by 
him; this is man in the state if sensibility, who is called homo 
phenomenon. The latter is the person, and the former merely a personified 
idea; there, man is simply under the moral law, but here he is a 
phenomenon, affected by the feelings of pleasure and pain, and must be 
coerced by the noumenon into the performance of duty. (Ethik Vigilantius, 
27:593)40 
                                                 
40 Kant makes a similar point in his lectures from 1793. Following standard natural law theory he argues 
that obligation requires both an obliging (obligans) and obliged (obligatus). Thus he writes that, “Although. 
. . obligation is established by reason, it is nevertheless assumed that in the performance of our duty we 
have to regard ourselves as passive beings, and that another person must be present, who necessitates us to 
duty”.  Typically the source of the law was found in God. “Crusius found this necessitating person in God, 
and Baumgarten likewise in the divine will, albeit known through reason, and not positively. . . .” Kant, 
however, argues that we do not need to appeal to God in order to explain obligation, for “if the obligator is 
personified as an ideal being or moral person, it can be none other than the legislation of reason; this, 
then, is man considered solely as an intelligible being, who here obligates man as a sensory being, and 
we thus have a relationship of man qua phenomenon towards himself qua noumenon” (Ethik Vigilantius, 
27:510 – my emphasis).Similarly in 1784-5 he argues that, “We have in ourselves two foundations for our 
actions: inclinations, which are animal in nature, and humanity, to which the inclinations have to be 
subordinated” (Ethik Collins, 27:347). Here he suggests that our animal inclinations have to be 
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Kant, then, would endorse Schiller’s claim in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of 
Man, that, 
Every individual human being, one may say, carries within him, 
potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human 
being, and it is his life’s task to be, through all his changing 
manifestations, in harmony with the unchanging unity of this ideal. 
(Schiller 1967, p.17) 
 
To be moral, then, is to attempt to live up to this ideal. But what is this ideal? This 
question will be the main topic of this dissertation. I will argue that Kant believes that our 
idea of an ideal man is the pure idea of an individual member of an intelligible world. 
And Kant believes that our idea of an intelligible world is the pure idea of a community 
of individuals in interaction. For Kant, then, to be moral is to choose to be a member of a 
community and to interact really with others. 
 
Our idea of a community is a pure theoretical idea derived from the category of 
community, the third category of relation in Kant's table of categories. I will argue that 
Kant believes that the only way we can conceive of a community is if we think of the 
individuals that constitute the community as autonomous agents. As a result of this the 
idea of an individual member of a community is the idea of an autonomous agent. So to 
choose to be a member of a community is to choose to be autonomous.  
 
The distinction between a priority and purity 
                                                                                                                                                 
subordinated to our (idea of) humanity. Note that the relationship of reason to inclination is one of 
subordination not eradication. 
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Kant argues that the moral ideal must be a pure idea. Kant stresses the importance of the 
purity of ethics in all of his mature moral writings, so it is important to understand what 
he means by this term.  In his logic lectures, he explains that,  
A concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. A pure concept is one 
that is not abstracted from experience (vel empiricus vel intellectualis). A 
pure concept is one that is not abstracted from experience but arises rather 
from the understanding even as to content. (Jäsche Logic, 9:92)   
 
At first sight it might seem that in contrasting pure with empirical, Kant simply wishes to 
identify purity with a priority. Purity, however, involves more than mere a priority, for a 
pure concept must not only be a priori, but it must also “arise from the understanding as 
to its content”. Kant is more explicit about the distinction between purity and a priority in 
his introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason. In the first edition introduction he offers 
a definition of purity, explaining that, “every cognition is called pure. . .that is not mixed 
with anything foreign to it” (A10/B24).41 In the second edition he expands on this and 
makes it clear that he believes that not all a priori cognition is pure. Thus he explains 
that, 
Among a priori cognitions, however, those are called pure with which 
nothing empirical is intermixed. Thus, e.g., the proposition “Every 
alteration has its cause” is an a priori proposition, only not pure, since 
alteration is a concept that can be drawn only from experience. (B3) 
 
The example Kant gives here is of a proposition that is a priori but not pure, but his 
account of why it is not pure can also be applied to concepts. Indeed, the reason why the 
proposition Kant appeals to is not pure is because the concept of alteration is itself not a 
                                                 
41 Kant’s emphasis. 
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pure concept. The unschematised concept of a cause is one of the categories, and so is a 
product of the pure intellect; it is a priori and pure.42 The notion of alteration, on the 
other hand, although it is a priori, is not a product of the pure intellect, for the notion of 
alteration only makes sense in time, and so involves both the intellect and the faculty of 
intuition. Thus, Kant explains in the Transcendental Aesthetic that, 
the concept of alteration and, with it, the concept of motion (as alteration of 
place), is only possible through and in the representation of time – that if this 
representation [i.e. the representation of time] were not a priori (inner) intuition, 
then no concept, whatever it might be, could make comprehensible the possibility 
of an alteration, i.e., of a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates . . . in 
one and the same object. (A31/B48) 
 
The concept of alteration, then, is a priori. It is not, however, a pure concept because it is 
impossible to think of an alteration without thinking of its taking place in time. The 
notion of alteration does involve pure categories, but it also involves reference to our 
representation of time, and this representation of time, although it is a priori, is not a 
product of our intellect but a product of our faculty of intuition. In the concept of 
alteration pure concepts of the understanding (categories) are “mixed with something 
foreign” to them, namely our intuition of time. Only concepts which are products of the 
pure understanding, then, are, in the strict sense, pure concepts.43 
 
                                                 
42 The schematized concept of cause is, then, on my interpretation not a pure concept. Although, it is a pure 
schema. 
43 Thus the unschematized categories are pure, the schematized categories a priori, but not pure concepts. 
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This understanding of purity lies behind Kant’s distinction between pure philosophy (or 
metaphysics), on the one hand, and mathematics (and natural science) on the other.44 As 
Hartman (1974) explains in his introduction to Kant’s Logic,  
the pure part of natural cognition must show what reason can accomplish 
by itself and where it needs the assistance of principles of experience. 
Pure rational cognition based on mere concepts is called pure 
philosophy or metaphysics; whereas rational cognition based on the 
construction of concepts, through representation of an object in an 
intuition a priori, is called mathematics. (p.lxxix – my emphasis)  
 
According to Hartman, then, for Kant mathematics is a priori, but not pure. My claim is 
that, for Kant, our examination and understanding of the idea of a good will must be 
based upon pure philosophy understood in this sense.45  
 
To understand the distinction between concepts of pure reason and merely a priori 
concepts, then, one can consider the difference between our ideas of pure reason (such as 
God, or spirit) and the categories, which are pure concepts, and our (mathematical) 
concepts of numbers and shapes, which are a priori but not pure concepts. Numbers and 
shapes, then, not being empirical concepts, are thinkable a priori. They are not concepts 
of the pure intellect, however, because thinking them, according to Kant, also requires 
some input from the faculty of intuition. For numbers and shapes must be constructed a 
priori in pure intuition (in our pure intuitions of space and time). In other words, our 
(mathematical) concepts of numbers and shapes (and our concept of alteration) are not 
pure because they require the co-operation of two faculties: the faculty of intuition and 
                                                 
44 See Kant’s Preface to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science for this distinction. 
45 Mathematics involves the construction of concepts (in intuition), pure philosophy, in contract, starts with 
analysis, and Kant claims that moral philosophy is 90% analysis. 
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the faculty of understanding/reason. This can be expressed without making any reference 
to the notion of distinct faculties, in terms of the difference in content between these two 
types of concept. Concepts of number and shape are not pure because they have both a 
categorical (conceptual) and a spatio-temporal content. In contrast, ideas of pure reason, 
being pure, are thinkable without any input from the faculty of intuition and as such have 
no spatio-temporal content (or properties). They are, Kant believes, constructed purely 
from a priori concepts in pure thought, whereas our concepts of shapes are constructed in 
(the a priori intuition of) space, while numbers are constructed in (the a priori intuition 
of) time.46 The pure idea of a world, for example, can have no spatio-temporal content 
(and as a consequence can have no spatio-temporal qualities or properties). 
 
A pure idea, then, is one that originates purely from the intellect, with no input from the 
faculty of intuition. Thus, if our moral ideal is to be pure, it must not only be a priori but 
it must also have no intuitive content, that is, it must have no content provided by the 
faculty of intuition. In other words, Kant maintains that our moral ideal is ‘intelligible’; it 
is the idea of an individual conceived of in a non-spatio-temporal way.  
 
Our moral ideal is the pure idea of a member of a world 
 
Our moral ideal, then, must be a pure idea. But, Kant believes, we possess a number of 
pure ideas, and so the questions must be asked: which of our pure ideas can function as 
                                                 
46 Or, to be more precise, our concepts of numbers and shapes involve an awareness of how they are 
constructible in time or space. They are necessarily schematized. We cannot have the unschematized 
concept of a number or a shape. See the Schematism, A141/B180. 
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our moral ideal? Kant argues that to be moral is to choose to be a member of a moral 
world or a kingdom of ends. And he identifies the idea of a moral world with the idea of 
an intelligible world.47  For Kant, then, the choice to be moral is the choice to be ‘a 
member of an intelligible world’.  
 
In talking of an ‘intelligible world’, at least in the ethical context, Kant is not referring to 
some other, ontologically distinct world. Instead, when he talks of the idea of an 
intelligible world all he really means is our pure idea of a world, that is our idea of a 
world insofar as it is an object of the pure intellect.48 In many contexts in which Kant 
talks of “the intelligible world”, then, we could replace this expression with “our pure 
idea of a world”, and in this dissertation I will use these expressions interchangeably. On 
this interpretation the word ‘idea’ is redundant in the expression ‘our idea of an 
intelligible world’. I will, however, occasionally use this expression, just to remind the 
reader that when Kant is talking of ‘the intelligible world’ he is normally just talking 
about our idea of a world. Kant makes this clear in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he 
explains that, 
The mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the concept of a world in general, 
abstracting from all [spatio-temporal] conditions of intuiting it. 
(A433/B461 – my addition in square brackets) 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that when he talks of the intelligible world, or mundus 
intelligibilis, all he means is our pure concept of a world. He also makes this clear in his 
                                                 
47
 Thus, in the Critique of Pure Reason he can write: “an intelligible, i.e., a moral world” (A811/B839). 
48 In the expression the “idea of the intelligible world”, grammatically, “intelligible” is modifying “world”, 
but Kant is writing clumsily because it should really be modifying “idea”, stressing that the idea is a pure 
idea, that is, a product of the pure intellect. “Pure” and “intelligible”, in this context, amount to the same 
thing. 
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metaphysics lectures, where he argues that, “there is also an intelligible world that exists 
merely in my understanding apart from all possible experience; but in this, space and 
time are out of the question” (29:858).49 The intelligible world, then, is merely an object 
of pure thought, or an idea; it is the idea of a world that is not spatio-temporal and which 
has no objective reality [at least from the theoretical perspective]. In other words, this 
idea cannot be an object of our faculty of intuition and as a result cannot be an object of 
experience. However, although such a world cannot be an object of (our faculty of) 
intuition, it can be an object of choice, or what Kant calls our faculty of desire. For he 
believes that although it is impossible for us to experience a world corresponding to our 
pure idea of a world50, it is possible for us to choose to be a member of such a world. He 
does not, however, believe that there is any theoretical justification for believing that 
such a world, corresponding to our idea, actually exists, or even that such a world is 
really possible. Our pure idea of a world, then, contains no contradictions, and so it is 
conceivable that a world could actually exist corresponding to this idea. Given the 
conceivability of such a world there is nothing irrational in making it our life project to be 
member of such a world.  
 
Our idea of an intelligible world is the idea of a community of individuals in 
interaction51  
                                                 
49 Elsewhere he argues that, “a foreigner called it fantasy to speak of the intelligible world <mundo 
intelligibili>. But this is just the opposite, for one understands by it not another world, but rather this 
world as I think of it through the understanding” (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:850 – my emphasis). 
50 Or even for us to experience something corresponding to our pure idea of a of a member of a world. 
51 This account seems to be at odds with certain claims Kant makes in the first Critique. In particular, in the 
first Critique, Kant distinguishes between three ideas of pure reason – namely the ideas of the soul, the 
world and God. Each of these is derived from one of the three categories of relation. And in the first 
Critique the idea of the world is not derived from the category of community but from that of the second 
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Kant believes that our idea of a world is, by definition, the idea of a whole. Kant states 
this explicitly and frequently in his metaphysics lectures. For example in his lectures 
from 1792-3 he argues that, 
A multitude of substances without connection makes no world. One must 
thus not define world: the universe of substances, but rather the whole of 
them. (Metaphysik Dohna, 28:657) 
 
And he makes it clear that he believes that we can only think of a whole of substances if 
we think of the substances as connected and interacting.52 Kant continues by introducing 
the distinction between the form and matter of a world and arguing that while the 
“material of the world are substances”, the formal element 
                                                                                                                                                 
category of relation and thus here the idea of a world is the idea of a series and not the idea of a 
community. I suggest that in the first Critique he is giving an account of our idea of the phenomenal world, 
and not an account of our idea of a noumenal world. It should be clear, however, that when he talks of the 
intelligible world in his metaphysical writings and in his ethical work he has something more in mind than 
the idea of a series. I suggest  that Kant ultimately believes that there is only one idea of pure reason – but 
that this idea is complex. Specifically I suggest that Kant believes that we have the complex idea of ‘a 
world (or community) of individual substances created by God’. I suggest that none of the component 
ideas, distinguished in the first Critique, can ultimately be thought in separation from one another. And 
hence, that each idea (for example the idea of a ‘world’ or ‘community’) involves all of the categories.  I 
have discussed this in slightly more detail in chapter one. And I believe that the account offered here is 
ultimately compatible with Kant’s account in the first Critique. However a defense of this belief, and in 
particular an account of how the three ideas of pure reason identified in the first Critique are derived from 
the three categories of relation, is beyond the scope of my dissertation. I will merely suggest that in the first 
Critique Kant is interested merely in examining three aspects of this complex idea. Thinking of the three 
ideas of pure reason identified in the first Critique as aspects of one unified complex idea helps us 
understand the unity of reason.   
52 Kant’s claim that a multitude of substances can only constitute a world insofar as they interact should be 
read as a denial of the Leibnizian claim that isolated monads can constitute a world, or even a possible 
world, on the basis of the (pre-established) harmony between them. At this stage I have suggested that 
individuals can be thought of as being members of a world only insofar as they are in interaction. In 
Chapter 6, when I examine Kant's analysis of action, I will argue that individuals can only interact if they 
are already members of a community, and so one cannot explain how it is possible for individuals to be 
members of a unified community on the basis of the fact that they interact. So Kant's account of how 
individuals can thought of as members of a unified community cannot appeal to their interaction. In 
Chapter 7, when I examine Kant's account of our idea of community I will explain how his analysis of this 
idea is not based upon presupposing the interaction of the individuals that constitute a community. 
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is the real connection <nexus realis> of these substances. Real connection 
is reciprocal influence (acting and suffering). . . a multitude of substances 
without connection makes no world. (Metaphysik Dohna, 28:657) 
 
The idea of a world, then, is the idea of a whole of (individual) substances, and we can 
only think of a whole consisting of individuals if we think of the whole as a community 
and the individuals that constitute the whole as really interacting. As a consequence of 
this definition of a world, the idea of a member of a world is, by definition, the idea of 
‘an individual in real interaction with other individuals’.  
 
This identification of the idea of a world with the idea of a community is not an off the 
cuff remark. Because this identification is so important for my thesis I will provide some 
more textual evidence for my interpretation. 
 
In his lectures from the early 1780s Kant once again distinguishes between the idea of a 
world and that of a mere multitude and argues that, 
a great multitude of isolated substances would not constitute a world 
(isolated substances are only the stuff for a world), because they would not 
constitute a whole, but rather each of them would be entirely alone and 
without any community with the others. (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:853 
– my emphasis) 
 
Substances, then, can only constitute a world if they are in community with one another. 
Kant's belief, that our idea of a world is, by definition, the idea of a community of 
substances (or individuals), can be traced back to his pre-critical period. Thus, in his 
metaphysics lectures from the mid-1770s he claims that, 
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The aggregation of the substances in which there is no community still 
does not constitute a world. Reciprocal determination, the form of the 
world as a composite <compositi>, rests upon interaction <commercio>. If 
we thought substances without real connection <absque nexu reali> 
and without interaction <commercium>, where every substance would 
be in and for itself and they would have no community with one 
another, then that would indeed be a multitude <multitude>, but still 
not a world. // Thus the connection <nexus> of substances that stand in 
interaction <commercio> is the essential condition of the world. 
(Metaphysik L2, 28:196 – my emphasis) 
 
Once again Kant makes it quite clear that the distinction between a world and a mere 
multitude is that for a set of individuals to constitute a world there must be some ‘real 
connection’ between them, that they must interact and constitute a community. Similar 
passages are not hard to find.53 The idea of an intelligible world, then, is the pure idea of 
a community of substances. And, as we have seen in chapter one, I believe that the idea 
of a kingdom of ends is merely the idea of a world, understood in this sense as a 
community of substances in real interaction. 
 
To choose to be moral, then, is to choose to be a member of a community. In some sense, 
then, Kant’s ethics should be understood as ‘communitarian’. This is not to say that to be 
moral is to choose to be a member of some actual community; rather, to be moral is to 
choose to be a member of an ideal community. In saying this I agree with O’Neill (1989), 
who argues that, “the Categorical Imperative states essential requirements for a possible 
community (not an actual community) of separate, free and rational beings” (p.44). 
O’Neill, however, does not explicitly draw the conclusion that this implies that an 
explanation of the possibility of morality involves an explanation of how we can actually 
                                                 
53 See for example: 28:581-2, 28:45, 29:851-2, 29:868, & 29:1006-7. 
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have an a priori idea of such a community.  For Kant believes that our idea of 
‘community’ is an a priori and pure idea and we know by examining this idea a priori 
how we would have to act if we decide we desire to be a member of a community. It is 
instructive, at this point, to compare Kant with Hume. Hume is an empiricist, believing 
that all of our ideas must have an empirical origin. Hume’s empiricism informs his ethics 
and political philosophy, for he believes that our idea or conception of society must be 
based upon experience. As a result of this he argues, in the Treatise, that the idea of a 
pre-social duty to enter into society is non-sensical, because we cannot actually acquire 
the idea of society until we have actually experienced a society.54 Hume’s extreme 
empiricist assumptions, then, form the basis for his rejection of Locke’s political 
philosophy, for Locke argues that, even in the state of nature, man would capable of 
recognizing a reason to enter into society, which implies that man must be capable of 
possessing the idea of society before he actually experiences one. Kant sides with Locke 
on this issue, believing that we have a duty to enter into society. As a consequence he 
believes that our idea of society must be a priori.55 Unlike Locke, however, Kant believes 
that he can provide a detailed account of what is involved in this a priori idea of society 
or community, for he believes that we can trace this idea back to the category of 
                                                 
54 Thus, Hume (1978) argues, presumably against Locke, that, “in order to form society, ‘tis requisite not 
only that it be advantageous, but also that men be sensible of its advantages; and ‘tis impossible in their 
wild uncultivated state, that by study and reflection alone, they should ever be able to attain this 
knowledge” (p.486). This is the reason why Hume claims that justice is an artificial virtue. The reason why 
we cannot, in the state of nature, have knowledge that society would be beneficial is because in the state of 
nature we do not have the idea of society. I suggest the reason for this is Hume’s belief that, “all beings in 
the universe, consider’d in themselves, appear entirely loose and independent of each other. ‘Tis only by 
experience that we learn their influence and connexion” (p.466). 
55 Unlike Locke, however, Kant believes that he has the philosophical resources, lacking to the empiricist, 
to explain the nature and ‘genesis’ of this idea of society. For the idea of community is based on the 
category of community, which in turn is derived from the disjunctive form of judgment. In Chapter 6, I will 
explain, in more detail, the a priori nature of the idea of community, its basis in the table of judgments and 
its relationship to the idea of autonomy. 
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community and the corresponding disjunctive form of judgment. In chapter eight I will 
examine Kant's account of the origin of this idea in more detail. 
 
The idea of a member of a community (or world) is the idea of an autonomous agent 
 
Reflecting on what is involved in our pure idea of a world, then, we realize that in order 
to be a member of a world an individual must have certain characteristics.  In particular, 
Kant believes that our pure idea of a community (or world) can only be the idea of a 
community of autonomous agents, each of whom ‘gives’ or legislates the laws of the 
community. As a consequence of this, the pure idea of a member of a world is the idea of 
an autonomous agent. The reason for this is that Kant believes that a world is essentially 
unified, for, as we have seen, it is this unity that distinguishes the idea of a world from 
that of a mere multitude. In addition, he believes that a world can only be unified or ‘held 
together’ by laws, with such laws being understood to be intelligible relations. So the idea 
of a world is the idea of a multitude of individuals unified by laws. Now, if the unity of a 
world is to be ‘intrinsic’ to the world, rather than merely existing in the mind of some 
ideal observer observing the world, then the members of the world must be responsible 
for the unity of the world, and Kant believes that this is only possible if each individual 
member of the world is the source of, or ‘the giver of’, the laws that  provide the world 
with its unity. In other words, each member of a world must be autonomous. Thus, our 
pure idea of a world is the idea of a multitude of autonomous agents.  
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If we decide to make it our fundamental project to be a member of an intelligible world 
we must behave in a way that makes this possible. In particular we must choose to be 
autonomous, to be legislators, giving and abiding by the laws of such a potential world. If 
we act in such a way we have no theoretical grounds for assuming that we will actually 
become members of such a world, for we have no theoretical grounds for assuming that 
there is actually, or even could be, such an intelligible world corresponding to our idea. 
The pure idea of a world, however, does not contain any contradictions, so there is 
nothing irrational in hoping to become a member of such a world. This involves hoping 
that there is an intelligible world corresponding to our pure idea of a world which 
actually exists, and that if we act suitably we can become members of it. Or perhaps, and 
I think that this is perhaps Kant’s considered opinion, we can hope that even if such a 
world does not actually exist, we can actually bring it into being through our willing. 
  
It should be clear from what I have said above that I am advocating a particular 
conception of autonomy. To be autonomous, on this interpretation, is not merely to ‘give 
law to oneself’, but to give a particular type of law to oneself. To be autonomous is to 
give laws that bind both oneself and others. One could, however, imagine a solipsistic 
egoist who wants to give some unity to his life and so chooses to act only on certain 
principles or laws. Such an egoist attempts to give law to himself, but the only law he 
attempts to submit himself to is an intra-personal law. Kant suggests that Wolff can be 
thought of as advocating such an ethical principle, for the principle of perfection demands 
that we unify our desires and inclinations, but not necessarily in a way that makes them 
compatible with the desires and inclinations of others. Nietzsche also, at times, seems to 
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advocate a sort of egoistic, solipsistic autonomy.56 Such an individual, who attempts to 
give unity to her inclinations by subjecting them to some personal law, might be thought 
of as taking Leibniz’s conception of a monad as her moral ideal. The Leibnizian believes 
that the only type of finite individual we can conceive of is a solitary individual. Such an 
individual is essentially active and its activity is that of having representations. A 
Leibnizian monad, then, can be thought of as a series or stream of representations. This 
stream, however, is essentially unified. What unifies the representations of an individual 
is that they are subject to a law, and Leibniz calls this law, which provides the 
representations of an individual their unity, the ‘law of the individual’ or the ‘law of the 
series’. The law of the series can be thought of the source of the series of representations 
and, Leibniz believes, accounts for the unity of the individual. Such a law, however, is to 
regarded purely as an internal law. An egoist, then, who takes such a conception of an 
individual as his ideal would try to unify his representations (or desires) but thinks that 
this can be done purely by reference to some law purely internal to the himself, perhaps 
the ‘law of his genius’. The ‘rational’ solipsist (or a rational hedonist), then, can be 
thought of as attempting to subject herself to purely intra-personal laws, which make no 
reference to other individuals.  Such an individual may claim that they are striving to be 
autonomous, claiming that they subject themselves to their own laws, or perhaps that they 
subject themselves to the law of their own genius. An autonomous agent in Kant's sense, 
however, legislates and subjects himself to inter-personal laws, that is, to laws of a 
                                                 
56 Thus,  in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1969), in the section  Of the Way of the Creator, 
Zarathustra asks: “Do you call yourself free? I want to hear your ruling idea, and not that you have escaped 
from a yoke. . . Free from what? Zarathustra does not care about that! But your eye should clearly tell me: 
free for what? Can you furnish yourself with your own good and evil and hang up your own will above 
yourself as a law? Can you be judge of yourself and avenger of your law?” (p.89). Nietzsche seems to 
suggest that we must be creative in the sense of creating our own, individual intra-personal law.   
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possible (ideal) community. To be autonomous, in the Kantian sense, then, is not merely 
to legislate for oneself but for a (potential) community.57 
 
Deciding to be moral, then, is a bit like deciding to join a club. One can imagine the idea 
of an ideal club and decide that the most important thing in life is to be a member of such 
a club. The idea of such a club, to be an adequate idea, will include, in general, a 
conception of what the membership criteria are. Now we don’t know whether such a club 
exists or not. And there is nothing I can do alone to bring this club into existence – for the 
existence of the club, even if such a club is possible, depends upon others freely choosing 
to become members (for a club of one is not a club), and this is not something I have, or 
could have, any control over. If, however, I decide that being a member of this club is the 
only important thing in my life, then I will make satisfying the membership criteria the 
primary concern of my life, and must just hope that there are others who (a) know the 
rules of the club (i.e. that there are others who are conscious of the moral law – the same 
moral law I am conscious of) and (b) decide to become members. 
 
To conclude: A moral idealist is someone who believes that at the heart of our ethical 
judgments and practices lies the pure a priori idea of a particular kind of individual. My 
claim is that Kant is an ethical idealist and that such an ‘ideal’, which he often calls ‘the 
idea of a good will’, lies at the heart of Kant’s ethics. The main aim of this dissertation 
will be to examine what is involved in this ideal. I will argue that the moral ideal of a 
‘good will’ is to be identified with the ‘cosmological idea’ of ‘a member of an intelligible 
                                                 
57 In claiming this I am disagreeing with Schönfeld (2000), who argues that, “Leibniz’s pre-established 
harmony permits the autonomy of souls” (p.141). 
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world’, and that we can understand many of Kant’s ethical claims by looking at what he 
has to say about the idea of ‘an intelligible world’ in his metaphysical works. The most 
fruitful sources of information on how Kant conceived of an intelligible world are his 
pre-critical writings and his Lectures on Metaphysics, and these sources will be referred 
to frequently in this thesis.  
 
(2b) Kant’s Phenomenal Solipsism 
 
In claiming that Kant advocates an ‘ethics of interaction’ (or perhaps an ‘ethics of 
relations’) I mean that Kant’s moral ideal is the idea of being an individual in interaction 
with other individuals and that, as a consequence, to be moral is to choose to interact with 
others. Indeed, one could say that, for Kant, to be moral is to choose that others exist. The 
reason for saying this is because Kant believes that the existence of (other) individuals is 
not something that is given to us in experience, rather we merely have a pure a priori idea 
of the other, and nothing given in experience can be adequate to this idea.58 To 
understand what this might mean it is necessary to understand Kant’s attitude towards 
solipsism and ‘the problem of other minds’.  
 
Kant believes there is and can be no theoretical answer to the solipsist. We have no way 
of knowing or even reasonably inferring that other individuals actually exist. 
                                                 
58 Indeed, we are not aware of our own existence as an individual. We have the idea of individuality, but do 
no, and cannot, have the experience of an individual. Not only do I have to choose that others exist as 
individuals, I am faced with the choice of whether I want to make it my project to exist as an individual. 
These two choices, however, go hand in hand. 
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Theoretically there is no escape from solipsism, or what Kant calls ‘egoism’.59 
Phenomenal experience provides us with no evidence for the existence of other 
individuals – indeed it provides us with no evidence that we ourselves are really 
individuals. This does not, however, imply that we must become solipsists or egoists. For 
the ‘problem of other minds’ is not a theoretical problem but a moral one. We are free, 
Kant believes, to treat the world around us as a world of objects, regarding the living 
bodies around us as complicated machines merely to be used. We can, however, choose 
to regard other living human beings as individual persons by attempting to interact with 
them intelligibly; this is what we do when we choose to listen to our conscience.  We 
cannot know that the human beings we encounter around us really are rational 
individuals, for we do not experience them as individuals, but we can choose to think of 
them as individuals without contradiction. 
 
A number of Kant scholars, most notably Strawson, Bird and Walsh, who have attempted 
to give a Wittgensteinian interpretation of Kant, would disagree with this solipsistic 
reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. For, on their interpretations, the conditions for 
the possibility of judgment that Kant enumerates in the Critique of Pure Reason should 
be understood as conditions for the possibility of intersubjective agreement. On such an 
interpretation, Kant’s whole theoretical framework presupposes the existence of other 
minds. 
  
                                                 
59
 Kant makes it clear that he identifies egoism with solipsism in his metaphysics lectures. For example in 
his lectures from 1792-3 he claims that, “the Egoist is he who holds himself, as thinking being, as the only 
worldly being” (Metaphysik Dohna, 28:663). 
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In his review of Walsh’s Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics, Guyer (1977) rejects such 
Wittgensteinian interpretations of Kant, arguing that, “intersubjectivity plays no role at 
all in the main argument of the Critique of Pure Reason” (p.268). Guyer argues that, 
Such interpretations give both the concept and the possibility of other 
persons a force which they are not meant to have in Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction. Instead, Kant’s argument adopts the 
standpoint of methodological solipsism in order to construct the 
strongest possible answer to an empiricist skepticism. (p.266) 
 
Guyer is right to stress that Kant’s theoretical arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason 
make no appeal to the notion of intersubjectivity or to inter-personal agreement. 
However, I do not think Guyer goes far enough here, for Kant does not merely ‘adopt the 
attitude of methodological solipsism’.60 Instead he is committed to what I shall call 
phenomenal solipsism (or egoism). In other words, Kant believes that the world actually 
appears to us solipsistically. The world we experience is experienced, Kant believes, as a 
world in which there are no true individuals. We do not, then, experience other human 
beings as individuals or persons; rather, it is up to us, from the practical perspective, to 
choose whether or not recognize other human beings as individuals existing 
independently of us and to treat them as persons. Kant, then, is not merely committed to 
the position that from the theoretical perspective there is no answer to the solipsist, but 
                                                 
60 I should point out at this juncture that, unlike Guyer, I do not see Kant’s primary goal as attempting to 
provide a answer to (empiricist) skepticism. Instead I regard him as engaged in a type of phenomenology, 
attempting to describe the nature and structure of our experience (in such a way as to leave morality 
possible). I do not, then, think he is primarily concerned with justifying our judgements, but with 
explaining how we are able to make them. As a result, I do not regard his solipsism in the Critique of Pure 
Reason as ‘methodological’.  Although Kant himself argues for the primacy of the practical over the 
theoretical I do not believe he goes far enough. He seems to believe that the account of experience he offers 
in the first Critique is true. For me it is enough that it is a plausible story, and one that leaves room for the 
possibility of morality. 
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also to the stronger position that if the phenomenal world were all there were then the 
solipsist would be right. 
 
Kant's remarks on Spinoza in his published writings makes his attitude clear. For Kant 
repeatedly maintains that if things in themselves really did exist is space and time as we 
experience them, then Spinoza would be right in believing that God is the only real 
substance or individual. And Kant believes that to claim that God is the only true 
individual or substance is equivalent to claiming that God is the only real being. Thus, in 
the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant explains that, 
If this ideality of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but 
Spinozism, in which space and time are essential determinations of the 
original being itself, while the things dependent upon it (ourselves 
therefore included) are not substances [i.e. simple, individuals] but merely 
accidents inhering in it; (5:102 – my addition in square brackets)61 
 
This is why Kant believes that the ‘realist’ believes “that there is nothing present outside 
him, but rather everything that we see is mere illusion”. For we must remember that Kant 
is working in the Leibnizian tradition. In this tradition all beings must ultimately be 
simple and indivisible, or composed of simples. As Leibniz (1989) famously claims, 
“what is not truly a being is not truly a being. It has always been thought that one and 
being are reciprocal terms” (p.85). The (transcendental) realist claims that the objects of 
experience, or bodies, are the only things that are ‘real’; what you see is what you get. 
Bodies, however, are not simple; existing in space, they are, Kant believes, infinitely 
                                                 
61 Kant also equates transcendental realism with Spinozism on a number of occasions in his metaphysics 
lectures, claiming, for example, that, “if we consider space as real, we assume Spinoza’s system” 
(Metaphysik Dohna, 28:666). See also: 28:567, 29:1008-9 & 29:977-8.  
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divisible.62 So to claim that bodies are all that is real is, in effect, to deny that anything 
really exists independently of us. Thus, if we accept Kant’s Leibnizian assumption that 
everything real must be simple, the realist, in affirming that (apart from ourselves) only 
bodies possess reality, is in fact committing himself to what Kant calls empirical 
idealism, for he is implicitly committed to the position that there is nothing real external 
to us.  
 
Realism and idealism 
 
Kant is famous for claiming to be an empirical realist but a transcendental idealist. And 
he believes that a commitment to what he calls ‘transcendental realism’ (and Kant would 
class both contemporary naturalism and physicalism as forms of transcendental realism) 
is equivalent to being an empirical egoist or solipsist. This is what he means when he 
claims in the Critique of Pure Reason that, “transcendental realism. . . finds itself 
required to give way to empirical idealism” (A371), for empirical idealism is equivalent 
to solipsism or egoism.  This identification of realism with solipsism may sound 
surprising, because there is a tendency to understand the terms ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ 
anachronistically. To understand what Kant means by claiming to be a transcendental 
idealist but an empirical realist, we need to understand how the terms ‘idealism’ and 
‘realism’ were used in 18th century German metaphysics; ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ were 
understood to be alternatives to (Cartesian) dualism. Thus, in 18th century metaphysics 
                                                 
62 As he argues in his lectures from 1792-3: “[I]n the world of appearances, there are no simple parts. Only 
in the intelligible world, noumenal world is of monads, but we do not at all cognize it” (Metaphysik Dohna, 
28:663-4). 
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textbooks, questions about idealism were discussed as a part of ‘Rational Psychology’, 
and the standard distinctions were between egoism, dualism and idealism. Understood in 
this context, idealism, dualism and egoism are metaphysical positions concerning what 
types of substances there are. Kant will argue that ‘dualism’ is untenable and that 
‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, at least insofar as they were traditionally understood, collapse 
into one another. Kant himself believes that he has a far more tenable position, which he 
calls transcendental, or formal, idealism. 
 
‘Idealism’ can be understood in two senses. On the one hand idealism can mean the 
denial of the reality of the world around us. On the other hand, it can mean the claim that 
(only) ‘spirits’ or ‘minds’ really exist independently of us. I will call the first conception 
of idealism ‘idealism in the negative sense’ and the second ‘idealism in the positive 
sense’. 
 
Baumgarten defines ‘idealism’ in his Metaphysics, the textbook that Kant used for his 
metaphysics lectures for over 30 years, in the following terms: “He who admits only 
spirits in this world is an IDEALIST.” (#402) Kant follows this definition in his own 
lectures but then identifies the alternative to idealism, so understood, not as realism but as 
egoism.63 Given the fact that, traditionally, realism was considered to be the alternative to 
idealism, labeling the alternative to idealism ‘egoism’ provides strong evidence that Kant 
believes that the (traditional) realist must be an egoist or solipsist. Kant, then, contrasts 
                                                 
63 In fact, following Baumgarten, Kant distinguishes between egoism, idealism and dualism. Claiming that, 
“the dualist believes in thinking beings and bodies outside him.” (29:928) However, Kant rejects dualism 
out of hand arguing that, “in general it [Dualism] is so absurd that it may well never occur to affirm this 
error seriously, even if it were irrefutable as well” (29:928). 
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the egoist who maintains that, “there is nothing present outside him, but rather everything 
that we see is mere illusion” (29:927), with the idealist (and here Kant is clearly talking 
of idealism in the positive sense), and explains that, “idealism is when one imagines that 
outside oneself thinking beings are indeed present, but not bodies” (29:928).64 Kant 
continues by maintaining that the egoist cannot be refuted, at least not by our 
experience.65  
 
In his ethical writings Kant advocates something like idealism in the positive sense, for to 
be virtuous is to choose to (or at least to strive to) regard ourselves and other human 
beings as individuals. It is to choose to interact with other individuals, with other ‘spirits’, 
and not just in some fantasy world, but in the physical world we experience. However, 
we do not, and cannot, experience physical objects (including the physical human beings 
around us) as individuals. Indeed, we may well ask: How is it possible for a physical 
object to be an individual agent (or ‘spirit’)? For physical objects are necessarily spatio-
                                                 
64 Of course, in claiming to be a ‘transcendental’ idealist, Kant ultimately wants to reject both realism and 
idealism (or perhaps we could say he wishes to accept them both, merely denying their negative claims). 
The purpose of this discussion, however, is merely to show that Kant follows Baumgarten in claiming that 
the alternative to idealism is egoism, which implies that Kant believes that ‘realism’ and ‘egoism’ are 
interchangeable terms. I believe that, following Leibniz, Kant believes that everything that exists must be 
simple. The realist, then, is a solipsist because he believes that what we see is what we get, and we never 
experience anything simple. The idealist, on the other hand and rather paradoxically for the contemporary 
reader, actually affirms the existence of true individuals independent of us. Kant, being a transcendental, or 
formal, idealist will claim that the lack of simplicity in the objects of experience is not due to the objects 
themselves but is due to our form of intuition. Thus Kant explains in his lectures on metaphysics from the 
1790s that, “Whoever maintains and assumes ideality with respect to the form, that space and time are not 
properties, but rather are only subjective conditions of our intuition, he is a transcendental idealist” 
(28:773). Kant explains the benefit of adopting transcendental idealism in the preceding sentence. Here 
Kant claims that, “[if e]xtension has its ground in my representation; the thing itself can be simple”. 
Transcendental idealism, then, provides a way of explaining how we can still think of objects of sense (and 
in particular the other human beings we experience) as simple, even though we can only experience them 
as infinitely divisible. Transcendental idealism, then, allows us to assume that the lack of simplicity in the 
objects of experience is due to our manner of experiencing things and not due to the things themselves. 
65 “I cannot refute the egoist by experience, for this instructs us immediately only of our own existence” 
(29:927). 
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temporal, whereas spirits are by definition non-spatio-temporal.  To act morally involves 
regarding (and treating) other bodies as autonomous individuals.66 The problem the 
ethicist faces is that all objects of experience (bodies, including human bodies) are 
experienced as non-individual.67 One solution would be to adopt a dualist position and 
argue that bodies and minds (spirits) are two distinct types of things. Kant, however does 
not want to take this route for it would suggest that we don’t really have any real ethical 
duties towards the human beings (bodies) around us, but, at most, only to the minds they 
are somehow connected to. Kant rejects this route because he believes that: (a) we can 
only have ethical commitments towards individuals but, (b) we have ethical 
commitments towards the human beings (bodies) around us.68 It is only possible to hold 
both of these commitments if it is possible for us to think of the human beings (bodies) 
around us as individuals without contradiction. The problem, however, is to explain how 
it is possible to think of bodies as (simple) individuals given that they are experienced as 
essentially spatio-temporal, and hence as non-simple.  
 
So far in this discussion I have couched this discussion in terms of the necessary 
individuality of an autonomous individual. Some commentators may not be sympathetic 
towards my stress on the importance of the notion of individuality in Kant's ethics. An 
                                                 
66 It is not clear to me whether Kant thinks there is any distinction between the choice to really recognize 
other human beings as autonomous and the choice to treat other human beings as autonomous. I suspect 
that Kant's considered opinion is that we can only treat others human beings as not autonomous insofar as 
we choose not to recognize them as autonomous. This is a consequence of his belief, discussed in chapter 
one, that the commands of morality are like Sirens voices, and in so far as we choose to listen to the 
commands of morality they are irresistible.   
67 This is a rather clumsy expression, but it is important to stress that Kant does not merely make the claim 
that (human) bodies are not experienced as individuals, but also makes a stronger claim, namely, that 
bodies as experienced are experienced as not being individuals. 
68 Kant's commitment to (b) is a result of his respect for common sense, pre-philosophical, ethical 
commitments. For (b) is a central commitment of common sense morality. 
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analogous argument could be made in terms of the necessarily unconditioned nature of 
our idea of an autonomous individual.69 Kant believes that we can only have moral 
relations with unconditioned (free) beings, but that we experience every body as 
essentially conditioned, and, thus, he must be able to explain how it is possible for us to 
think of bodies as unconditioned without contradiction. 
 
Kant's solution to the mind-body problem - transcendental (formal) idealism 
 
In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes famously argues that mind and body must be distinct 
kinds of substance because (i) mind is essentially simple (indivisible) whereas (ii) body is 
essentially divisible, and (iii) one kind of substance cannot be both essentially divisible 
and essentially indivisible (simple). Kant accepts premises (i) and (ii), but he cannot 
accept the conclusion, and so rejects premise (iii).70 The rejection of premise (iii) is 
transcendental idealism. But how can we possibly reject premise (iii)? 
 
Kant’s answer will be to claim that although (a) the objects of experience are real, (b) 
their (infinitely) divisible form is ideal or merely apparent.71 This offers a solution to the 
mind/spirit problem72, for it allows us to explain how we can think of the bodies we 
experience as simple (minds or spirits) without contradiction, even though it is a 
                                                 
69 Although, here, a critic of Kant could object to Kant's move from the claim that our idea of an 
autonomous being must (as an idea) be unconditioned to the claim that our idea of an autonomous being 
must be the idea of an unconditioned being.  
70 Although, for Kant, the problem isn’t the mind-body problem, but the spirit-body problem. 
71 (a) is Kant’s empirical realism, (b) his transcendental, or formal, idealism. 
72 In his lectures Kant customarily introduces transcendental idealism in the context of his discussion the 
mind-body problem and rational psychology. Similarly, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses 
transcendental idealism in the Paralogisms, a section that corresponds to rational psychology in traditional 
metaphysics textbooks.  
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condition of our experience that we experience them as essentially non-simple.73 
Transcendental idealism, then, leaves conceptual space for us to think of the objects we 
experience as simple even though they necessarily appear to us as non-simple, and this 
allows us to accept the reality of both bodies and spirits (‘minds’) without accepting 
dualism. It does this by postulating a distinction between the form and the matter of the 
objects of experience and affirming the reality of the matter of the objects of experience 
while denying the reality of their spatio-temporal form. The spatio-temporal form of 
these objects is ideal and subjective. This allows room for us to think of (at least some) 
objects of experience as simple (as spirits) without contradiction, and this is necessary if 
we are to have moral relations towards human bodies. If we reject transcendental 
idealism, and, following the transcendental realist, affirm the reality of both the form and 
matter of the objects of experience, we must maintain that the world is in itself spatio-
temporal as it appears to us. This would imply that there is nothing simple independent of 
us. And, if we assume with Leibniz that what is not truly a being is not truly a being, to 
maintain there is nothing simple independent of us is to claim that nothing really exists 
independently of us. Thus, given the untenability of dualism, if we accept the Leibnizian 
assumption, the transcendental realist can only be an egoist or solipsist. Transcendental 
idealism, on the other hand, in claiming that the lack of simplicity we experience in the 
world is merely due to our form of intuition, leaves room for the logical possibility that 
some of the bodies that we experience as non-simple are in fact, in themselves, simple 
                                                 
73 Similarly it also explains how we can think of other people as unconditioned even though we experience 
them as conditioned. 
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individuals. 74 Whether we choose to regard some of the bodies around us as true 
individuals is not, however, a theoretical matter, but a practical one.  
 
In our daily lives, then, we encounter many bodies. We do not experience them as simple. 
We do not experience them as individuals. This is true even of the human beings we 
encounter. We know that human beings can die and decompose. They can be cut up and 
burned. They can all disappear into crowds. This is not, for Kant, a moral claim, but a 
claim about the nature of our experience. It is just a fact about our experience that we 
experience nothing as simple and truly individual. For, Kant believes, the idea of an 




Our moral ideal is the idea of a member of an intelligible world (or community), and this 
is the idea of an autonomous individual. Individuality is, however, intelligible. An 
                                                 
74 This interpretation of Kant is diametrically opposed to Schopenhauer’s, for Schopenhauer argues that, for 
Kant, individuals exist only phenomenally, whereas the intelligible realm is one. Thus Hollingdale writes 
(in Schopenhauer, 1970) that, according to Schopenhauer, “since Kant had proved that space and time, the 
spatio-temporal fragmentation of the world, belonged as forms of perception only to the plane of 
phenomena, the noumenal plane, the ‘real world’ of the thing in itself, must be one and indivisible. 
Consequently the will in the stone and the will in me is the same will” (p.21). However, Kant is driven to 
transcendental idealism because he wants to avoid Spinozism, for “Those who assume space as a matter in 
itself or as a constitution of things in themselves, are required to be Spinozists, i.e., they assume the world 
to be the summation of the determinations of a united necessary substance, thus only one substance” 
(29:1009). Transcendental Idealism, however, allows us to avoid making this assumption. 
75 I am focusing on ‘simplicity’ here for the sake of argument. Kant believes that ‘spirits’ must be 
autonomous individuals, and as individuals they must be simple, in addition, however, a part of being 
autonomous is the idea of being a cause which is not an effect. Kant also believes that we cannot 
experience anything as a cause which is not an effect. Indeed it is a feature of the temporal nature of our 
experience that everything we experience must be experienced as an effect. Transcendental idealism allows 
us to claim that it is not a fact about things themselves that everything must be an effect, but merely a fact 
about the nature of our experience. 
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‘individual’ is an object of thought, not an object (or even a possible object) of 
experience; it is an idea. It is impossible for us to experience any object as an individual. 
We can, however, if we are transcendental idealists, think of objects of experience as 
individuals without contradiction. In so doing we think of ourselves as members of an 
intelligible world. For we think of them as intelligible (rather then phenomenal) and we 
are related to them.  This is what lies behind Kant’s claim in the Groundwork that: 
By thinking itself into a world of understanding practical reason does not 
overstep its boundaries, but it would certainly do so if it wanted to intuit or 
feel itself into it. (4:458)76 
 
In addition, not only can we think ourselves into a world of understanding (an intelligible 
world), we can also choose to be members of such a world. For although we cannot intuit 
or feel ourselves into such a world, Kant believes that we can will our way into it. For 
although the thought of a world of understanding cannot be an object of my faculty of 
intuition, nor of my faculty of feeling77, it can be an object of my faculty of desire, or will. 
This will be the topic of the following chapter. 
                                                 
76 This claim should be read in conjunction with Kant’s claim in the preface of the second edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason that, “even if we cannot cognize these same objects [objects of experience] as 
things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves” (Bxxvi). 
77 Kant perhaps changed his mind about this question. 
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Chapter Three 
The Kingdom of Ends as a Community of Spirits: 




I have argued that, for the mature Kant, the idea of a kingdom of ends is an idea of pure 
reason, being the idea of an intelligible world, or community. In this chapter I will 
examine the genesis of Kant's conception of a kingdom of ends. I will argue that Kant 
first started to think of morality in terms of striving to be a member of a kingdom of ends, 
understood as an ideal community, in the early 1760s, and that he was influenced in this 
by his encounter with the Swedish mystic Emanuel Swedenborg. Swedenborg wrote 
volumes about his visions of heaven and hell, and in 1766 Kant published a book on 
Swedenborg, Dreams of a Spirit Seer, a commentary on Swedenborg’s magnum opus, 
Heavenly Secrets. Most commentators take Kant's attitude towards Swedenborg to have 
been entirely negative, and argue that, at the most, Kant's encounter with him had a 
purely negative impact upon his development, inducing him to reject certain of his early 
metaphysical positions. In this chapter, I will argue that Swedenborg had a positive 
influence upon Kant's development, particularly upon his ethics, for Kant’s conception of 
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a kingdom of ends is modeled upon Swedenborg’s conception of heaven as a community 
of spirits governed by moral laws.  
  
Kant's engagement with Swedenborg in the early 1760s convinced him that it is possible 
for us to conceive of interaction between spirits. Up until this point he had believed that 
interaction was only possible between embodied beings. Swedenborg’s descriptions of 
heaven as a community of spirits governed by moral laws, standing in non-spatial 
relationships to one another, provided Kant with a way of conceiving of a community of 
intelligible individuals. We can trace back the mature Kant's idea of a kingdom of ends, 
or an intelligible world, to Swedenborg’s description of heaven as a community of spirits. 
That Kant's idea of a kingdom of ends is modeled on a particular conception of heaven 
should not be surprising if we remember that Kant often refers to the idea of a kingdom 
of ends as “the kingdom of God”. In this chapter I will attempt to justify these claims.  
 
Although we can trace the genesis of Kant's idea of a kingdom of ends to Swedenborg’s 
account of heaven, I will argue in the chapters that follow that by the 1780s his idea of 
such a kingdom had departed from Swedenborg’s conception of heaven in two major 
respects. Firstly although Swedenborg conceives of heaven as a kingdom governed by 
divine laws, he does not suggest that the members of the kingdom must be the “givers” of 
the laws. The mature Kant, in contrast, will argue that the idea of a kingdom of ends is 
the idea of a kingdom in which the members of the kingdom are the givers of the laws 
that provide the kingdom with its unity. That is, he believes that our idea of a kingdom of 
ends is the idea of a community of autonomous individuals. Secondly, Swedenborg 
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conceives of heaven as a community of spirits governed by laws of love, or what Kant 
will call laws of benevolence. The mature Kant, however, will maintain that we must 
conceive of the kingdom of ends as a political community, or ideal state, governed by 
juridical laws. Laws of benevolence, he will argue, are only possible in such a political 
community, and so we cannot conceive of a community governed solely by laws of love 
or benevolence. 
 
In this chapter, then, I will argue that Swedenborg had a positive influence upon Kant's 
development. This is not to say that Kant was in any sense a follower or secret disciple of 
Swedenborg. Indeed he almost certainly believed that Swedenborg was deranged, and 
that his visions were probably due to some physiologically induced mental illness. 
However, although Kant believes that Swedenborg was almost certainly mad, this does 
not imply that he did not find his visions morally inspiring. My claim is that what Kant 
took from Swedenborg was the idea that morality demands that we develop a character 
that makes us a potential member of a kingdom of ends, or heaven considered as a 
community of spirits. Although Kant would later develop a more sophisticated account of 
the nature of such a community Kant’s idea that morality involves striving to be a 
member of such an ideal community, and that the criterion for citizenship in such a 
community is the state of ones character, dates back to the mid-1760s and his 
engagement with Swedenborg.78  
 
                                                 
78 Kant was not the only person to be impressed with Swedenborg as a moralist. Coleridge, for example, 
writes that, “I can venture to assert that as a moralist, Swedenborg is above all praise” (quoted from Bellin 
& Ruhl  1985, p.ix). 
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In addition to the positive influence on Kant's ethical development, Swedenborg also had 
a positive influence on the development of Kant's theoretical philosophy, and in 
particular upon his belief in the ideality of space and time. For Swedenborg himself 
believed that the spatiality and temporality of objects of experience were due to our mode 
of perception and not due to the nature of the objects themselves, and Swedenborg 
believed that after death our doors of perception will be opened and we will experience 
things as they are in themselves. As we shall see, at least up until the early 1790s, Kant 
himself was committed to the position that after our bodily death we can hope for such a 
change in our form of intuition. 
 
The claim that Swedenborg had a positive influence on Kant's development is definitely a 
minority position. For the majority of Kant scholars who attribute any influence to 
Swedenborg attribute a merely negative influence. The general structure of this negative 
influence thesis is that, priori to reading Swedenborg, Kant held a position that was 
similar to Swedenborg’s. Upon reading Swedenborg, however, Kant realized the 
absurdity of his own earlier position; according to the negative influence thesis, then, 
Kant regarded Swedenborg’s writing as a reductio ad absurdum of his earlier 
metaphysics. The two most significant recent proponents of the negative influence thesis 
are Laywine (1993) and Schönfeld (2000).79 In this chapter, in addition to providing 
evidence of a positive influence I will also demonstrate the weaknesses of these two 
accounts of the negative influence thesis. 
                                                 
79 And as Schönfeld himself acknowledges that he is following Laywine in attributing a merely negative 
influence to Swedenborg  I will concentrate primarily upon refuting her presentation of the position. See 
Schonfeld (2000), p.244. 
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In the 1750s the young Kant believed that interaction was only possible between spatio-
temporally embodied individuals. The reason for this commitment was his belief that 
interaction is only possible between impenetrable things (conceived of as centers of 
force), and he believed that only spatio-temporally embodied beings can be impenetrable. 
As a consequence the young Kant was implicitly committed to the position that real 
interaction between disembodied spirits is impossible. 
 
By the 1780s, however, Kant has radically changed his position. For the mature, critical 
Kant maintains that real interaction is intelligible rather than phenomenal. He believes 
that we can only conceive of real interaction between intelligible beings, that is, between 
individuals conceived of as not subject to the spatio-temporal conditions of experience. In 
the language of the young Kant, then, the critical Kant maintains that real interaction is 
only possible between (disembodied) spirits.80  
 
Kant changed his position in the early to mid 1760s, and what provoked him to change 
his position was his engagement with the Swedish spiritualist Emanuel Swedenborg. 
Kant came across Swedenborg in the early 1760s and in 1766 published a book on his 
work, Dreams of a Spirit-seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics.81 Swedenborg was 
a mystic who wrote voluminously about his visions of the spiritual world. Kant clearly 
                                                 
80 The mature Kant himself  explicitly identifies the intelligible world with the ‘spiritual world’ in the his 
metaphysics lectures from the early 1790s (over 10 years after having written the Critique of Pure Reason. 
See, Metaphysik K2 where he identifies the intelligible world <mundus intelligibilis> with a spiritual world 
<mundus pneumaticus> (28:775). The idea of a ‘spirit’ is the idea of a disembodied (i.e. non spatio-
temporal) individual, so it is the idea of an intelligible, rather than a phenomenal, being.  
81 Which I shall refer to henceforth as Dreams. 
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thought that Swedenborg was deranged. There was, however, something valuable about 
his descriptions of his experience of the spiritual realm, for it suggested to Kant a way of 
conceptualizing intelligible interaction. For Swedenborg describes the spirit world as 
governed by spiritual laws with spirits as the locus of spiritual (or moral) forces, 
excluding or attracting one another on the basis of the state of their moral characters. 
Although spirits do not exist in space/time, they do stand in relations to one another, and 
there is something analogous to space in the spirit world for there is a ‘moral distance’ 
between spirits, which depends upon the respective states of their characters. In reflecting 
upon Swedenborg’s account of the spirit world, Kant discovered a means of conceiving 
of spirits (or intelligible individuals) as impenetrable and standing in relations to one 
another, without having to think of them as embodied or necessarily spatio-temporal. 
This was an essential step in Kant’s development for it provided him with a way of 
conceptualizing his moral ideal: a kingdom of ends as an intelligible world of individuals 
in interaction. Further reflection also led him to the conclusion that the only way of 
conceiving of such an intelligible world is as a community of autonomous agents. Before 
discussing Kant’s engagement with Swedenborg, I will begin by justifying my claim that 
Kant changed his position between the 1750s and the 1780s. 
 
(3a) Kant’s Change of Position 
 
The young Kant conceived of individuals as centers of forces and as a result believed that 
individuals must be impenetrable. In addition he concluded that this meant that all 
individuals, if they are to interact, must be spatio-temporally embodied. 
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In this I agree with Laywine (1993), who argues that as early the True Estimation of 
Living Forces (of 1747),  
Kant claims, in effect, that the soul occupies a place not primarily because 
it is embodied, but because it can produce change of state in things other 
than itself. In short, the soul has a place by reason of its outwardly directed 
activity. . . This is his view not only in the True Estimation, but also in the 
Nova Dilucidatio [New Elucidation]. (p.45) 
 
Discussing the Physical Monadology (of 1756), a work which Laywine believes 
expresses the same basic position of the New Elucidation of the previous year, Laywine 
explains that in this work Kant’s position is that, 
An element fills space by resisting every effort of every other element to 
penetrate the sphere of its activity. Thus elements fill space by making 
themselves impenetrable to one another. Unless we can show that the 
force whereby a soul is present in space is different from an element’s 
force of repulsion, Kant is faced with the odd conclusion that the soul [or 
spirit] is impenetrable. (p.49 – my addition in square brackets) 
 
The strongest textual evidence for the claim that the young Kant believed that only 
embodied individuals can really interact is to be found in the New Elucidation. In this 
work Kant attacks the doctrine of pre-established harmony, arguing that that if individual 
substances really were isolated worlds unto themselves, then it would be impossible for 
them to undergo any alterations of state. Given the fact that individuals do undergo 
alterations, then, they must really interact. He continues by noting that,  
Our demonstrations [that change is impossible if we accept pre-established 
harmony] furnishes the opinion that some kind of organic body , must be 
attributed to all spirits whatever with powerful evidence of its certainty. 
(1:412)82  
                                                 
82 In this passage Kant seems to be advocating a position he imputes to Leibniz, namely that every soul 
(monad) must have a material vehicle. This is a position the mature Kant clearly rejects. Thus is the early 
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This suggests that at this point Kant believed that embodiment was necessary for 
interaction, for the argument Kant is alluding to seems to be something like the 
following: (1) An individual substance can only undergo a change of states if it really 
interacts with other substances. (2) Spirits change their states. (3) Only embodied 
substances (that is, substances “to which some organic body can be attributed”) can really 
interact. Therefore, (4) spirits must be embodied.  The conclusion Kant draws makes no 
sense unless he is implicitly assuming something like premise three. 
 
The young Kant, then, seems to have believed that real interaction is impossible between 
disembodied spirits. By the time of the Critique of Pure Reason, however, he has clearly 
changed his mind. Thus in his metaphysics lectures from 1782-3, lectures given between 
the publication of the first and second editions of the Critique, Kant can claim that, 
The world must also have only one cause. The connection <nexus> of 
substances is on that account to be thought possible only as derivative, but 
with that not as ideal, but rather concurrently as real. This proof holds, 
however, only for the noumenal world <mundus noumenon>. In the 
phenomenal world <mundus phaenomenon> we do not need it, for it is 
nothing in itself. Here everything is interaction <commercio> in virtue of 
space. The systems of occasional and predetermined harmony take place 
only in the sensible world. (29:868 Metaphysik Mrongovius) 
 
Here Kant argues that real interaction occurs only in the intelligible world, and that there 
is no real interaction in the phenomenal world. In the language of the young Kant, this 
would be to claim that real interaction is only possible between disembodied spirits. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
1780s he will claim that, “the opinion of Leibniz, that the soul has here already and also will in the future a 
vehicle <vehiculum> of matter which is indestructible, is sensible and explains nothing” (Metaphysik 
Mrongovius, 29:920). 
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position that there is real interaction in the intelligible world is a consequence of Kant's 
claim that our idea of the intelligible world is the idea a community of individuals.  
The young Kant conceived of ‘force’ and ‘resistance’ and ‘impenetrability’  as sensible 
concepts, applicable only to spatio-temporal beings.  He believed that for two beings to 
resist one another implies that they must be in a spatial relationship to one another. Kant, 
however, did not remain committed to this view throughout his career. If he had remained 
committed to this position, he would have had to maintain that that spirits, or intelligible 
individuals could not really interact, for the mature Kant remains committed to the view 
that real interaction is only possible between beings that resist one another. The mature 
Kant, however, believes that resistance is a pure concept, being what he calls a predicable 
of the category of community.83 As such it can be thought independently of the spatio-
temporal conditions of experience. The same can be said of the concept of force which, 
Kant argues, is a predicable of the category of causality. Resistance and force, then, are 
pure concepts which can, of course, be applied to objects of experience but which can be 
thought without reference to the (spatio-temporal) conditions of experience. The fact that 
resistance and force are pure (unschematized) concepts implies that we can think of 
individuals resisting each other without having to think of them as spatially embodied. 
The germs of this view can be traced back to Kant’s reading of Swedenborg in the early 
1760s. That is not to say that the view was worked out in any detail at this time. For Kant 
would only develop the table of categories in the late 1770s. Kant’s reading of 
Swedenborg, however, stimulated him to think about the possibility of ‘moral’ or 
‘intelligible’ forces and relations.  
                                                 
83 See A82/B108. 
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Engaging with Swedenborg helped Kant to develop an account of the possibility of real 
interaction between spirits, an account that did not commit him to the (for him untenable) 
position that spirits are necessarily embodied. This account was, I believe, only worked 
out fully with his introduction of the table of judgments and categories in his critical 
period, which allowed him to explain how we conceptualize real interaction in terms of 
the disjunctive form of judgment.  The mature Kant, then, could argue that real 
interaction does not require that individuals are (spatially) impenetrable, but merely that 
they resist one another (by means of ‘intelligible’ forces). For we are able to think of a 
multitude of non-spatio-temporal individuals resisting one another because resistance can 
be conceived of independently of any spatio-temporal conditions. Both ‘resistance’ and 
‘force’ are, Kant believes, pure concepts, which, although they can be applied to objects 
of experience can be thought of independently of the spatio-temporal conditions of 
experience. As a result of this, Kant believes that we can conceive of individuals as 
exercising forces and resisting one another without thinking of them as (spatially) 
impenetrable. The realization, then, that Kant came to while reading Swedenborg was 
that it is possible to distinguish between physical forces and intelligible (what Kant refers 
to as ‘moral’) forces. This distinction helped him to see that it is possible to conceive of a 
spirit/intelligible world in which there is real interaction.  
 
(3b) 1763-6 - Kant’s Engagement with Swedenborg 
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Kant read Swedenborg in the early 1760s and in 1766 published Dreams of a Spirit-seer 
elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics, a book dealing with Swedenborg’s eight volume 
Arcana Coelestia. In his Arcana Coelestia Swedenborg, amongst other things, recounts 
his visions of heaven and his experiences with the world of spirits. Kant’s response to 
Swedenborg has puzzled many commentators. In particular, there is little agreement on 
Kant’s ultimate attitude towards Swedenborg. I will argue that although Kant believed 
that Swedenborg was mad, he was deeply affected by this encounter. In particular I 
believe, following Kant’s most recent biographer Manfred Kuehn, that Kant underwent a 
moral conversion during the period he was engaging with Swedenborg and I will argue 
that there is a relationship between his reading of Swedenborg and the nature of his 
conversion. In particular Kant was very congenial towards Swedenborg’s ‘modern’ 
conception of heaven as a spiritual community and the idea that the spiritual [or 
intelligible] world is not somewhere we are transported after death, but is an intelligible 
community of which we are already members, although without being able to intuit it.  
 
In addition Kant was also deeply struck by Swedenborg’s suggestion that it is up to us to 
determine which type of spiritual community we belong to and that in choosing a 
particular (moral) character we are choosing to be members of a community of similar 
characters. This is reflected in Kant’s account of how we go about making moral 
judgments. For, according to Kant, when we are thinking morally about what sort of 
character (maxims) we should adopt, we think about whether it would be possible to be a 





Swedenborg was born in 1688, and was an important figure in enlightened Swedish 
intellectual life in the early 18th century. He died in 1772. Amongst other things he was a 
respected engineer, mathematician and scientist. He wrote important works on 
metallurgy, chemistry, mineralogy and astronomy, and published the first work in 
Swedish on algebra, as well as co-founding Sweden’s first scientific journal, Deadalus 
Hyperboreans.84 He also wrote a four volume scientific treatise on the brain, based upon 
his own anatomical studies in which he discovered the functions of the cerebellum, the 
pituitary gland and spinal fluid. In 1716 he was offered, but turned down, the 
professorship in mathematics at the University of Uppsala and instead accepted the 
position of Assessor Extraordinary to the Swedish Board of Mines, an important position 
he held for almost 30 years. All in all Swedenborg could be regarded as a typical man of 
the enlightenment. In 1736, however, he started to have mystical visions and eight years 
later, on the night after Easter, April 6-7, 1744, he had a major mystical experience, 
believing he had personally encountered God, face to face, who had opened up his soul 
and revealed the world of spirits to him and commissioned him to spread the word about 
the true nature of the spirit world. Concerning this experience, he writes that, “from that 
day I gave up the study of worldly science, and I labored in spiritual things. . . The Lord 
opened my eyes. . . so that in the middle of the day I could see into the other world, and 
in a state of perfect wakefulness converse with angels and spirits”.85 After this he gave up 
                                                 
84 This, and the following, information about Swedenborg’s life is taken from Benz (2002), Laywine 
(1993), McDannell & Lang (1988), Bellin & Ruhl (1985) and Horn (1997). 
85 Quoted from Bellin & Ruhl (1985), p.43. 
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his official position and concentrated on his spiritual writings. From this period onwards 
he had frequent visions of both heaven and hell, and wrote many books about his 
experiences.  
 
After his death in 1772 his followers founded a Swedenborgian church, the Church of the 
New Jerusalem, which exists to this day. Perhaps the most famous immediate follower of 
Swedenborg was the English poet William Blake who, for a short time, was an active 
member of this church. Many Swedenborgian elements and references can be found in 
his poetry and his Marriage of Heaven and Hell is a (critical) response to Swedenborg’s 
Heaven and Hell. Many early abolitionists were followers of Swedenborg.86  He had an 
influence on the German Romantics, especially upon Goethe, Schelling and Novalis, and  
had a strong influence on both American popular and high culture in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. His views were popularized through popular works, such as 
Elizabeth Stuart Phelps huge bestseller The Gates Ajar (1868), and Helen Keller’s 
Autobiography, and parodied by writer such as Mark Twain in his Extract from Captain 
Stormfield’s Visit to Heaven, and he had a strong influence upon Emerson and the 
Transcendentalists. Even the sober William James is known to have carefully read many 
of his books. At the very least, then, Swedenborg should be regarded as an interesting, if 
marginal, figure in our cultural history.  
 
In addition to recounting his experiences with spirits, Swedenborg wrote volumes of 
inspired  biblical interpretation. He believed that the bible has both an external and an 
                                                 
86 One reason for this was Swedenborg’s belief that Africans led a purer more spiritual life than Europeans, 
and that in the afterlife they were to be found in the highest heavens.  
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internal sense that he had been granted divine insight into this true internal sense of the 
divine word, and believed that his true vocation was to spread this inner word.  
 
To understand Swedenborg’s practice of biblical exegesis, and the importance he placed 
upon it, we must understand something about his doctrine of ‘correspondences’ and his 
account of the ages of mankind. At the heart of Swedenborg’s theology lies his doctrine 
of ‘correspondences’. According to this doctrine everything we experience (spatio-
temporally) in this life ‘corresponds’ to something in heaven, which for Swedenborg is 
understood to be an organic community of angels. The most frequent metaphor 
Swedenborg offers to explain this doctrine is in terms of the human face. When we look 
at someone’s face we can see their joy or sadness. Their outer appearance reveals their 
inner emotional state. The phenomenal world has the same relationship to the spiritual 
world as the expression on a human being’s face has to their inner emotional state. 
Swedenborg believes, then, that the phenomenal world is, in effect, the face of heaven. 
Unfortunately, he believes that in our current fallen state we are not able to see it in these 
terms. Thus Swedenborg explains that, 
We can see in the human face what correspondence is like. In a face that 
has not been taught to dissimulate, all the affections of the mind manifest 
themselves visibly in a natural form, as though in their very imprint, which 
is why we refer to the face as “the index of the mind.” This is our spiritual 
world within our natural world. (Heaven & Hell, #91) 
 
Although we are unable to immediately experience the natural world as the face of the 
spiritual world, there was a time when human beings could. To understand the 
importance Swedenborg places on his inspired biblical interpretation, it is necessary to 
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understand his account of the gradual fall of mankind. His simplest account of this falling 
away of mankind from heaven is to be found in Heaven & Hell, and this account of the 
stages of this fall is based upon Ovid’s account in Metamorphoses of the three ages of 
mankind.  
 
Swedenborg maintains that the earliest human beings were “heavenly people”  who could 
read the heavenly significance of phenomenal events and objects in the same way that we 
can read a face. Thus he explains that the first age of mankind was the “Golden Age” and 
that at this time humans, 
Thought on the basis of actual correspondences, and . . . the natural 
phenomena of the world that greeted their eyes served them as means for 
thinking in this way. Because they were of this character, they were in the 
company of angels and talked with them. (Heaven & Hell, #115) 
  
In the Golden Age, which for Swedenborg was the age of Adam, humankind was face to 
face with heaven, or the community of angels.87 After the fall, however, humankind 
became more separated from heaven and gradually lost this “face to face” connection 
with the heavenly angels. In the following age, which Swedenborg calls the Silver Age, 
mankind had not lost all connection to heaven. In this age, 
People did not think from actual correspondences but from a knowledge 
about correspondences. There was still a union of heaven with humanity, 
but not such an intimate one. 
 
After the fall, then, humans lost the ability to intuit heaven, but they retained an ability to 
understand the relationship between the phenomenal and the heavenly. In the age of the 
                                                 
87 Swedenborg reads the bible symbolically, and believes that ‘Adam’ does not refer to a particular 
individual, but to an age of mankind. 
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old testament prophets mankind had lost the ability to intuit the phenomenal world as the 
face of heaven, but they still had knowledge of these correspondences, and this 
knowledge was collected in the old testament. The bible, then, explains these 
correspondences.  
 
In the following age, the Bronze Age, this knowledge was replaced with a mere 
familiarity. Thus Swedenborg explains that in this age came people who “were indeed 
familiar with correspondences but [who] did not do their thinking on the basis of their 
knowledge of correspondences” (ibid.). This familiarity consisted in the ability to 
understand the true spiritual meaning of the bible.  
In our age, however, even this familiarity has been lost, for 
Humanity became more and more externally minded and at last physically 
minded. Then the knowledge of correspondences was completely lost, and 
with it any awareness of heaven and of its riches. (ibid.) 
 
Swedenborg’s mission in life he believes is, at the very least, to restore our familiarity 
with heaven and its riches, for he was granted an intuition of the heavenly in order to be 
able to interpret the true spiritual meaning of the bible, and his magnum opus, Heavenly 
Secrets, the eight volumes of which Kant read and responded to, is an attempt to do just 
this. 
 
For Swedenborg, then, the bible is like a textbook on physiognomy, but a textbook we do 
not know how to read. In the Bronze Age, however, people could understand it and use it 
as such. They were in a position similar to that of an imagined alien visitor to this planet, 
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a visitor who understands and feels human emotions, but is unable to see from looking at 
peoples faces how they are feeling. The bible is like a manual that can be referred to 
make judgments about what emotional states certain facial expressions signify. An alien 
visitor who met someone who was smiling, and, having checked the manual, could make 
the judgment that the person was happy. He would not see the person’s happiness, but 
could make a judgment about it. The ancient readers of the bible were in a similar 
position. Unlike Adam, they could not see the heavenly in the phenomenal, but they 
could, by using the bible, obtain knowledge of, or at least familiarity with, the heavenly. 
Gradually, however, humankind became even more separated from heaven, and in the 
modern world we cannot even understand the true inner meaning of the bible. 
Swedenborg, however, believes that his eyes were opened to the true inner, spiritual 
meaning of the bible by God and he was assigned the task of acquainting the rest of 
humanity with this meaning.  
 
As a result, much of his writing consists of bizarre symbolic biblical interpretation. An 
example, will give the reader some idea of his principles of interpretation. I will quote at 
length to give the reader some idea of Swedenborg’s prose style.88  
 
Genesis 2:19-20 reads as follows: “And Jehovah God formed out of the ground every 
beast of the field, and every fowl of the heavens, and brought it to the man to see what he 
would call it; and whatsoever the man called every living soul, that was the name thereof. 
And the man gave names to every beast, and to the fowl of the heavens, and to every wild 
                                                 
88 Which even Kant found to be “dull”: “The style of the author is dull” (2:360). 
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animal of the field; but for the man there was not found a help as with him.”  
Swedenborg begins his commentary on this passage in the following terms, 
By “beasts” are signified celestial affections, and by “fowls of the 
heavens” spiritual affections; that is to say, by “beasts” are signified things 
of the will, and by “fowls” things of the understanding. To “bring them to 
the man to see what he would call them” is to enable him to know their 
quality, and his “giving them names” signifies that he knew it. But 
notwithstanding that he knew the quality of the affections of good of the 
knowledge of truth that were given to him by the Lord, still he inclined to 
his own, which is expressed in the same terms as before – that “there was 
not found a help as with him. 
That by “beasts” and “animals” were anciently signified affections and the 
like things in man, may appear strange at the present day; but as the men 
of those times were in a celestial idea, and as such things are represented 
in the world of spirits by animals, and in fact by such animals as they are 
like, therefore when they spoke in that way they meant nothing else. Nor 
is anything else meant in the Word in those places where beasts are 
mentioned either generally or specifically. The whole prophetic Word is 
full of such things, and therefore one who does not know what each beast 
specifically signifies, cannot possibly understand what the Word contains 
in an internal sense. But, as before observed, beasts are of two kinds – evil 
or noxious beast, and good or harmless ones – and by the good beasts are 
signifies good affections, as for instance by sheep, lambs, and doves. 
(p.76-7)89 
 
Each beast mentioned in the bible, then, signifies something specific. And so does every 
plant, element, name and number. Stone refers to faith or solid truths; water also refers to 
truth but “not in respect to its solidity, but in respect to its originality. . . and also to its 
reviving and cleansing properties.. . Birds refer to thoughts, and waterfowl to thoughts 
flowing like pure scientific truth” etc.90 Swedenborg is particularly concerned with the 
importance of the inner meaning of numbers, arguing that, “it is clearly evident that 
                                                 
89 Kant jokingly compares Swedenborg’s inspired method of interpretation to the play of the imagination 
which is at work in those who “discover the Holy Family in the irregular patterns of marble, or monks, 
baptismal fonts and organs in stalactites and stalagmites, or even the discovery by the mocking Liscow on a 
frozen window-plane of the triple crown and the number of the beast – none of them things which anyone 
else would see unless their heads were already filled with them beforehand” (2:360). 
90 These examples are from Solovyov (1997), p.4. 
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whatever numbers are used in the Word never mean numbers” (p.370). And, of course, 
Swedenborg has been granted special insight into these hidden meanings.91  
 
Kant clearly thought Swedenborg was mad, and in Dreams, he declares that he would not 
blame the reader for regarding spirit-seers such as Swedenborg as “candidates for the 
asylum” (2:348).92 Many readers have taken Kant's attitude towards Swedenborg in 
Dreams to be entirely negative. However, although he was a sworn enemy of inspired 
interpretation, and was skeptical of any appeal to revelation and special insight, his 
attitude towards Swedenborg’s visions is ambivalent, for his general attitude towards 
stories of the supernatural is not one of dogmatic rejection, but a skeptical  agnosticism.93 
Thus he concludes the first part of Dreams with an assertion of his ignorance, which, he 
claims, 
[P]revents my venturing wholly to deny all truth to the many different 
ghost-stories which are recounted, albeit with a reservation which is at 
once commonplace but also strange: I am skeptical about each one of them 
individually, but I ascribe some credence to all of them taken together. 
(2:351)94 
                                                 
91 To us such views may seem ridiculous, and may be the source of an amused chuckle. In Kant's day, 
however, such views were far more mainstream. For the idea that biblical interpretation required special 
insight, provided by divine grace, was a standard feature of 18th century pietist doctrine. In understanding 
Kant's attitude to Swedenborg we should keep this fact in mind. Kant, of course, was a champion of the 
enlightenment, and so was a sworn enemy of such enthusiastic doctrines. But they would have appeared to 
him as far less abnormal than they do to a 21st century educated reader. 
92 And he jokingly suggests that Swedenborg’s visions may have been the result of misdirected wind, 
quoting Hudibras’ opinion that: “if a hypochondriacal wind should rage in the guts, what matters is the 
direction it takes: if downwards, then the result is a f---; if upwards, an apparition or an heavenly 
inspiration” (2:348). 
93 Contemporary readers of Kant were not so quick to judge Kant's attitude as entirely negative. Thus 
Mendelssohn (1767), in his review of Dreams, writes that Kant's book, “occasionally leaves the reader in 
doubt about whether Mr. Kant wished to ridicule metaphysics or whether he intended to praise 
clairvoyance” (quoted from, Schönfeld 2000, p.181). And Oetinger, the founder of Swabian theosophy, 
wrote to Swedenborg on December 4, 1766, that, “we have a book, “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer,” that is full of 
lofty praise, but at the same time, in order not to seem fanatical [schwärmerisch] is equally full of 
derogatory remarks against you” (quoted from, Dole 1997, p.3).   
94 It appears that Kant is speaking in propria persona here, for in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, written in 
1766, after the publication of Dreams, he claims that, “It was in fact difficult for me to devise the right style 
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I suggest that although Kant had no time for Swedenborg’s inspired interpretation, and 
was deeply unsympathetic to his doctrine of correspondences, he was profoundly affected 
by the content of Swedenborg’s visions and that regardless of Kant’s appraisal of 
Swedenborg’s mental state, Kant’s engagement with him had a profound effect upon 
Kant’s development.  For, following Schneewind and Kuehn, I believe that Kant 
developed the essentials of his mature ethics around 1764-5, while he was engaged with 
Swedenborg, and the fact that he arrived at this position at precisely the time he was 
engaging with Swedenborg is not coincidental, for he was drawn to Swedenborg’s 
‘modern’ conception of heaven as a society or community of spirits. And in 
Swedenborg’s vision of heaven as a community of angels we find the genesis of Kant's 
idea of a kingdom of ends as an ideal community that we should strive to be members of. 
    
(3d) Kant’s Encounter with Swedenborg: The Facts 
 
What do we know of Kant’s engagement with Swedenborg? At the very least we know 
that Kant was seriously interested in Swedenborg between 1763 and 1766.95  Establishing 
                                                                                                                                                 
with which to clothe my thoughts, so as not to expose myself to derision. It seemed to me wisest to forestall 
other people’s mockery by first of all mocking myself; and this procedure was actually quite honest, since 
my mind is really in a state of conflict on this matter. As regards the spirit reports, I cannot help but be 
charmed by stories of this kind, and I cannot rid myself of the suspicion that there is some truth to their 
validity. . .” (10:70 – my emphasis). 
95 In addition Kant had positive things to say about Swedenborg during his metaphysics lectures ten years 
later in the mid 1770s. See 28:288-9. He also refers positively to Swedenborg in his lectures of 1792-3, see 
28:690. 
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these dates is important, for they coincide with what one commentator has described as 
Kant’s moral conversion of 1764.96 
 
Kant’s first known reference to Swedenborg is found in a letter to Charlotte von 
Knobloch probably written in 1763. Kant begins the letter by explaining his attitude 
towards the paranormal, claiming that no one is in a position  to accuse him of having a 
“mystical bent” or of having a “weakness for giving in easily to credulity” (10:43). And, 
although he does not  “see such things as impossible”, he used to be inclined to regard 
ghost stories and tales about spirits with skepticism.  He continues, however, with the 
claim that: “That was my position for a long time, until I became acquainted with the 
stories about Herr Swedenborg” (10:44). Kant’s skepticism about the paranormal, then, 
has been shaken by the stories about Swedenborg that have been relayed to him. 
 
Intrigued by these stories he attempted to start a correspondence with Swedenborg and 
induced a number of his merchant friends to speak with him.97 After explaining this 
(mediated) interaction, Kant continues his letter by recounting a number of the stories he 
has heard about Swedenborg. The incident that seemed to Kant “to have the greatest 
weight of any of these stories and really removes any conceivable doubts” (10:46) 
concerns a fire in Stockholm.98 This fire occurred in 1756, while Swedenborg was in 
Gothenburg, about fifty miles from Stockholm. Swedenborg was at a party with about 15 
                                                 
96 See Kuehn (2001), p.171. I will return to the question of Kant’s moral conversion in the following 
section. 
97 And reports that, “He [Swedenborg] told my friend without any reservation that God had given him a 
wonderful power enabling him to communicate with souls of the dead whenever he pleased” (10:45). 
98 This story is also recounted in Dreams (2:355-6). Although, in this published work Kant is more 
skeptical about the veracity of the story. 
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other people. At about 6pm he started to look worried and explained to the other guests 
that he had had a vision that a fire had just started in Stockholm and was spreading fast, 
and he was worried that it would burn down his own house. Two hours later, however, he 
announced with relief that the fire had been put out, but had reached within three doors of 
his house. The story of Swedenborg’s vision spread through Gothenburg’s polite society 
that evening and even reached the Governor, who called him to his mansion and 
questioned him about the details of his vision.  Swedenborg’s vision occurred on 
Saturday night. On Monday evening a letter arrived from the merchants’ guild in 
Stockholm describing the fire in the exact same terms as Swedenborg had. Kant 
concludes his account of this story by asking, “What objections can one raise against the 
authenticity of such a story?”, for, 
The friend who wrote me this investigated the whole matter personally, not only 
in Stockholm but as recently as two months ago in Gothenburg. He is very well 
acquainted with the most distinguished families in Gothenburg where everyone 
concerned told him the same story about this incident and most of the 
eyewitnesses of 1756, which is not so long ago, are still alive today. (10:47) 
   
Here then was a supernatural story attested to by reliable sources. And, intrigued by this, 
Kant finishes his letter by informing von Knobloch that he, “eagerly awaits the book 
Swedenborg intends to publish in London. All arrangements have been made so that I 
will receive it as soon as it leaves the press” (10:48). 
 
On November 6, 1764, (probably about a year after Kant’s letter to von Knobloch), 
Kant’s friend Hamann wrote to Mendelssohn that Kant, “was planning to review the 
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Opera Omnia of a certain Schwedenberg [sic]”.99 The work Kant had been reading was 
Swedenborg’s eight volume Heavenly Secrets, and his response, Dreams of a Spirit Seer, 
was published in 1766. Kant’s remarks on Swedenborg in this book are less flattering 
than in the letter to von Knobloch. He describes Heavenly Secrets as “eight quarto 
volumes stuffed full of nonsense” (2:360), and in his preface explains that Dreams was 
written because “the author went to the expense of purchasing a lengthy work, and what 
was worse, he put himself to the trouble of reading it, as well!” (2:318). What Kant found 
most tiresome in Swedenborg’s opus was his interminable biblical exegesis, and he 
writes in Dreams that, “none of these visionary interpretations are of any concern to me 
here” (2:360). The interspersed accounts of Swedenborg’s spiritual visions, however, 
were quite stimulating. Thus in Dreams he focuses exclusively on Swedenborg’s visions 
of the spirit world, explaining that, 
It is only in the audita et visa, in other words, only what his own eyes are 
supposed to have seen and his own ears to have heard, which we are 
chiefly concerned to extract from the appendices attached to the chapters 
of his book. (2:360) 
 
Although Kant's comments on Swedenborg in dreams are often negative, we shall see 
that he does have very positive things to say about Swedenborg in his later metaphysics 
lectures.  
 
1764 – Kant’s moral “rebirth” 
 
                                                 
99 Quoted from Kuehn (2001), p.171. 
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A number of important Kant scholars now believe that Kant had worked out the basis of 
his mature ethical position by the mid-1760s, and that this coincided with some sort of 
personal ‘moral conversion’. I believe that this story is basically correct. Following 
Lehman’s (1969) suggestion that Kant underwent a ‘life crisis’ in 1764,100 Kuehn (2001), 
in his excellent new biography of Kant, argues that in 1764 Kant underwent a ‘moral 
conversion’. He writes that, 
profound changes that took place in 1764. The elegant Magister with a 
somewhat irregular and unpredictable lifestyle changed into a man of 
principle with an exceedingly predictable way of life. He became like [his 
friend] Green. (p.156) 
 
Schneewind (1998) also places a great emphasis on this period. Examining the 
development of Kant’s ethics, Schneewind provides a “story that now seems to make the 
best sense of the available evidence” (p.486). He argues that “the central point” of this 
story “is of course the claim that Kant had arrived at the essentials of his distinctive view 
of his morality by 1765” (ibid.). I agree with both Schneewind and Kuehn that 1764-5 
marks an important turning point in the development of Kant’s ethics.  
 
Kuehn suggests that Kant’s ‘moral conversion’ coincided with three important events in 
his life: (1) His 40th birthday on April 22nd, 1764,101 (2) the death of his best friend 
                                                 
100 Lehman (1969), p.412. 
101 Kuehn writes that, “On April 22, 1764, Kant turned forty. This was a significant event, at least in Kant’s 
own view of life. According to his psychological or anthropological theory, the fortieth year is of the 
greatest importance. . . [For] Kant believed that it is in our fortieth year that we finally acquire a character” 
(p. 144). 
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Johann Daniel Funk in April 1764, and (3) the development of his friendship with the 
English merchant Green.102 
 
I agree that the first two events probably played an important role in Kant's conversion. 
The development of Kant's friendship with Green, however, could not have played a role 
because, according to Kuehn, Kant did not meet Green until 1766, or at the earliest in 
1765, after the date of his conversion. In addition, what seems to be missing from 
Kuehn’s list is the fact that it was precisely at this time that Kant’s interest in 
Swedenborg was at its peak.  
 
Kuehn convincingly argues that at this time Kant was thinking deeply about the state of 
his character, and that his moral conversion involved a deep change in his character, or, 
to use Kant's own terminology, the conversion involved the establishment of a character. 
This focus on character (or what Kant calls one’s ‘disposition’ or ‘intelligible character’ 
in his mature writings) lies at the heart of Kant’s ethics for he believes that the choice of 
maxims is, in effect, a choice of character.103 Thus, in his Anthropology, Kant explains 
that, 
sometimes people say that a person has simply character (a moral 
character) which defines him as an individual and no one else. . . [such a 
moral character] is the distinguishing mark of a reasonable being endowed 
                                                 
102 Although Kuehn never explicitly makes the argument, the impression one gets upon reading Chapter 
four of Kuehn’s illuminating biography of Kant is that Kant’s moral conversion of 1764 was somehow 
influenced by his friendship with Green. Thus, for example, Kuehn remarks that in 1764, Kant “became 
more like Green” (p.156). However, as Kuehn himself points out elsewhere (p.154) Kant did not meet 
Green until 1766, or perhaps 1765, a year or two after his ‘moral conversion’!  This suggests that Kant’s 
change in character was not somehow a result of this friendship, but, instead, that the change in character is 
what made his “deep moral friendship” with Green possible. 
103 Kuehn (2001), quite nicely emphasizes the importance of the idea of character in Kant’s ethics by 
suggesting that maxims should be defined as “character-constituting principles” (p.147). 
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with freedom. The man of principles has character. Of him we know 
definitely what to expect. He does not act on the basis of his instinct, but 
on the basis of his will. (Anthropology, 7:285)104 
 
To have character, then, is to be a man of principles, and this is the distinguishing mark 
of a reasonable being who has a will rather than merely acting upon instinct. A little latter 
Kant explains that his conception of character is to be distinguished from the usual 
understanding of the term, which “understands by character those qualities which 
accurately describe a person, be they good or bad” (7:292). For Kant, in contrast, moral 
character is not the sort of thing that can be good or bad; it is the sort of thing that one 
possesses or does not possess. Simply to have a character is “rare” and “admirable”, and 
he writes about the idea of character in the same language he uses to describe the idea of 
a good will in the Groundwork, writing, for example, that “character has an inner value 
and is above all price” (7:282) and that “having a character is the minimum requirement 
that can be expected of a rational person, and at the same time also the maximum of his 
inner value (of human dignity)” (7:295). 
 
One in not born with character, but must, Kant believes, acquire it, and he writes that one 
can “take it for granted” that, 
the establishment of character is, similar to a kind of rebirth, a certain 
solemn resolution which the person himself makes. This resolution and the 
moment at which the transformation took place remain unforgettable for 
him, like the beginning of a new epoch. This stability and persistence in 
principles can generally not be effected by education, examples, and 
instruction by degrees, but it can only be done by an explosion which 
suddenly occurs as a consequence of our disgust at the unsteady condition 
                                                 
104 A few pages later he writes, in similar vein, that, “to have a character relates to that property of the will 
by which the subject has tied himself to certain practical principles which he has unalterably prescribed for 
himself by his own reason” (7:292). 
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of instinct. . . Wishing to become a better person in a fragmentary manner 
is a vain endeavor because one impression fades away while we labor on 
another. The establishment of a character, however, is absolute unity of 
the inner principle of conduct as such. (7:284-5) 
 
Kant here writes as if he is speaking from experience. And we know that in the early 
1760s he radically transformed his own lifestyle. He went from being an unpredictable 
young man to being the “man of principle”, the Kant of legends whose regularity was so 
famous that it was said that you could check the accuracy of your timepiece when you 
saw him start his afternoon walk. It is not, then, unreasonable to assume that Kant is 
basing these words on his own experience and that his “new epoch” began around the 
time of his fortieth birthday, in the early 1760s while he was reading Swedenborg. 
Further evidence for such a dating is provided by Kant’s remark that, “perhaps there will 
be only a few who have attempted this revolution before their thirtieth year, and fewer 
still who have firmly established it before their fortieth year” (ibid.).105 Following Kuehn 
I suggest that this stress on the importance of ones fortieth year is probably based upon 
Kant's own personal experience. 
 
This importance of a sudden moment of rebirth played a central role in the theory and 
practice of 18th century Prussian Pietism.106 Kant himself received a pietist education at 
the Collegium Fridericianum, so it is not surprising that he was open to the idea of a 
sudden moment of moral conversion, for “the teaching staff in [pietist] institutions placed 
a higher priority on a reform of the will than on scholastic attainment” and “regarded a 
                                                 
105 See Kuehn (2001), pp.145-8, for further evidence that Kant thought that one’s 40th year was a significant 
moment in life. 
106 18th century pietism had a strong influence on the development of what has become American-style 
“born-again” Christianity. 
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conversion as the foundation of study. Students who had not yet experienced a 
‘breakthrough’ were expected to exhibit a repentant attitude and demonstrate that they 
were preparing to be ‘born again’” (Gawthrop 1993, p.164). Francke, perhaps the most 
influential Prussian pietist in the early 18th century, revolutionized Prussian education, 
and the schools influenced by his teaching (including Kant’s) placed a huge emphasis 
upon “breaking the child’s natural will” (ibid, p.156) in the hope of provoking such a re-
birth experience.  
 
Kant’s attitude towards pietism is complicated. By the time of his education, pietism had 
been institutionalized in Prussia and was, in effect, the state religion, and Kant did not 
enjoy his early education. To get ahead in the Prussian state bureaucracy (which included 
educational institutions) it helped if you professed the faith, which involved being able to 
appeal to some personal moment of conversion or “breakthrough” (Durchbruch). This, of 
course, resulted in much hypocrisy with students, and, for that matter, anyone in an 
official state position, being rewarded if they could offer a story of personal 
conversion.107 It is clear that Kant was disgusted by this hypocrisy and in his account of 
the establishment of character offered in the Anthropology he makes it clear that he does 
not believe that such a breakthrough can be achieved as a result of education. In arguing 
this he is strongly disagreeing with pietist practice.   
                                                 
107 Fulbrook (1983) explains that in early eighteenth century Prussia, at the time Kant received his 
education, “the need for pietist testimonials to obtain positions in church and state led to superficial 
conversion and regeneration according to the routinised general stages of pietist experience. Pietism, 
conceived as a spontaneous religion of the heart had become rationalized and mechanical as the orthodoxy 
of the state” (p.170) The hypocrisy of many so-called pietists was a common criticism at the time. Thus 
Fulbrook quotes Semler (1781), a contemporary of Kant's: “Now suddenly people were all supposed to 
become pious, or re-born; this alleged aim is impossible if one doesn’t count in all the hypocrisy and 
fanaticism. The true purpose was, to give oneself airs, without work or scholarship, and to get in with the 
Duke and Court.” (ibid. p.171) 
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In addition, Kant also found morally objectionable the pietist practice of treating the re-
birth experience of others as models to follow. One of the dominant forms of pietist 
literature was the conversion narrative, and these narratives were used as models to be 
emulated. Thus Semler, a contemporary of Kant's, explains that, for the pietist, “the story 
of one’s own experience and edification became the rule to follow exactly”.108 Kant 
objected to the practice of taking a phenomenal model as an ideal to emulate. Thus he 
argues in his ethics lectures that, 
An example is when a general proposition of reason is exhibited in 
concreto in the given case. . . All cognitions of morality and religion 
[however] can be set forth apodictically, a priori, through reason. We 
perceive a priori the necessity of behaving so and not otherwise, so no 
examples are needed in matters of religion and morality. . . The examples 
must be judged by moral rules, not morality or religion by the examples. 
The archetype lies in the understanding. . . The reason why man would 
gladly imitate in matters of religion is that they fancy that if they behave 
as does the great majority among them, they will thereby constrain God, in 
that He cannot, after all, punish everybody. (27:333) 
 
Imitating the behavior of others, then, is to undermine the purity of ethics. Rather than 
taking as our moral ideal the a priori ideal of being a citizen of a kingdom of ends we 
take as our ideal the empirical example of others. Given human weakness, taking the 
experience of another person, however, virtuous she may be, is to take something less 
than perfect as our model, and this makes it much easier for us to give excuses to 
ourselves. This is Kant's principled objection to the pietist practice of imitating the 
conversion experiences of others. Conversion, Kant believes, is something that we can 
experience personally, but it is not something to be imitated, for it is not something that 
                                                 
108 Quoted from Fulbrook (1983), p.169. 
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we can choose. It is logically impossible to choose to be morally reborn, for we are 
morally reborn, Kant believes, when we choose to have a pure disposition. What it is to 
be reborn is to have chosen to have a pure disposition and in so far as we are attempting 
to choose to be reborn we are not choosing to have such a disposition. 
 
Despite his reservations about pietist practice, it is clear that the pietist idea of a moral 
rebirth or “breakthrough” plays an important role in his ethics.109 This is evident from the 
passage from the Anthropology already cited. The notion of a moral conversion is also a 
major theme in part 2 of Kant's Religion, and here Kant writes: 
That a human being should become not merely legally good, but morally 
good (pleasing to God) i.e. virtuous according to the intelligible character 
(virtus noumenon) and thus in need of no other incentive to recognize a 
duty except the representation of duty itself, that, so long as the foundation 
of the maxims of the human being remains impure, cannot be effected 
through gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in 
the disposition of the human being (a transformation to the maxim of 
holiness of disposition). And so a “new man” can come about only 
through a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation and a change of heart. 
(6:47 – my emphasis) 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that we cannot become moral gradually but that to become 
moral involves a sudden revolution and moment of rebirth. Kant himself hoped he was 
moral, and so must have believed that he himself went through such a revolution of 
character, and all the evidence points to the fact that this probably happened around 1764, 
at the time he was engaging with Swedenborg. Although the pietist notion of a 
                                                 
109 In claiming this I am rejecting Kuehn’s (2001) claim that, “It is absurd to claim that Pietism was a major 
influence on [Kant’s] moral philosophy” (p.54). Of course, Kant was not a pietist. He found much of the 
actual, so called, pietist practice he saw around him distasteful and he strongly objects to the idea that our 
will must be broken so that we can subordinate ourselves to the will of God. However, Kant's belief that 
morality consists in the purity of our disposition is clearly influenced by the pietist ideal of purity of heart, 
as is his emphasis on the importance of moral conversion or rebirth. 
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“breakthrough” plays an important role in Kant's ethics, he secularizes this ideal.  For the 
pietists this “breakthrough” involved subordinating one’s natural inclinations to the 
divine will, whereas, for Kant, it involves subordinating them to an idea, the idea of being 
a member of a kingdom of ends. In addition, repelled by the hypocrisy and “false pride” 
he saw around him, Kant believes that such a rebirth is a private matter, revealed to the 
world not through one’s words but through one’s actions. This disgust at the hypocrisy 
around him is, I suggest, one reason why the mature Kant, even though he believed 
himself to be morally reborn, felt disinclined to advertise the fact.110 Perhaps a deeper 
reason is that he believed that even if one has been morally reborn one cannot, or at least 
should not, present one’s own rebirth experience as a model to be emulated. Advertising 
his own moral rebirth might encourage others to attempt to emulate his rebirth 
experience, distracting them from the purity of the moral ideal within. 
 
The death of his friend and his 40th birthday in 1764, then, left Kant thinking of death 
(and the possibility of an afterlife), the importance of friendship and the state of his own 
character. These events in his personal life left him very receptive to the ‘modern’ 
conception of heaven propounded by Swedenborg, with his conception of the afterlife as 
a community, one’s place in which is determined by the state of one’s character.  
 
(3e) – Swedenborg’s Heaven and Kant's Ideal of a Moral Community 
(Kingdom of Ends/Intelligible World) 
 
                                                 
110 For further information on the role of pietism in 18th century Prussia, see Gawthrop (1993),  Fulbrook 




If we believe that one’s conception of the ideal state after death (if one has such a 
conception) reflects something deep about one’s moral convictions, the fact that Kant 
found Swedenborg’s conception of heaven appealing should, at the very least, tell us 
something about his ethical theory. In the case of Kant, I believe that the relationship 
between his ‘image of heaven’ and his ethics is particularly strong, for Kant believes that 
to be moral is to choose to be a member of an intelligible world and he is not adverse to 
identifying the idea of an intelligible world with the idea of “the kingdom of God’, or the 
“kingdom of heaven”.111 One of the reasons for this is because Kant is drawn to the 
‘Swedenborgian’ conception of heaven as a community and believes, with Swedenborg, 
that morally we should think of ourselves as already in heaven (or hell) but without 
realizing it, and we should believe that our spiritual location depends upon our choice of 
character.  
 
In Heaven a History, McDannell & Lang (1988) present Swedenborg as a major 
manifestation of what they call the ‘modern perspective on heaven’. Traditionally, they 
argue, the joy of blessed soul in heaven consisted primarily in the relationship of that soul 
towards God. According to the ‘modern’ conception, however, a major, if not the, joy in 
heaven consists in the interaction of the blessed. Thus, they argue that although, 
The concept of a saintly community in heaven has a long tradition in 
Christian history, originating in the book of revelation. Christians 
acknowledged their belief in the “communion of Saints” each time they 
                                                 
111 See, in particular, Part 3 of Religion. Also see the Critique of Practical Reason (5:137), where he 
explicitly makes such an identification, writing: “intelligible world (the kingdom of God)”. 
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recited the Apostles’ creed. However, what began during the Renaissance 
and more clearly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the 
recognition that heavenly happiness did not hinge on the vision of God but 
on the social interaction of the saints. No longer did the saints merely 
dance with the angels outside the celestial gates; they now enjoyed each 
other’s company in the full sight of the divine. (p.211)112 
 
McDannell & Lang base their analysis on both textual and iconographic sources. In the 
final sentence of this passage they are referring to the fact that in most medieval 
depictions (paintings and woodcuts, for example) of the last judgment the blessed may be 
depicted as paying an interest in, and interacting with, one another outside the gates of 
heaven. Once beyond the gates, however, they are nearly always depicted as focusing all 
of their attention upon the presence of the divine and not upon one another. Beginning 
with the renaissance, it is far more common to see the blessed depicted as interacting with 
each other, even in the presence of God. This trend towards depicting the state of the 
blessed as an idealized human community reached a peak, they argue, in the works of 
Swedenborg.  
 
Johnson (1996) explains Swedenborg’s conception of the spiritual world as follows: 
The spiritual world consists of three realms: heaven, hell, and an 
intermediate realm that he calls the world of spirits. Heaven is populated 
                                                 
112 McDannel & Lang identify four characteristics of the ‘modern’ conception of heaven, all of which they 
find in Swedenborg: “First, only a thin veil divides heaven from earth. For the righteous, heavenly life 
begins immediately after death. Concepts of purgatory or sleeping in the grave until the general 
resurrection are either denied or minimized. Secondly, rather than viewing heaven as the structural opposite 
of life on earth, it is seen as a continuation and fulfillment of material existence. . . Thirdly, although 
heaven continues to be described as a place of “external rest”, the saints are increasingly shown engaged in 
activities, experiencing spiritual progress, and joyfully occupying themselves in a dynamic, motion filled 
environment. The journey to God does not end with an admittance to heaven but continues eternally. 
Spiritual development is therefore endless. Finally, a focus on human love expresses in communal and 
familial concerns slowly replaces the primacy of divine love experienced in the beatific vision. Social 
relationships, including the love between man and woman, are seen as fundamental to heavenly life and not 
in conflict with divine purpose” (p183). 
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by angels and hell by demons, all of whom are the departed spirits of 
rational beings who formerly inhabited earth and other planets. The 
intermediate world of spirits is populated by both departed spirits and by 
the spirits of living, embodied beings. Every rational being holds a dual 
citizenship in both the material and the spiritual worlds. Each of us exists 
always-already in a relationship with a spiritual self, what we might call 
the “better angels” of our nature. This spiritual self is the soul, understood 
both as the animating principle of the body and as our moral personality. 
Since each of us already exists in the spiritual world, the departure of the 
soul to the spiritual world is not to be understood as a journey from one 
place to another. Rather, it is to be understood as a transformation of our 
mode of cognition from sensuous intuition, which shows us only the 
material world, to a spiritual form of cognition, which reveals to us the 
place we already occupy in the spiritual world. . . There are three main 
spiritual laws governing the spiritual world: divine love, divine wisdom, 
and “use”. . . Divine love is the most primordial pneumatic law. . . Each 
community in the spirit world consists of spirits who have developed 
similar “loves”, similar hierarchies of value, [and] similar moral characters 
or temperaments during their embodied existence. (p.4) 
 
 
This depiction of heaven as an ideal human community struck a chord with Kant and, as 
we shall see, he advocates a very similar position in his metaphysics lectures.  In 
addition, he was sympathetic to Swedenborg’s belief that it is up to us, and not God, to 
choose which spiritual community (either heaven or hell) we belong to through the 
choice of our character.113 Thus, Swedenborg (1995) writes that, “Heaven is in a man, 
and people who have heaven in themselves come into heaven” (p.319). Similarly, “the 
evil within a person is hell within him and after death, his greatest desire is to be where 
                                                 
113 As McDannell & Lang (1988) point out, “Swedenborg radically departed from the orthodox Christian 
belief in an individual and final judgment. The spirit, not God, ultimately decided where to spend eternity” 
(p.189). 
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his own evil is. . . Consequently the person himself, not the Lord, casts himself into hell” 
(1997, p.547).114  
 
To conclude: Although it is tempting to dismiss Swedenborg as a lunatic from a bygone 
era, there is something decidedly ‘modern’ in his madness: firstly, in his conception of 
heaven as a community and, secondly, in his rejection of the idea of the last judgment as 
an external judgment, made by God, at or after our death. Kant was drawn to both of 
these views, both of which are incorporated into his mature ethics. In addition, from the 
theoretical perspective, his reflections on Swedenborg pushed him towards his critical 
distinction between the phenomenal and intelligible world.115 
 
Kant and Swedenborg on the post-mortem condition – a “cleansing of the doors of 
perception”?116 
                                                 
114 The famous Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov, in his encyclopedia article on Swedenborg, 
recounts one of Swedenborg’s visions, that illustrates this position: “At this time my inner person was in 
the middle heaven. . . which consists of a community of spirits who love truth because it is good. In their 
presence I felt their strong influence on my heart and proceeding to it to my brain, and the thought occurred 
to me, Is there any way in which the Lord’s mercy could let devils remain in hell to eternity? Even while I 
was thinking about this, one of the angels of a just temperament flew down with uncommon speed to the 
throne region of the great Satan and at the Lord’s suggestion brought out one of the evil devils in order to 
grant him heavenly bliss. I was allowed to see, however, that as the angel rose into a heavenly sphere, the 
proud expression on his prisoner’s face changed into one of suffering and his body turned black. . . dreadful  
convulsions came over him. . . and he showed that he was suffering immense and unbearable pain. . . His 
misery touched me, and I begged the Lord to command the angel to let him go. When, with the Lord’s 
consent, he was released, he hurled himself down headfirst so impetuously that all I could see was how his 
extraordinary black heels flashed by. . . Then I was given the insight that anyone’s stay in heaven or hell 
depends not on the arbitrary will of God but on the inner state of one’s essential nature. . . In this way, I 
understood that the eternity of hell for people who arrive there for their own gratification is in complete 
accord with both the wisdom and the goodness of God” (1997, p.5). 
115 Thus he concludes section one of Dreams with the observation that “from now on it will perhaps be 
possible, perhaps, to have all sorts of opinions about but no longer knowledge of such beings” (2:351). This 
claim is in line with his critical position that we can think of the intelligible world, but have no 
cognition/knowledge of it. 
116 “If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to man as it is” – William Blake, 
from The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.  Blake was, for a time, a member of the Swedenborgian New 
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Swedenborg believes that, “Every man while living in the body is in some society of 
spirits and of angels, though entirely unaware of it.” (p.352). Kant holds a very similar 
view, believing that although we can only intuit ourselves as members of the phenomenal 
world we should think of ourselves as members of a spiritual or intelligible world. Thus, 
in the Critique of Practical Reason  Kant argues the antinomies of pure reason (from the 
Critique of Pure Reason) are a labyrinth, to which transcendental idealism provides the 
key. In discovering this key, however, reason “further discovers what we did not seek and 
yet need, namely a view into a higher, immutable order of things in which we already 
are” (5:107 – my emphasis). 
 
Further evidence that Kant conceived of the afterlife in these terms is to be found in his 
lectures on metaphysics. In these passages Kant not only claims that we should regard 
ourselves as now already members of a spiritual (or intelligible) community, but without 
being able to intuit it, but also that we should hope that upon our death our form of 
intuition will change and we will be able to intuit our membership. This view is clearly 
derived from Swedenborg, and Kant himself acknowledges this debt. 
 
Kant's metaphysics lectures followed the structure of Baumgarten’s metaphysics 
textbook, and Kant customarily discussed the question of death and the post-mortem 
condition at the end of his discussion of rational psychology. In the mid-1770s, before the 
publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, he could claim that, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jerusalem church, and this poem was written as a response, and commentary on, Swedenborg’s Heaven 
And Hell. 
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We have a cognition of the bodily world through sensible intuition insofar 
as it appears to us; our consciousness is bound to animal intuition; the 
present world is the interaction <commercium> of all objects, insofar as 
they are intuited through present sensible intuition. But when the soul 
separates itself from the body, then it will not intuit the world as it 
appears, but rather as it is. Accordingly the separation of the soul 
from the body consists in the alteration of sensible intuition into 
spiritual intuition, and that is the other world. The other world is 
accordingly not another location, but rather only another intuition. 
(Metaphysik L1, 28:296 – my emphasis) 
 
Some commentators may think such views are pre-critical and are incompatible with his 
critical project. Kant, however, repeats this claim in his lectures throughout the 1780s and 
into the 1790s. Given the fact that many readers of Kant might be surprised by this 
commitment, it is worth quoting these passages at some length. 
 
Thus in 1782-3, in a lecture course he gave between the publication of the first and 
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that: 
Now we find ourselves already in the intelligible world, and each human 
being can count himself as belonging, according to the constitution of his 
manner of thinking, either to the society of the blessed or of the damned. 
He is now only not conscious of it, and after death he will become 
conscious of this society . . . We are now already conscious through reason 
of finding ourselves in an intelligible realm; after death we will intuit and 
cognize it and then we are in an entirely different world that, however, is 
altered only in form, namely, where we cognize things as they are in 
themselves. (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:919-20) 
 
Here Kant once again suggests that we can hope for some form of intellectual intuition 
after death. The claim that we are “now already conscious through reason of finding 
ourselves in an intelligible world” should be understood as meaning that even though we 
are at present unable to intuit ourselves as members of an intelligible world we are able to 
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think of ourselves as members of such a world, for the idea of an intelligible world is an 
idea of pure reason. And Kant makes it clear, once again, that he believes that it is not 
irrational to hope that at some point we will have an intuition of our membership. 
 
In his lectures in 1784 he repeats the claim that “the virtuous is already in heaven only he 
is not conscious of it” (28:445), and adds that, 
Cutting off all further pondering on this is the best remedy, that we can 
say: another world means only another intuition of the same things, the 
sensible world thus entirely ceases for us . . . Now it is asked: will the soul 
exist as pure intelligence? But it is indeed that when it is not sensible. But 
one also cannot think how a being that is created should cognize things in 
themselves. We will thus presumably come only by degrees to a greater 
perfection of cognitions and have another kind of intuition in the same or 
in another world. Here no philosophy goes any further. (Metaphysik 
Volkmann, 28:446) 
 
And in his lecture course from 1790-1 he once again repeats the claim that “the human 
being who is virtuous is in heaven, only he does not intuit it, but he can infer it through 
reason.” (28:593) He continues by adding that, 
the transition from the sensible world into the other is merely the intuition 
of oneself. According to content it is always the same, but according to 
form it is different . . . One sees at once how limited is our knowledge of 
the state of the soul after death. This life shows nothing but appearances, 
another world means nothing other than another intuition, things in 
themselves are unknown to us here, but whether we will become 
acquainted with them in another world? We do not know. A pure spirit 
cannot exist merely as soul in the sensible world. As intelligence it does 
not appear in space, also not in time. (Metaphysik L2 28:593) 
 
Thus, throughout the 1780s, the decade in which Kant wrote the Critique of Pure Reason, 
the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant was committed to the claim 
that we can (and should) hope for intellectual intuition after death. Some commentators 
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may argue that we should not place too much emphasis on unpublished lecture notes 
jotted down by his students. However, there is much consistency in the notes and the 
doctrine Kant presents here is clearly not just Kant’s summary of Baumgarten’s position. 
And, in addition, there is also evidence in his published writings that Kant is committed 
to such a position. For example, in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of 
Pure Reason Kant talks of, 
that remarkable predisposition of our nature, noticeable to every human 
being, never to be capable of being satisfied by what is temporal (since the 
temporal is always insufficient for the predispositions of our whole 
vocation) leading to the hope of a future life. (Bxxxiii) 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that the future life we must hope for is atemporal, which, given 
Kant’s account of time as a form of intuition, can only mean that he believes that we must 
hope for some change in our form of intuition (into a non-temporal form of intuition) 
after death.  
 
This position is clearly derived from Swedenborg’s claim in Heavenly Secrets, that, 
Every man while living in the body is in some society of spirits and of 
angels, though entirely unaware of it. And if he were not conjoined with 
heaven and with the world of spirits through the society in which he is, he 
could not live a moment. . . The very societies in and with which men 
have been during the life of the body, are shown them when they come 
into the other life. And when, after the life of the body, they come into 
their society, they come into their veriest life which they had in the body, 
and from this life begin a new life; and so according to their life which 
they have lived in the body they either go down to hell, or are raised up 
into heaven. (p.352) 
 
He was drawn to such a position because he believed that if we are to attempt to be moral 
we must have some hope that we can eventually have some awareness of our true moral 
 151 
disposition (or, what he calls in the Critique of Pure Reason our ‘intelligible character’). 
For example, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant can argue that, “an upright man 
cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of his uprightness” (5:116). However to be 
upright is to have a moral disposition or intelligible character, and this is not the sort of 
thing that can be an object of our form of intuition. As a result we can have no knowledge 
of our uprightness. Thus Kant can write in the Religion that,  
According to the law, each and every human being should furnish in his 
own self an example of [the] idea [of a human being morally pleasing to 
God]. And the required prototype always resides only in reason, since 
outer experience yields no example adequate to the idea; as outer, it does 
not disclose the inwardness of the disposition but only allows inference to 
it, though not with strict certainty. (Indeed, even a human being’s inner 
experience of himself does not allow him so to fathom the depth of his 
heart as to be able to attain, through self-observation, an entirely reliable 
cognition of the basis of the maxims which he professes, and of their 
purity and stability). (6:63) 
 
Kant believes, then, that the virtuous man, if he is to be happy must have assurance of his 
uprightness. This, however, is impossible, given our form of intuition, because to be 
upright is to have a good intelligible character, and our intelligible character is not a 
possible object of (our form of) intuition. Kant also believes that we can hope to be 
happy. Therefore he concludes that we must hope that our form of intuition will change. 
  
Interestingly, however, Kant does not continue to maintain that we must hope for a 
change in our form of intuition in his metaphysics lectures from the 1790s, and I suspect 
that he changed his position while writing the Critique of Judgment. A full examination 
of this issue would have to involve a careful interpretation of the Critique of Judgment 
and his short essay The End of All Things, published in 1794. My hypothesis is that in the 
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1790s he decided that in order to be assured of his uprightness, the virtuous man does not 
need to intuit his membership in the intelligible world, but could feel it. Such a feeling, as 
opposed to an intuition, of one’s own uprightness (that is, a felt assurance of one’s 
membership in a kingdom of ends) would be enough to make the virtuous man happy. 
We can be assured of our membership in such a world by experiencing the beauty of 
other (autonomous) individuals around us.117 We cannot hope to intuit their individuality 
and autonomy, but we can hope to feel it. For (a) the ideal of beauty is the (moral) human 
being118 and (b) the ideal aesthetic judge is the disinterested moral agent. I believe that in 
his account of the feeling of beauty in the Critique of Judgment Kant came to see a way 
of satisfying his hope for some awareness of our membership in the kingdom of heaven 
without having to appeal to the possibility of intellectual intuition after death. For, if we 
were perfectly moral (and hence perfectly disinterested) we would feel the beauty of 
those autonomous agents around us.119  A more detailed discussion of this interesting 
issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
                                                 
117 Thus I believe that one of the major aims of the Critique of Judgment is to explain how there can be a 
visible expression of moral ideas. Thus, in his discussion of the ideal of beauty in section 17 of the Critique 
of Aesthetic Judgment Kant explains that “the visible expression of moral ideas, which inwardly govern 
human beings, can of course be drawn only from experience, but as it were to make visible in bodily 
manifestation. . . their combination with everything that our understanding connects with the morally good 
in the idea of the highest purposiveness – goodness of soul, or purity, or strength, or repose, etc. – this 
requires pure ideas of reason and great imagination. . .” (5:235 – my emphasis). The aim of the Critique of 
Judgment is to explain how moral ideas (such as the idea of an autonomous individual) can have  a visible 
expression. That is, how it is possible to experience a visible body as an autonomous individual. In 
claiming this I agree with Guyer (1993) that “Kant did not look to moral theory to solve a problem in 
aesthetic theory; instead, he looked to aesthetics to solve what he had come to recognize as crucial 
problems for morality” (p.19). Although we disagree about exactly what moral problem Kant is attempting 
to solve. 
118 “There is still a distinction between the normal idea of the beautiful and its ideal, which on the grounds 
already introduced can be expected only in the human figure. In the latter the ideal consists in the 
expression of the moral, without which the object would not please universally and moreover positively” 
(5:235). 
119 Our experience of beauty, then, could, as Schiller suggests, “serve as a pledge in the sensible world of a 
morality as yet unseen” (Schiller 1967, p.15).  
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Swedenborg and the phenomenal/intelligible distinction 
 
I believe that engaging with Swedenborg pushed Kant towards developing his 
phenomenal-intelligible distinction, and that Kant conceives of the intelligible world as a 
community of spirits in real interaction. Kant explicitly calls the intelligible world as the 
‘spiritual world’. For example, in his metaphysics lectures from the early 1790s (over 10 
years after having written the Critique of Pure Reason), he explicitly identifies the 
intelligible world (mundus intelligibilis) with the spiritual world (mundus pneumaticus) 
(Metaphysik K2, 28:775). Laywine also suggests that Kant’s reading of Swedenborg 
deeply affected him, and that this engagement led him to develop the phenomenal-
intelligible distinction. However, the reasons she gives for this are very different from 
mine. And she attributes a very different conception of the intelligible world to the 
mature Kant than I do, for she believes that the mature Kant was committed to the 
position that there could be no real interaction in the intelligible world, for the idea of 
interaction between disembodied spirits is unintelligible.  
 
Laywine (1993) maintains that Swedenborg, like the young Kant, also regarded spirits as 
necessarily embodied and spatio-temporal. According to Laywine, Swedenborg, in effect, 
functioned as a mirror to Kant. The young Kant was committed to the view that spirits 
interact, and as a result believed that they must resist one another and be impenetrable. 
As a result of this the young Kant concluded that spirits must necessarily be embodied. In 
reading Swedenborg, Laywine suggests, Kant recognized his own outlandish position 
reflected warts and all. And recognized that unless he clearly distinguished between the 
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phenomenal and the noumenal his position was equally outlandish. In the course of 
engaging with Swedenborg, then, Kant realized that he must clearly distinguish between 
the intelligible and the phenomenal world, and allow for real interaction only in the 
phenomenal world. And this was a position he maintained for the rest of his life. 
 
Laywine maintains, then, that the critical Kant believed that real interaction is impossible 
in the intelligible world. Thus she argues that,  
[K]ant apparently denies that pre-established harmony prevails in the 
Kingdom of Ends. But how can he deny this, given his remarks about the 
system of Leibniz in the Note to the Amphiboly in the first Critique? 
There he says that, if we use our pure concept to represent community in 
the intelligible world, we must apparently represent this world as one in 
which pre-established harmony prevails. So how might we possibly 
conceive of the Kingdom of Ends, if not as a system of pre-established 
harmony? (p.142) 
  
Elsewhere, Laywine claims that in remark three of the Amphiboly, “Kant goes so far as to 
say that Leibniz was perfectly right to espouse pre-established harmony” (p.139), and that 
Kant’s position in the first Critique is that, “the metaphysician cannot reasonably 
conclude, even on his own dogmatic terms, that physical influx prevails in the intelligible 
world. Leibniz was right: the intelligible world presents a system of pre-established 
harmony” (p.140). This is clearly a misinterpretation of the position of the mature Kant, 
for there is ample textual evidence to show that the mature Kant conceives of the 
intelligible world as a community in which there is real interaction.120 The only textual 
evidence she points to support her interpretation are Kant's comments on Leibniz in 
                                                 
120 See chapter 1. 
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remark three of the Amphiboly of the Critique of Pure Reason, and she clearly misreads 
this passage.  
 
In remark three of the amphiboly Kant explains the reason why Leibniz’s “principle of 
the possible community of substances amongst themselves had to be predetermined 
harmony and could not be a physical influence” (A274/B330). Laywine claims that the 
reason Kant gives is that it is impossible for us to conceive of real interaction using the 
unschematized concept of community. This interpretation, however, is totally 
unwarranted.  For she fails to read remark three in its historical context, and, in particular, 
in the context the disagreement between Wolff and Crusius about the relationship and 
distinction between the will and the understanding. Schneewind (1998) explains that at 
the heart of this disagreement is Crusius’s belief that, “the Wolffians are. . . mistaken in 
thinking will and understanding to be only one power” (p.446).121 And Kant clearly sides 
with Crusius in this debate. 
 
Thus, Kant continues remark three by explaining that the reason for Leibniz’s 
commitment to pre-established harmony is because, for Leibniz, “everything is only 
internal, i.e. occupied with its own representations” (ibid.). And what he means by this is 
that Leibniz attributes to  
substances no other inner state than the thought through which we 
internally determine our senses itself, namely the state of 
representations. This completes the monads, which are to constitute the 
fundamental matter of the entire universe, the active power of which, 
however consists merely in representations, through which they are 
                                                 
121 The following discussion of Crusius and Wolff is indebted to Schneewind.  
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properly efficacious merely within themselves. (A274/B330 – my 
underlining) 
 
This, then, is the reason Kant points to as for why Leibniz was committed to pre-
established harmony.  And any educated contemporary reader would have understood 
what Kant was alluding to here, namely the fact that the Leibnizians reduced all faculties 
to a single power or faculty. The reason, then, why Kant believes Leibniz was committed 
to pre-established harmony was because he, like  
Wolf [sic] wished to derive everything from the faculty of knowledge and 
defined pleasure and unpleasure as action of the faculty of knowledge. He 
also called the faculty of motivation a play of representations, and so 
merely a modification of the faculty of knowledge. (28:674) 
 
Any contemporary educated German reader would have recognized that this is what Kant 
was alluding to in the Amphiboly when he claims that for Leibniz “the active power [of 
monads] consists merely in representations”. Anyone aware of this debate, then, should 
be able to recognize that in remark three of the Amphiboly Kant does not come anywhere 
near claiming that pre-established harmony must prevail in the intelligible world. All he 
is claiming is that if, like Leibniz and Wolff you assume that all human powers (or 
faculties) can be reduced to the power of representation then you must committed to 
regarding individual as isolated (and thus to pre-established harmony). Kant, however, 
clearly rejects this assumption, for, following Crusius, he sharply distinguishes between 
our faculty of cognition and our faculty of desire. 
 
Although Laywine’s account of Kant's attitude towards Swedenborg in the 1760s is based 
upon a misinterpretation of his mature position we, can still learn something from 
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examining the problems with her account. In addition, her view have been influential on 
others working on Kant's development. For example, Schönfeld (2000) in his recent book 
The Philosophy of the Young Kant, accepts Laywine’s interpretation without revision.122 
Thus, he writes that, 
The inevitable consequence of the pre-critical project was that bodies and 
souls, or material and immaterial substances, are subject to the same laws. 
At the same time, the pre-critical project must not rule out the possibility 
of an afterlife – that is the possibility that material substances remove 
themselves from their physical embodiment and interact purely among 
themselves. . . What would such an immaterial community of souls look 
like? Because souls are substances that obey the same fundamental laws as 
bodies, the immaterial community of the souls must contain the same 
structure as the physical world. The reductio ad absurdum of the pre-
critical project is Swedenborg’s spirit-world – a world whose ghostly 
inhabitants are not even aware of their postmortal state because it looks 
and feels just like their old home123. . . It is therefore correct to say 
(Laywine, 1993) that Kant found in the Arcana Coelestia a caricature of 
his own metaphysics. (p.244) 
 
Schönfeld, following Laywine, believes that Kant regarded Swedenborg’s work as the 
reductio ad absurdum of his own earlier position. 
 
According to Laywine and Schönfeld, then, Kant found Swedenborg’s writings to be 
ridiculous but also saw them as a mirror in which he could see reflected the absurdity of 
his own earlier position. This recognition provoked Kant to reflect upon his own earlier 
metaphysical commitments and to reject his earlier account of the spatiality of spirits and 
                                                 
122 And it should be noted that there are very few books on the development of Kant's views in the 1760s.  
123 This claim is also to be found in Laywine. What both Laywine and Schönfeld fail to recognize is that 
Swedenborg distinguishes between spirits and angels (and demons). He believes that even though 
immediately after death our form of intuition remains the same, and hence many spirits after death are not 
aware that they have died, over time ones form of intuition changes and one comes to recognize oneself as 
a member of either heaven or hell. Although neither Laywine nor Schönfeld notice this aspect of 
Swedenborg’s theology, Kant himself, as we shall see, does. This makes it clear that Kant actually read 
Swedenborg’s work quite carefully. 
 158 
to carefully distinguish between the sensible and the intelligible in his next work – the 
Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. As Laywine explains it: 
On Kant’s own view, it would seem that the soul is an object of sensation 
in as much as we could collide with one. Now Swedenborg also represents 
immaterial things – angels and departed spirits – as objects of sensation. . . 
[On reading Swedenborg, Kant] was impressed by the general fact that he 
could not reasonably dismiss Swedenborg’s reported conversations with 
angels and departed spirits so long as it was possible on his own view to 
collide with Spirits who had passed on to the hereafter. . . Kant did not 
find Swedenborg’s work problematic just because it is all about angels and 
spirits. Kant himself was not troubled by admitting that it might be 
possible for such things to exist. Even in Dreams, he is refuses to say [sic] 
that the existence of angels and spirits is impossible. . . The problem with 
Swedenborg was rather that the spirit-seer of Stockholm represents 
immaterial things as though they could be subject to the conditions of 
sensibility. (p.57) 
 
Kant's response to this problem was, according to Laywine, to conclude that (a) spirits (or 
souls) cannot be subject to the conditions of sensibility, and as a consequence that (b) 
they cannot collide with one another and (c) that they cannot really interact. On my 
interpretation Kant drew almost the opposite conclusions, namely that, (a) the objects that 
we experience around us as subject to the conditions of sensibility can be thought of 
(although not intuited as) intelligible individuals (or spirits), (b) intelligible individuals 
can be thought of as centers of intelligible (moral) forces and as resisting one another, 
and, as a consequence of this, (c) intelligible individuals can be thought of as really 
interacting. 
 
In the course of his engagement he found a way out of his dilemma, for Swedenborg’s 
visions suggested to him that real interaction, although it involves resistance and forces, 
does not necessarily have to involve physical forces, which can only be applied to spatio-
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temporal bodies. Indeed ten years after reading Swedenborg, Kant could still talk of 
Swedenborg’s visions as ‘sublime’, and what he found so sublime about Swedenborg was 
that he clearly distinguished between the sensible world and the spiritual (intelligible) 
world. Thus, in his metaphysics lectures from the mid 1770s, ten years after his engaging 
with Swedenborg, Kant could argue that, 
The thought of Swedenborg is in this quite sublime. He says the 
spiritual world constitutes a special real universe; this is the 
intelligible world <mundus intelligibilis> which must be distinguished 
from the sensible world <mundo sensibilis>. He says all spiritual natures 
stand in connection with one another, only the community and connection 
of the spirits is not bound to the condition of bodies; there one spirit will 
not be far or near to the other, but rather there is a spiritual connection. 
Now as spirits our souls stand in this connection and community with one 
another, and indeed already here in this world, only we do not see 
ourselves in this community because we still have a sensible intuition; but 
although we do not see ourselves in it, we still stand within it. Now when 
the hindrance of sensible intuition is once removed, then we see ourselves 
in this spiritual community, and this is the other world; now these are not 
other things, but rather the same ones, but which we intuit differently. 
(28:289-9. Metaphysik L1 – my emphasis)124  
 
Here, roughly ten years after writing Dreams Kant makes it quite clear that he does not 
regard Swedenborg as having subjected immaterial substances to the conditions of 
sensibility.125 Indeed, Kant actually credits Swedenborg himself with having postulated 
                                                 
124 See also Kant’s metaphysics lectures from 1792-3. Here Kant argues that “the concept of the spiritual 
life of the soul is wholly idea. It may be supposed; and if [after death] we pass over from the animal life 
into a purely spiritual life, then this is not to be sought in space. (Swedenborg assumed the ideal whole 
<totum> as real, invisible church.)” (Metaphysik Dohna, 28:690). Also suggesting that he did not regard 
Swedenborg as having offered an account of the spiritual life that is to be sought in space. 
125 Swedenborg himself argues that although angels are not “clothed with a material body” (Heaven & Hell, 
#77), they were once living human beings and are not “formless minds, nor ethereal gases, but people to a 
T” (Heaven & Hell, #75). In particular he will stress in Heavenly Secrets that spirits are not merely 
“abstract” Cartesian disembodied thinking subjects, but are essentially “organic” (Heavenly Secrets, p219).   
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the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible world.126 Now, Laywine might 
argue that the Kant of the mid-1770s is misremembering the attitude of the Kant of the 
mid-1760s towards Swedenborg. However, even in Dreams, Kant makes it clear that he 
regards Swedenborg as having distinguished between spiritual ‘space’ and physical 
space. Spirits do have something analogous to positions, but these are not spatial 
positions. Thus Kant summarizes Swedenborg’s position in Dreams:  
[T]he positions of the spirits, relative to each other, have nothing in 
common with the space of the corporeal world. Hence in what concerns 
their spirit-positions, the soul of someone in India may often be the closest 
neighbor of someone in Europe. (2:363) 
 
Instead the relations and ‘distances’ between spirits are moral.  
Their connections with each other are represented under the concomitant 
conditions of nearness, while their differences are represented as 
distances, just as the spirits themselves are not really extended, though 
they do present the appearance of human forms to each other. . . 
Everything depends on the relation of their inner state and on the 
connection which they have with each other, according to their agreement 
in the true and the good. (2:363) 
 
This is an accurate characterization of Swedenborg’s position. For example, Swedenborg 
(1995) argues that, “there are no spaces in heaven except states that correspond to inner 
ones. . . Nearnesses are similarities, and distances dissimilarities. . . consequently, people 
who are in dissimilar [moral] states are far apart” (p. 192-3). This is why he believes that 
heavenly things “cannot be comprehended by a natural idea because there is space in that 
idea; for it is formed out of such things as are in the world; and in each and all things 
                                                 
126 As we have seen in chapter one, Kant reaffirms this position in the corresponding sections of his 
metaphysics lectures throughout the 1780s. Although in these later lectures he does not mention 
Swedenborg by name the reference seems clear. 
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which strike the eye there is space”.127 Similar passages are extremely easy to find, and 
Kant obviously found them. It is difficult to understand how Laywine and Schönfeld 
could reach the conclusion that Swedenborg believed that immaterial things were subject 
to the spatio-temporal conditions of sensibility, or that that this is how Kant read him.  
 
Swedenborg is insistent that angels neither exist in space nor experience heaven in spatio-
temporal terms. He does believe that immediately after death existence often continues as 
it did on earth, and he tells a number of stories about dead spirits he met who did not 
realize that they were dead. Laywine takes his claim that some spirits after death do not 
recognize they are dead and experience the spirit world as if it is spatio-temporal as proof 
that he believes the world of spirits is spatio-temporal. She fails to recognize, however, 
that Swedenborg distinguishes between the life of the spirit immediately after death and 
the heavenly spirits in general and heaven as a particular community of spirits. 
Swedenborg makes this distinction because he believes that (some?) individuals need to 
make moral progress even after death, however he believes that at some point virtuous 
spirits will become angels and their inner eyes will be opened, and they will no longer 
experience the community they become part of as subject to the conditions of outer 
sense.128  
  
Although aspects of Kant's conception of the intelligible world can be traced back to 
Swedenborg, there are some significant differences. Most importantly, Kant objects to 
                                                 
127 Quoted from Raine (1985), p.92.  
128 Swedenborg distinguishes between his visions of spirits and normal sensory vision. Sensory vision 
occurs by means of the sense organs, we experience things that strike our eyes. Swedenborg claims that his 
spiritual visions do not occur through his physical eyes, but through an inner eye. 
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Swedenborg’s claim that objects in the phenomenal world can be symbols of the 
intelligible world of spirits. Thus he claims in his Anthropology that, 
To claim that the actual phenomena of the world, which present 
themselves to the senses, are merely a symbol of an intelligible world 
hidden in the background (as Swedenborg does), is fanaticism. However, 
in the exhibition of concepts (called ideas) which belong to that morality 
which is the essence of all religion and which consequently come from 
pure reason, we must distinguish the outer shell, useful and necessary for a 
time, from the thing itself, the symbolic from the intellectual (public 
worship from religion) – this is enlightenment. If this is not done an ideal 
(of pure practical reason) would be replaced by an idol and the final 
purpose would be unsuccessful. (7:191-2) 
 
Kant here objects to regarding the phenomenal world as a symbol of the spiritual world. 
What he is objecting to here is Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences. For this would 
suggest that the phenomenal world was in need of (inspired) interpretation, which Kant 
finds morally problematic. Instead, Kant thinks that we have the pure idea of a spiritual 
world and we can, and should, think of the phenomenal world as a world of spirits (or 
autonomous individuals). This is not a matter of interpretation, but a matter of application 
(of an idea to an object of experience) and this application is a matter of choice and does 
not require any interpretation.  
 
In addition to criticizing symbolic (spiritual) interpretations of the phenomenal world, in 
this passage Kant also comments upon the usefulness of symbolic representations of the 
intelligible. He suggests that such representations may be necessary for a time, but 
ultimately we must replace our symbolic representation of the intelligible world with an 
intellectual one. I suggest that here Kant is talking from personal experience, because, 
influenced by Swedenborg’s writings, he first started to think of the intelligible world in 
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symbolic terms, however, as we shall see, he gradually came to intellectualize his 
conception of this world, thinking of it more and more as an idea of pure reason.  
 
To Conclude: Kant realized that just because space is necessarily subject to the category 
of community, not every community is spatial. Indeed our pure idea of a community (the 
kingdom of ends, or an intelligible world) is the sort of thing that could never appear in 
space. To put it crudely, what Kant took from Swedenborg was the idea that relations 
didn’t have to be spatial. In addition to believing that the spiritual community is not 
spatial, although it contains qualitative moral relations analogous to quantities spatial 
relations, Swedenborg conceives of the spirit world as governed by non-physical 
pneumatic laws. It is no coincidence, then, that at the time of reading Swedenborg Kant 
began to conceptualize the intelligible world as a community governed by non-physical 
laws. 
 
I agree with Schönfeld (2001) that the pre-critical Kant believed that, “bodies and souls, 
or material and immaterial substances, are subject to the same laws” (p.244), and that this 
made it impossible for him to conceptualize a disembodied post mortem condition. 
However, upon reading Swedenborg he did not encounter a parody of his own earlier 
position, but an alternative to it, for Swedenborg clearly distinguishes between physical 
laws and spiritual (or what he calls pneumatic) laws. Kant clearly found the idea of a 
spiritual community governed by spiritual laws morally appealing, and the genesis of his 
moral ideal of a kingdom of ends can be traced back to this idea. However, by the 1780’s 
Kant had come to see that in conceiving of a community of spirits it is not enough to 
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conceive of it as governed by pneumatic laws, but had come to see that these laws must 
be given by the members of the community itself. In other words, he reached the 
conclusion that we can only conceive of a community of spirits if we think of each 
individual spirit as autonomous. This is a notion that is not to be found in Swedenborg, 







From Pneumatic Laws to Moral Laws: 
Interaction and Autonomy 
 
I have argued that the idea of a ‘good will’ should be understood as the idea of ‘a member 
of an intelligible world’, and that the idea of an intelligible world is the idea of a 
community of individuals in real interaction. In the previous chapter I argued that Kant 
first started to conceive of the intelligible world in these terms in the course of his 
engagement with Swedenborg. In this chapter I shall examine the development of this 
idea of a community in more detail. At the time of writing Dreams Kant conceived of 
such a community as a community of individuals governed by pneumatic (spiritual laws), 
and does not seem to have thought it to be important that these laws must be thought of as 
given by the members of the community. The mature Kant, however, conceives of such a 
community as governed by moral laws and believes that the only type of individuals that 
can really be members of a community are autonomous agents.  
 
The reason for this is that an individual can only be a member of a unified (intelligible) 
world if the individual itself is the ground (or more precisely if it is the concurrent 
ground) of the intelligible relations between individuals that constitute the world, because 
for a world to be a world it must be unified and the principle (or source) of its unity must 
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be intrinsic to the world. And this is only possible if the individuals that constitute the 
world are the source of the unity of the world. Now, what unifies a world, and makes the 
world a world, are the relations (or laws) that hold between its individual members. So 
for a world really to be a world the individual members of the world must be the source 
of the laws that provide the world with its unity. Thus the idea of a member of a world is 
the idea of a being who “gives”, or legislates, the laws of the world. As a consequence, 
the only type of being that has the capacity to be (or become) a member of a ‘world’, 
strictly speaking, is a being that is aware of potential laws and chooses to actualize these 
laws, and this is, by definition, an autonomous agent.   
 
In so far as it is possible for me to instantiate the moral ideal and become a member of an 
intelligible world, then, I would have to (a) be aware of the potential laws which could 
‘glue’ such a world together, and (b) choose to actualize these potential laws. For only a 
being that has chosen to actualize these potential laws can be a member of an intelligible 
world. Thus, to choose to be a member of an intelligible world is to choose to be a 
legislator for such a world. Now, a being that has chosen to actualize law is, by 
definition, an autonomous agent. My consciousness of moral laws, then, is a 
consciousness of potential laws, which, if I choose to ‘give’ them, would give intelligible 
unity to the world. In other words, my consciousness of moral laws is a consciousness of 
the potential relations between individuals that could hold us together in one community. 
For me to become a member of the intelligible world is for me to choose to actualize the 
potential laws of this world, laws which if actualized would transform me from, at most, 
one of a multitude into a member of a community. 
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(4a) Pneumatic Laws and Forces in Dreams 
 
In Dreams Kant muses on the possibility of  ‘pneumatic laws’ (that is, laws governing 
spirits) through which I could be “connected” to spiritual beings “independently of the 
mediation of matter”. He writes that,  
I am connected with beings of my own kind through the mediation of 
corporeal laws, but I can in no wise establish from what is given to me 
whether, in addition, I am not also connected, or could not ever be 
connected with such beings, in accordance with other laws, which I shall 
call pneumatic laws, and be so independently of the mediation of matter. 
(2:370) 
 
Here Kant expresses his skepticism as to any possible knowledge of the world of spirits. 
Experience can provide me with no knowledge of a world of spirits and of my possible 
relationship to such a world. Such skepticism, however, does not rule out the possibility 
of such a world of spirits connected by pneumatic laws, nor does it rule out the possibility 
that I am actually (or could possibly become) a member of such a world.129  
 
Kant makes the relationship between pneumatic laws, interaction and morality, clearer 
when he suggests that these putative ‘pneumatic laws’ between spirits can be thought of 
as analogous to the law of gravity. For just as the law of gravity is thought of as the basis 
for interaction between bits of matter, pneumatic laws can be thought of as the basis for 
interaction between spirits. In addition, just as the postulation of the law of gravity is the 
                                                 
129 It is worth noting that even at this early stage in his development, Kant is not conceiving of the ‘spiritual 
world’ as a world that is ontologically distinct from the physical (or phenomenal) world. Kant does not 
suggest that the world of spirits is another world – but that ‘spiritual interaction’ (if possible) would merely 
be another way for me to be “connected with beings of my own Kind”. 
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basis of the postulation of gravitational forces, the postulation of pneumatic laws allows 
us to postulate pneumatic forces, and, having postulated such pneumatic forces we are 
free to regard our moral impulses as manifestations of these forces. Thus, Kant argues 
that Newton, 
Did not hesitate to treat gravitation as a genuine effect produced by the 
universal activity of matter operating on itself; for this reason he also gave 
it the name ‘attraction’. Are we, then, to suppose that it would not in the 
same way be possible to represent the phenomena of the moral impulses in 
thinking natures, who are reciprocally related to each other, as the effect of 
a genuinely active force, in virtue of which spirit-natures exercise an 
influence on each other? (2:335) 
 
Here Kant argues that just as there was nothing illegitimate in Newton’s introduction of 
the idea of attraction as a force to explain the law of gravity, there is nothing illegitimate 
in thinking of putative pneumatic laws as being grounded in ‘pneumatic forces’ and he 
suggests that this is a possible way for us to conceive of our own (actual) ‘moral 
impulses’. In other words, Kant suggesting a way for us to think of our moral impulses as 
the basis of some sort of spiritual (or intelligible) interaction, presumably with other 
moral agents.  
 
Kant has something like the following in mind: Our actual “moral impulses” are 
immediate objects of consciousness. We are immediately aware of certain of our 
‘inclinations’130 as moral inclinations. We are not, however, immediately aware of such 
inclinations as forces. The idea of a pneumatic law, however, is not self-contradictory and 
so it is possible to think of myself as interacting with others “of my kind” according to 
                                                 
130 And here I am not using ‘inclination’ in a technical sense. In his later moral philosophy ‘inclination’ will 
acquire a technical sense. 
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such laws. In addition, one can  draw an analogy between the notion of the law of gravity 
and these putative pneumatic laws, and just as the existence of the law of gravity suggests 
the existence of gravitational forces (of attraction), the existence of pneumatic laws 
would seem to imply the existence of  pneumatic forces. I have no cognition of these 
putative pneumatic laws. If, however, I am to think of myself as in real interaction with 
“other beings of my kind”,  but “independently of the mediation of matter” (and I am able 
to think of myself in this way) I do so by thinking of myself as possessing some genuine 
active (pneumatic) forces. Thus, although I possess neither knowledge of any pneumatic 
laws nor direct awareness of any pneumatic forces there is nothing contradictory involved 
in thinking of my ‘moral impulses’ as phenomenal representations of such (albeit merely 
postulated) forces. Thus, although I do not intuit my moral inclinations as genuinely 
active forces (and so the awareness of these impulses can provide no theoretical evidence 
for the existence of pneumatic laws), I can think of these ‘moral impulses as the “effects 
of genuinely active forces”, insofar as I think of myself as a member of a world of spirits 
governed by pneumatic laws. In this way I can think of (although not intuit) myself as a 
center of intelligible forces and, as such, as the subject of intelligible interaction. 
 
Expressed in the language of morality, we could say that it is the postulated existence of 
pneumatic laws that makes it possible for us to think of our wills as morally effective. For 
our moral impulses can only really be considered as forces (and hence as genuinely 
effective) if there were pneumatic laws. Thus Kant remarks on the following page that, 
All the morality of actions, while never having its full effect in the 
corporeal life of man according to the order of nature, may well do so in 
the spirit-world according to pneumatic laws. (2:336) 
 170 
 
Here, Kant suggest that if there were pneumatic laws, this would explain how the 
morality of actions could be effective. Combining this with the suggestions from the 
passages previously cited, we could say that it is through the postulation of pneumatic 
laws that we are able to think of our moral impulses as effective. To be effective is to 
have causal power. So Kant is suggesting that we can think of ourselves as spirits acting 
upon one another through the exercise of moral forces if we think of ourselves as 
members of a spiritual world governed by pneumatic laws.  
 
Kant is, in effect, playing with the idea of a ‘Newtonian ethics’, with moral agents 
conceived of as centers of moral gravity. In Dreams he suggests that we can think of our 
moral impulses as representations of pneumatic forces. By the 1780s our consciousness 
of moral impulses will be replaced by our consciousness of moral imperatives (and laws) 
for the mature Kant will suggest that it is our consciousness of the categorical imperative 
which allows us to think of ourselves as centers of moral gravity and hence as capable of 
moral (intelligible) interaction. This is what he means when he argues in the Critique of 
Practical Reason that, “the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom [autonomy?]” 
(5:5).  
 
Kant was taken by this analogy between the law of gravity and ‘pneumatic laws’. And 
this analogy is not merely an off the cuff remark made in the 1760s and then forgotten. 
Indeed, Kant returns to this analogy between the idea of Newton’s law of gravity and the 
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idea of the moral law at least twice almost thirty years later in the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Thus, in Section 24 of  the Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics, Kant writes,   
In speaking of laws of duty (not laws of nature) and, among these, of laws 
for human beings’ external relations with one another, we consider 
ourselves in a moral (intelligible) world where, by analogy with the 
physical world, attraction and repulsion bind together rational beings (on 
earth). The principle of mutual love admonishes them constantly to come 
closer to one another; that of the respect they owe one another, to keep 
themselves at a distance from one another; and should one of these great 
moral forces fail, “then nothingness (immorality), with gaping throat, 
would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water” 
(if I may use Haller’s words, but in a different reference). (6:449)131 
 
Here Kant suggests that it is the ‘laws of duty’ which allow us to consider ourselves ‘as 
in an intelligible world’. These laws can be thought of as ‘binding together rational 
beings’ in the same way that the laws of gravity binds together the physical world. Thus 
Kant clearly implies that it is this laws of duty which provide the intelligible world with 
its unity. Kant also returns to this analogy in the Religion. Comparing divine mysteries to 
the idea of gravity he writes that, 
The cause of the universal gravity of all matter in the world is equally 
unknown to us, so much so that we can see that we shall never have 
cognition of it, since its very concept presupposes a first motive force 
unconditionally residing within it. Yet gravity is not a mystery; it can be 
made manifest to everyone, since its law is sufficiently cognized. When 
Newton represents it as if it were the divine presence in appearance 
(omnipraesentia phaenomenon), this is not an attempt to explain it (for the 
existence of God in space involves a contradiction) but a sublime analogy 
in which the mere union of corporeal beings into a cosmic whole is being 
visualized, in that an incorporeal cause is put beneath them – and so too 
would fare the attempt to comprehend the self-sufficient principle of the 
union of rational beings in the world into an ethical state, and to explain 
this union from that principle. We recognize only the duty that draws us to 
it. (6:138) 
 
                                                 
131 See also, 6:470 
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(4b) From Pneumatic Laws to Moral Laws 
 
By the 1780s (that is, by the decade in which he wrote the first two Critiques and the 
Groundwork) Kant had come to see that the existence of (pneumatic) laws could only 
provide the intelligible world with an ideal unity. Only moral laws, that is laws given by 
the members of the world themselves could provide the world with real intrinsic unity. 
Because of this, Kant soon came to see that the existence of pneumatic laws would not be 
sufficient to explain real interaction. Indeed, after the 1760s Kant does not often refer to 
pneumatic laws. He does, however, frequently talk of moral laws and I suggest that in his 
later works the function of conceptualizing the possibility of spiritual interaction is taken 
over by concept of moral laws. The main conceptual distinction between the pneumatic 
laws Kant discusses in Dreams and the moral laws of his mature ethics has to do with 
their objectivity. Pneumatic laws, insofar as they are modeled on the law of gravity are 
objective in a strong sense. Moral laws, on the other hand, although they are objective in 
the sense of being universal, also have a subjective element in that they only exist as 
actual laws if the individuals subject to them choose to subject themselves to them. 
Although their possibility is objective, their actuality is subjective. A good way to think 
of this difference between these two types of laws is to appeal to the distinction between 
the ‘ground of actuality’ and the ‘ground of possibility’. As Kant explains this distinction 
in his lectures on metaphysics, 
What contains the ground of actuality is called cause <causa> or principle 
of becoming <principium fiendi>; what contains the ground of possibility 
is called the principle of being <principum essendi>. (28:572) 
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A bit of matter attracted to another bit of matter is subject to the universal law of 
gravitation. The bit of matter, however, is neither the cause of the possibility nor of the 
actuality of the law of gravitation. In so far as Kant’s putative ‘pneumatic laws’ of 1765 
are though of as analogous to the law of gravitation, the same could be said of them. This 
is not, however, how we think of the relationship between moral agents and moral laws. 
Kant believes that moral laws, like physical laws, are objective in the sense that the moral 
agent who is subject to such laws is not the ground of their possibility. We cannot, and do 
not, create the moral law ex nihilo. Rather we recognize it as a command and as a 
command that holds not just for us but for all rational beings. Thus Kant claims in the 
Religion that, 
it is our universal human duty to elevate ourselves to [the] ideal of moral 
perfection, i.e. to the prototype of moral disposition in its entire purity, and 
for this very idea, which is presented to us by reason for emulation, can 
give us force. But precisely because we are not its authors but the idea has 
established itself in the human being without our comprehending how 
human nature could have even been receptive of it, it is better to say that 
that prototype has come down to us from heaven. (6:61)  
 
Moral laws are objective in the sense of being not created by us and in their universality. 
Although moral laws are objective in the sense of being universal, they are subjective in 
the sense that they are only potential laws, and  moral agents must be the ground of their 
actuality. In other words it is up to human beings to choose, through their actions, 
whether or not the moral law actually comes into existence as a law. Kant’s mature 
theory of real interaction, then, doesn’t merely require that individuals but subject to laws 
but that they must also be the ‘ground of actuality’ of the laws they are subject to. Given 
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the fact that, by definition, only autonomous beings are subject to laws they ‘give 
themselves’ in this sense, only autonomous beings can really be in interaction. Unlike the 
law of gravity or a putative ‘pneumatic’ law, then, a ‘moral’ law is merely a potential law 
(of nature), which it is up to the agent herself to actualize. 
 
At the very least, it is clear that Kant slowly modified his account of the role law plays in 
interaction between the 1760s and 1780s. In the Metaphysik Mrongovius lectures of  
1782-3 Kant could argue that,  
Physical influence happens according to general laws, but the two systems 
of ideal connection [i.e., occasionalism and pre-established harmony] do 
not. (29:868) 
 
Here Kant seems to suggest that the existence of general laws alone is sufficient to 
distinguish ‘real’ from ‘ideal’ interaction. By the early 1790s, however, Kant is arguing 
quite explicitly that being subject to general laws is not enough for there to be real 
interaction. Thus in the Metaphysik Dohna Lectures (1792-3) he argues that: 
The way we represent substances in the phenomenal world, all dispute 
ceases, for space already brings them into interaction <commercium>. But 
if we think a world merely through the understanding, this is more 
difficult. The relation of many substances among one another according to 
general laws is called harmony, this is without interaction <absque 
commercio> if no concept of cause and effect between them takes place.  
In so far as they actually stand in real interaction, the system of substances 
can be called a system of physical influence. (28:666) 
 
Here Kant claims, apparently contradicting the position he held at the time of the 
Metaphysik Mrongovius, that the existence of general laws, although it is necessary for 
real interaction is not sufficient. The reason for this is because by the 1780s Kant had 
 175 
come to distinguish between an ideal and a real community and had reached the 
conclusion that real interaction is only possible between individuals if they constitute a 
real community. A real community is only possible if the individuals that constitute the 
community are the source of the unity of the community, and individuals can be the 
source of the unity of a community if they are the source of the laws that provide the 
community with its unity. In other words, a real community can only be a community of 
(law-giving) autonomous agents. 
 
(4c) Moral Laws and Autonomy 
 
In the New Elucidation (1755) Kant had clearly not adequately distinguished between the 
idea of a real and ideal whole and could argue that: 
since the reciprocal relation between [substances] does not follow from the 
fact that God establishes simply their existence, unless the same schema of 
the divine understanding that gives them existence also sets up their 
relation insofar as it represents their existence as standing in reciprocity, 
it is completely clear that the general connection of all things is due 
merely to this divine representation. (1:413 – my emphasis) 
 
Here Kant suggests that the connection between things can be explained in terms of a 
representation in the divine understanding. On this early account then the relations 
between individuals ultimately exist merely in the divine ‘representation’. The relations 
are contained in the ‘divine representation’, but it is not clear how or why this would 
mean that there really were  relations between the substances themselves. Kant quickly 
came to see the inadequacy of this aspect of his earlier account and in his later mature 
terminology he would call such an account of interaction merely ‘ideal’ rather than of 
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‘real’ interaction. By 1782, Kant has clarified the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ 
interaction and defines ‘ideal’ interaction in the following way:  
The ideal connection <nexus idealis> is not connection in the things 
themselves, but rather merely in the idea of the observer who considers 
them. (Metaphysic Mrongovius, 29:866) 
 
Here Kant clearly rejects his earlier position, for given this account of the distinction 
between ‘ideal’ and ‘real’ connection, the model of interaction offered in the New 
Elucidation, with the relations existing merely in the ‘representation’ of God, is merely 
‘ideal’. By the early 1780s Kant, then, had come to realize the inadequacy of his earlier 
account. For  real interaction requires more than the fact that a set of individuals are 
subject to laws given by God, for real interaction is only possible in a world of 
autonomous agents self governed by  moral laws. The difference between ‘moral’ laws 
and other laws is that, by definition, individuals subject to moral laws choose to subject 
themselves to such laws. And an individual who chooses to subject himself to moral laws 
is an autonomous agent. Thus, real interaction requires the existence of individuals that 
have the capacity to be autonomous. Now, an individual that has the capacity to be 
autonomous must (a) be aware of the (potential) law and (b) be free to choose or will the 
law. 
 
Kant believes that real interaction is only possible between autonomous agents (self) 
governed by the moral law because he is committed to the position that a world in which 
individuals ‘really’ interact would have to be a ‘real whole’. And he came to believe the a 
real whole could only exist if the members themselves were responsible for its unity. In 
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particular Kant was committed to the idea that in a real whole it must simultaneously be 
the case that (a) the whole be unified, with the ground for the unity of the whole being 
internal to the whole and (b) the individual members are ontologically prior to the whole.  
I will argue that Kant thought that we can only understand how such a real whole is 
possible by conceiving of its ‘members’ as autonomous agents. 
 
Kant is explicit about this in the Groundwork. Here he defines an autonomous agent as a 
being that is “subject only to laws given by himself but still universal”. What he means by 
this is that an autonomous agent must be the ground of the actuality of the moral laws, 
but is not the ground of their possibility, for being universal the possibility of such laws 
must transcend the individual. He continues by explaining that the concept of autonomy 
leads to the idea of a kingdom of ends, which is depended upon it. In addition, he 
explains that, 
The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as 
giving universal law through all the maxims of his will, so as to appraise 
himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to a very fruitful 
concept dependent upon it, namely that of a kingdom of ends. // By a 
kingdom I understand a systematic union of various rational beings 
through common laws. (4:434) 
 
I suggest that Kant here identifies the idea of a ‘kingdom of ends’ with the idea of an 
intelligible world, for, as we have seen the idea of an intelligible world is the idea of a 
systematic union of individuals.132 There are a number of places in which Kant seems to 
                                                 
132 For example, Kant argues in his metaphysic lectures that,  “the aggregation of the substances in which 
there is no community still does not constitute a world. Reciprocal determination, the form of the world as 
a composite, rests upon the interaction. If we thought substances without real connection <absque nexu 
reali> and without interaction <commercium>, where every substance would have no community with one 
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identify a ‘kingdom of ends’ with an intelligible world. For example in Groundwork II 
itself he talks of “a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of ends” 
(4:438). And, in his lectures on ethics, given in 1785 around the time he was writing the 
Groundwork, Kant is able to argue that, 
The autonomy of our will greatly elevates our worth. The members of a 
kingdom of ends, whose ruler is God, are the true intellectual world. 
Augustine and Leibniz called it the Kingdom of grace. In the realm of 
ends, God is supreme ruler; in the realm of nature, the ultimate cause. . . 
(Ethik Mrongovius, 29:629 – my emphasis) 
 
If my identification the idea of a kingdom of ends with the idea of an intelligible world is 
correct, then what Kant is arguing in Groundwork II is that the idea of an intelligible 
world is somehow dependent upon the idea of an ‘autonomous agent’. And I have argued 
that reason why the idea of an intelligible world is dependent upon the idea of an 
autonomous agent is because we can only conceive of individuals as interaction and as 
members of a whole which has intrinsic unity if we conceive of them as the source of the 
laws that provide to whole with its unity.  
 
Kant provides further support for such an interpretation a few paragraphs later when he 
argues that, 
For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat 
himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time 
as ends in themselves. But from this there arises a systematic union of 
rational beings through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom, 
which can be called a kingdom of ends (admittedly only an ideal) because 
what these laws have as their purpose is just the relation of these beings to 
one another as ends and means. (4:434 - Kant’s italics, my bolding) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
another, then what would indeed be a multitude <multitudo>, but still not a world” (Metaphysik L1, 
28:196). 
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Here Kant claims that moral laws are the source of the “systematic union” of rational 
beings. These laws are the source of the relations between individual members of the 
kingdom of ends, and as a result of this they are the source of the unity of such a 
kingdom. The idea of a systematic union of beings is the idea of a community, and here 
Kant makes it clear that the purpose of moral (“common objective”) laws is to provide 
the community of beings with its unity. These laws are what relate the members of the 
community to one another. 
 
Kant is perhaps most explicit about the relationship between morals laws and community 
in his lectures. Here he claims that, 
Morality, through which a system of all ends is possible, gives the rational 
creature a worth in and for itself by making it a member of this great realm 
of all ends. The possibility of such a universal system of all ends is 
dependent solely on morality alone. For it is only insofar as all rational 
creatures act according to these eternal laws of reason that they can 
stand under a principle of community and together constitute a 
system of ends. For example, if all human beings speak the truth, then 
among them a system of ends is possible; but if only one should lie, then 
his end is no longer in connection with the others. Hence the universal rule 
for judging the morality of an action is always this: If all human beings did 
this, could there still be a connection of ends. (28:1100 – my bolding, 
Kant's italics) 
 
Here Kant is quite clear that he believes that only moral agents (autonomous agents) can 
“stand under a principle of community”. 
 
(4d) Why Did Kant Draw the Conclusion that Real Interaction is Only 
Possible Between Autonomous Agents? 
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Although there is good textual evidence to support the claim that Kant believed that a real 
community must consist of autonomous agents, he is not explicit as to why he draws this 
conclusion. There are, however, two arguments which, I believe, might lie behind his 
position. Before entering into a discussion of the concept and idea of community, I will 
briefly examine these two arguments. The first argument is based upon assumptions 
about the concept of individuality, the second on assumptions about what is involved in 
the notion of a ‘law’.  
 
(1) The most plausible reconstruction of Kant’s own motivation for drawing the 
conclusion that a real community must consist of autonomous agents is provided by 
thinking about what is involved in the idea of an individual, for Kant maintains that our 
idea of a real community is the idea of a composite individual, that is, an individual 
composed of individuals. This argument appeals to a Complete Entity Principle of 
Individuation.  The principle was defended by Leibniz is his early Disputatio 
Metaphysica de Principio Individui of 1663, and I believe that Leibniz remained 
committed to such a principle throughout his career. Leibniz explains (and attempts to 
defend) this principle in the following terms: 
That by means of which something is, by means of it that something is one in 
number. But any thing is by means of its entity. Therefore, [any thing is one in 
number by reason of its entity].133 
 
According to the complete entity principle of individuation, then, and individual must be 
the source of its own unity. This principle of individuation is to be distinguished from 
principles that place the source of an individual’s unity to a part or aspect of the 
                                                 
133 Leibniz (1996), Disputatio, #5. 
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individual, or to something external to the individual, for example, a theory that identifies 
a form or universal as the source of the unity of a material individual.   
 
For Kant, then, the idea of a real community is the idea of a particular type of individual, 
namely a composite individual. To understand why Kant believed that such an individual 
must be composed of autonomous agents, it is instructive to examine Leibniz’ failed 
attempts to conceptualize composition. As is well known, Leibniz believes that 
everything that exists is one. According to him, the only things that really exist are either 
themselves individuals or are composed of individuals. Leibniz, however, has a problem 
with explaining the possibility of composite individuals (or substances), for a composite 
substance must be composed of individuals and it must be an individual itself. For Kant a 
real community is composed of individuals and it is itself an individual, not necessarily in 
the sense of being an agent but at least in the sense of being unified.134 I suggest that 
Leibniz must ultimately conclude that there can be no real composite individuals, for he 
is implicitly committed to the position that all composition is ideal.  
 
The reason Leibniz felt compelled to deny the possibility of composite individuals was 
because he was committed to a particular principle of individuation, namely that “every 
                                                 
134 Although, as we shall see when we look at Kant’s account of property in the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant does seem to suggest that the type of community necessary to conceptualize the transfer of property is 
the idea of an agent. Here Kant is in a very Rousseauian mood and seems to be thinking of the moral 
community as a common will. In what follows, however, I am merely arguing that a real community must 
be an individual in the sense of being intrinsically unified and will not suggest that it  must be thought of as 
an individual in the sense of being itself an agent. 
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individual is individuated by its complete entity”.135  We can make sense of Kant’s 
position if we regard him as implicitly committed to the same (or at least a very similar) 
principle of individuation. Kant, however, believes that even with such a commitment 
one can make sense of the idea of a world or community of individuals. However, given 
a complete entity principle of individuation, such a community or world can only be a 
real community if the individuals which make up the community are themselves 
responsible for the unity of the community, and Kant thinks that this is possible if we 
think of the community as unified by laws and we think of the individual members of the 
community as the source of the laws (in the sense of being law-givers.) By assuming that 
Kant was committed to something like a complete entity principle of individuation, we 
can understand why he believed that such a community could only consist of autonomous 
agents. For “that  by means of which a community is” are the individuals which make up 
the community, and if we assume, with Leibniz, that “that by means of which something 
is, by means of it that something is one in number”, then we must conclude that if a 
community really is unified then the only way this is possible is if the individuals which 
constitute the community are the source of  its unity. Now, Kant believes that the form of 
a unified community are laws, and so if the individuals that make up a real community 
are to be thought of as the source of the unity of the community, they must be thought of 
as the source of its laws. 
 
                                                 
135Leibniz (1996). This claim is from Leibniz’ Disputatio Metaphysica de Principo Individui. This is one of 
Leibniz’s earliest writings, dating back to 1663, when he was seventeen years old. I believe that his 
commitment to this principle of individuation remained solid throughout his philosophical career.  
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(2) Although I believe that an appeal to the Complete Entity Principle of Individuation 
provides the most plausible reconstruction of Kant’s own motivation, I believe that a 
more plausible justification of Kant’s position can be given, by thinking about what is 
involved in the idea of a law, and in particular, what is involved in the idea of being ‘law 
governed’. This argument is influenced by H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of law in The Concept 
of Law.  
 
The basic point can be made in terms of the distinction between being ‘subsumable under 
laws’ and being ‘law governed.’ An observer of a multitude of substances could 
experience regularities in the relations between states of particular individuals and 
subsume these regularities under universal ‘laws’, but this does not in itself imply that 
there is any real relationship between the individuals themselves. The laws in such a case 
do in some sense ‘unify’ the individuals, but in such a case the unity is merely in the eyes 
of the observer. Real interaction involves not merely that there are observable regularities 
which can be subsumed under laws, but that  the individuals themselves are law-
governed. As H.L.A. Hart (1994) argues in The Concept of Law, laws should be 
understood as rules and rules (by definition)  must have an ‘internal aspect’. He imagines 
an ‘objective’ observer of society , who makes judgments about the existence of social 
laws merely on the basis of observable external behavior and argues that, 
If the observer really keeps austerity to this extreme external point of view and 
does not give any account of the manner in which members of the group who 
accept the rules view their own regular behavior, his description of their life 
cannot be in terms of rules at all. . . Instead it will be in terms of observable 
regularities of conduct, predictions, probabilities, and signs. (p.90)  
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To be justified in claiming that there is a law (which Hart argues is a type of rule) 
governing the behavior of a set of individuals, the actions, or behavior, of the individuals 
must not merely be subsumable under the ‘rule’, but the rule itself must provide a 




In this chapter I have argued that Kant thinks that we can only think of a real community 
insofar as we think of its ‘parts’ or members as autonomous agents who logically proceed 
and are independent of the whole but are collectively responsible for the unity of the 
whole, in the sense that the moral laws, which are given by each member of the 
community, are the ground of the unity of the whole. If my interpretation is correct, the 
idea of an autonomous agent is not primarily an ethical concept, but is an idea of reason 
that plays an essential role in our conception of a community (or intelligible world) that is 
intrinsically unified. I have argued that seeds of this position can be traced back to 
Dreams. In this early work, however, although Kant argues that our idea of an intelligible 
community of spirits is the idea of a community unified by laws, he has not yet reached 
the position that such a community can only be united by laws that are given by the 
members of the community. This is a position he will only reach in the 1780s.   In the 
following chapter I will examine Kant's account of the logical basis of our idea of 









The Critical Kant & Traditional Metaphysical 
Enquiry 
 
In the first part of the dissertation I was primarily concerned with questions that are 
clearly ethical. In the following four chapters I will concentrate on examining questions 
that may, on the face of it, appear to be entirely theoretical questions. In particular I will 
concentrate on examining Kant's theoretical account of the idea of community and the 
related notion of interaction. Before moving onto this, however, in  this chapter I will 
make some general remarks about the role and status of metaphysical speculation in 
Kant's mature philosophy. 
 
I have claimed that the ethical ideal of a good will or autonomous agent is to be identified 
with the metaphysical idea of a member of an intelligible world. As a result I believe that 
we can understand many of Kant’s ethical commitments by examining what he believes 
is involved in the idea of a world, and in particular, with what is involved in the notion of 
‘membership’ in such a world. Many of these ‘metaphysical’ commitments, which play 
an essential role in his ethical system, can be traced back to his pre-critical period. For, 
although there was a radical break in Kant’s understanding of the status of metaphysical 
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claims at some point in the 1770s, there is much continuity in the content of his pre-
critical and post-critical metaphysics.  
 
These claims may sound implausible to those readers raised on the assumption that 
Kant’s critical attitude towards traditional metaphysics is purely negative and destructive.  
Kant himself, however, is clear about the importance of traditional metaphysical enquiry 
in ethics. For example, in the Metaphysics of Morals he claims that, 
no moral principle is based, as people sometimes suppose, on any feeling 
whatsoever. Any such principle is really an obscurely thought metaphysics 
that is inherent in every human being because of his rational 
predisposition, as a teacher will readily grant if he experiments in 
questioning his pupil socratically about the imperative of duty and its 
application to moral appraisal of his actions. – The way the teacher 
presents this (his technique) should not always be metaphysical nor 
his terms scholastic, unless he wants to train his pupil as a 
philosopher. But his thought must go all the way back to the elements 
of metaphysics, without which no certitude or purity can be expected 
in the doctrine of virtue, nor indeed any moving force. (6:376 – my 
emphasis) 
 
Here Kant goes as far as to suggest that the moral philosopher must be taught 
metaphysics in scholastic terms. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
examining the role of traditional metaphysics in Kant’s critical philosophy. I will argue 
that although the critical Kant believes that metaphysical speculation cannot provide us 
with knowledge of the world, such speculation can provide us with a clearer ‘image’ of 





I have claimed that we can come to understand something about Kant’s ethics by 
examining his metaphysics, and in particular by examining what he has to say about the 
idea of an intelligible world. At first sight this may seem to be a strange claim to make 
about Kant, for he repeatedly claims that we can know (or ‘cognize’) nothing of the 
intelligible world. When Kant claims that we can know nothing of the intelligible world 
he is not claiming that we can say nothing interesting or useful about our idea of an 
intelligible world. Instead of banishing all metaphysical speculation as meaningless, he 
merely wishes to clarify the epistemic import of such speculation. Such speculation 
cannot provide us with any knowledge. The reason for this is that pure thought, governed 
by the law of non-contradiction, provides us with no criterion of real possibility. The fact 
that a concept does not contain a contradiction merely implies that the concept is 
thinkable. The fact that a concept is thinkable, however, does not imply that there 
actually is, or even could be, an object corresponding to the concept. Thinkability, then, 
is not an adequate criterion for real possibility. This commitment is the basis for Kant’s 
radical break with the rationalist tradition.  For if pure thought provides us with no 
criteria for real possibility we must posit some other, distinct, faculty (the faculty of 
intuition) that can explain how we are able to make such judgments. 
 
The belief that thinkability is not an adequate criterion of real possibility is the basis for 
Kant's distinction between thinking and cognition. Kant makes this distinction in his 
preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, explaining that, 
To cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility 
(whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori 
through reason.) But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not 
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contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if 
I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object 
somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. (Bxxvi) 
 
Traditionally metaphysicians had thought that they were, in effect, providing a 
description of the way the world really is ‘in itself’. Kant, as everyone knows, is famous 
for rejecting this conception of the role of metaphysics and arguing that our cognition is 
restricted to objects of possible intuition, with ‘intuition’ being defined as that (cognitive) 
faculty through which objects are given. And because Kant is committed to the belief that 
intuitability is the only criterion we possess for real possibility, he concludes that we can 
have no cognition (or knowledge) of anything that is (in principle) incapable of appearing 
in space and time, for it is a condition of our form of intuition that the only things that we 
(can possibly) experience are things that are able to appear in space and time. 
Understanding the conceptual relationship between two pure concepts or ideas, then, 
cannot provide us with knowledge or cognition, if the objects of these ideas cannot be 
given in experience, for we have no criteria for judging whether the objects of such 
concepts are actually possible. Kant believes, for example, that it is impossible to think of 
(the idea of) a world of individuals without thinking of (the idea of) God as the ground of 
the world, but this does not mean that we ‘know’ or ‘cognize’ that God is the ground of 
the world, for we do not know there is, or even could be, anything corresponding to our 
idea of a world.  
 
The idea of an intelligible world is the idea of a world that can be thought but not intuited 
(at least by beings such as us whose form of intuition is spatio-temporal). As a 
 190 
consequence the idea of an intelligible world is not a possible object of experience, and 
so we have no criteria for judging whether such a world is really possible. There is 
nothing contradictory in the idea, but non-contradiction, Kant believes, is not an adequate 
criterion of what Kant calls real possibility. As a result of this Kant believes that the idea 
of an intelligible world can provide us with no knowledge, for it does not provide us with 
an object of cognition.  
 
(5b) Kant’s Critique of Traditional Metaphysics 
 
Like Kant, rationalist metaphysicians distinguished, in principle, between the notion of an 
object of experience and an object of knowledge/cognition and believed that there were 
objects of knowledge that could not possibly be objects of experience.  Thus, 
philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz would agree with Kant that we have ideas of 
objects, such as God, that cannot possibly be objects of experience, but they did not 
assume that this meant that such ideas could not provide us with any knowledge. For 
these philosophers, God was not a possible object of experience, but he is an object of 
knowledge. Indeed in the fifth Meditation Descartes famously argued that we can know 
that God exists merely by examining our idea of God. Leibniz criticized Descartes’ 
argument, pointing out that it rests upon the hidden assumption that God is possible. 
Leibniz, however, believes that we can prove that God is possible if we can show that the 
idea of God does not contain a contradiction. Kant rejects this assumption and insists that 
the non-contradictoriness of an idea is not an adequate criterion for the real (de re) 
possibility of the object of an idea.  
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Kant’s radical reconceptulisation of modality 
 
Kant believes, then, that we can think of things, without contradiction, which might 
actually be impossible. Thus, for example, in his lectures on metaphysics, Kant remarks 
that, 
The concept of spirit has nothing contradictory in the representation, but 
whether it is possible that such an immaterial being can exist, this cannot 
be comprehended… [For] there can nevertheless be objects impossible in 
themselves that are assumed as possible because their concept experiences 
no contradiction. (29:962 – Metaphysik Vigilantius) 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that he believes that non-contradictoriness is not an adequate 
criterion of de re possibility. For we may possess the concept of a spirit, and this concept 
may contain no contradictions, but this does not imply that spirits are really possible. 
Thus, although the ideas of immaterial spirits and of God contain no contradiction, this 
gives us no ground for assuming that immaterial spirits or God are really possible. For 
although there may be nothing contradictory in the idea of a being that is both omnipotent 
and omniscient, there may be a de re impossibility involved in the combination of 
omnipotence and omniscience. The analogy Kant wishes to draw here is something like 
the following: we can have the concept of a triangle, but we only know that triangles are 
possible because a triangle can be given in intuition, that is, because we can construct a 
triangle corresponding to our concept in (the pure intuition of) space. We do not know, 
however, whether there is any form of intuition in which an actual spirit corresponding to 
our idea could be given. As a consequence, any argument that takes as a premise the 
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claim that spirits, say, are really possible because the idea of a spirit contains no 
contradiction cannot be sound. This is why no reasoning from ideas can provide us with 
any knowledge, for any such reasoning must begin with the ungrounded assumption that 
the putative object of the idea is really possible. Working out the conceptual relationships 
between, say, our ideas of spirit, world and God, however, does not involve any appeal to 
the real possibility of the (putative) objects of these ideas, and so is a legitimate form of 
inquiry, so long as we do not make the further assumption that such investigations can 
provide us with knowledge.  
 
Lying behind this position is a radical reconceptualisation of modal properties. For Kant, 
modal categories are not properties of objects, but instead concern the relationship 
between concepts and objects. When we claim that ‘unicorns are possible’ we are not 
asserting something about the nature of unicorns. Instead, we are making the claim that 
there could be an object corresponding to our concept ‘unicorn’. A more Kantian way of 
putting this would be to say that to claim that ‘unicorns are possible’ is to claim that an 
object could be given corresponding to the concept ‘unicorn’. Such an account of modal 
claims rests upon distinguishing between the faculty through which concepts are thought 
(the understanding) and the faculty through which objects are given, and Kant calls the 
faculty through which objects are given the faculty of ‘intuition’. Kant’s radical 
reconceptualisation of modality, then, lies behind the distinction he draws between 
understanding and intuition.  
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This distinction (between the understanding and intuition), then, was not introduced 
primarily to explain the particular nature of actual human experience, but is necessary for 
more abstract reasons. Specifically, Kant believes that the distinction between a faculty of 
thinking and a faculty through which objects are given is necessary to conceptualize 
adequately what is going on in modal judgments.136 For if we reject the position that the 
non-contradictoriness of a concept is an adequate criterion of real possibility, we need to 
appeal to some other, non-logical criterion for real possibility. Non-contradictoriness is 
merely a criterion for whether a concept can be thought. Real possibility has to do with 
whether an object can be given that corresponds to the concept, and this is a question that 
cannot (in principle) be answered merely by examining the concept. Pure logic alone 
cannot, in principle, answer questions about real possibility, nor, as a consequence, 
questions about existence. Questions about real possibility (and hence about being) 
cannot be answered by a pure understanding alone. Any being that can make the 
distinction between actual and merely possible objects must possess both a faculty 
through which objects are given (a faculty of intuition) and a faculty through which 
objects are thought (the understanding).   
 
The (logical) possibility of other forms of intuition 
 
                                                 
136 Kant makes this clear in the Critique of Judgment. Here he argues that: “For if two entirely 
heterogeneous elements were not required for the exercise of these faculties, understanding for concepts 
and sensible intuition for objects corresponding to them, then there would be no such distinction (between 
the possible and the actual). . . all of our distinction between the merely possible and the actual rests on the 
fact that the former signifies only the position of the representation of a thing with respect to our concept 
and, in general, our faculty for thinking, while the latter signifies the positing of the thing in itself (apart 
from this concept)” (5:402). 
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To claim that x is really possible is to claim that there could be an intuition corresponding 
to the concept x. Thus, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that, 
[T]he possibility of a thing can never be proved merely through the non-
contradictoriness of a concept of it, but only by the vouching of it with an 
intuition corresponding to this concept. (B307) 
 
Not violating the law of contradiction is for Kant, then, a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for real possibility. Intuitability, then, is the only positive (theoretical) criterion 
for real possibility. Now, because we can only intuit things in space and time, the only 
positive criteria we can have for real possibility is whether something could possibly be 
experienced spatio-temporally. And, given the fact that everything experienced in time is 
experienced as non-simple and conditioned, this implies that we are only justified in 
asserting real possibility of non-simple and conditioned beings.  Kant, however, does not 
draw the conclusion that just because the (putative) object of an idea is the sort of thing 
that could not be experienced by us the object must be impossible. Drawing such a 
conclusion would be just as dogmatic as assuming that simply because an idea does not 
contain a contradiction its putative object is possible. For all we know there might be 
beings (for example, angels or God) which experience objects in very different ways than 
we do and could experience objects that we are unable to experience.  
 
Thus, Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason that, 
[I]f. . . I leave out all intuition, then there still remains the form of 
thinking, i.e., the way of determining an object for the manifold of a 
possible intuition. Hence to this extent the categories extend further than 
sensible intuition, since they think objects in general without seeing to the 
particular manner (of sensibility) in which they might be given. But they 
do not thereby determine a greater sphere of objects, since one cannot 
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assume that such objects can be given without presupposing that 
another kind of intuition than the sensible kind is possible, which, 
however, we are by no means justified in doing. (A254/B310 – my 
emphasis) 
 
The categories, then, ‘extend further than sensible intuition’ in the sense that there are 
ideas that we can think without contradiction which cannot, in principle, be given in our 
experience. Just because we are incapable of experiencing objects which correspond to 
such ideas, we cannot conclude that such objects do not admit of being experienced, for 
there might be some being with some other kind of intuition which could experience such 
objects. Indeed, it is possible that there could be a being that could experience the objects 
we experience as necessarily spatio-temporal (and hence as necessarily conditioned) in 
some other way. It would, however, be dogmatic to presuppose that such an alternative 
kind of intuition is possible, so we must remain agnostic. 
 
Although we have no (theoretical) justification for assuming that another form of 
intuition is possible we have no theoretical justification for assuming that such a form of 
intuition is impossible, for there is nothing contradictory in the idea of a non-spatio-
temporal form of intuition. The notion, then, of such a form of intuition is problematic. 
Kant believes, however, that we have important moral reasons for hoping that such a 
form of intuition is possible. Indeed, Kant himself often argues in his lectures that we 
must hope that after our (physical) deaths our way of experiencing objects (our ‘form of 
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intuition’) will change and that we will be able to intuit the (putative) objects of our pure 
ideas.137  
 
To conclude: The only positive criterion for real possibility is whether something can be 
a possible object of intuition. On Kant’s view, concepts provide us with objects of 
thought. An object of thought is ‘really possible’ if there could be an intuition 
corresponding to it. Now, our form of intuition is spatio-temporal. Therefore the only 
criterion we have for real possibility is whether something could be an object of spatio-
temporal intuition. However, just because an object cannot be intuited by us, this does not 
imply that such objects are impossible, for, as we have seen, Kant thinks that there is 
nothing contradictory in the idea of some other form of intuition. We do not know that 
other forms of intuition (say divine intuition, or angelic intuition or perhaps even our 
post-mortem form of intuition) are possible, but neither do we know that other forms of 
intuition are impossible, and so, theoretically, we must remain agnostic on this issue. The 
idea of a ‘spirit’ (that is the idea of ‘a member of an intelligible world’) is thinkable as it 
is not self-contradictory. We do not know, however, whether an intelligible world is 
really possible and so we do not know whether spirits are ‘really’ possible, for we have 
no criteria for judging whether an object could be given (intuited) corresponding to our 
idea of a spirit. Spirits would be really possible if they were possible objects of intuition 
                                                 
137
 For example, in his metaphysics lectures of 1782-3, lectures he gave between the publication of the first 
and second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that, “Now we find ourselves already in the 
intelligible world, and each human being can count himself as belonging, according to the constitution of 
his manner of thinking, either to the society of the blessed or of the damned. He is now only not conscious 
of it, and after death he will become conscious of this society . . . We are now already conscious through 
reason of finding ourselves in an intelligible realm; after death we will intuit and cognize it and then we 
are in an entirely different world that, however, is altered only in form, namely, where we cognize things as 
they are in themselves” (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:919-20 – my emphasis). See also: 28:296, 28:445 & 
28:593. This doctrine was discussed in chapter three. 
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by some being (say ‘God’ or an ‘angel’) with a different form of intuition from our own. 
But we have no conception of what such a form of intuition would be like, or even 
whether such a form of intuition is possible. Kant concludes, then, that the ideas of pure 
reason do not contain any contradictions and are therefore thinkable, but we just do not 
know whether the putative objects of these ideas are even possible. Kant labels such 
concepts or ideas ‘problematic’. 
 
(5c) The Positive Role of Traditional Metaphysical Speculation 
 
To understand Kant’s attitude towards metaphysics, and the positive role he believes it 
plays in ethical thinking, it is instructive to compare his attitude to that of Leibniz. 
Leibniz, in writing his Monadology, was attempting to provide a description of the way 
the world is in itself. Kant, in contrast, believes that we can have no knowledge of the 
‘way the world really is’, no knowledge of ‘things-in-themselves’. Although such 
metaphysical speculation can provide us with no knowledge of the way the world is, it 
can, however, provide us with an ‘image’ of the way the world could and should be. 
Central to Kant’s critical philosophy, then, is the claim that we can have no knowledge of 
things as they are in themselves, and insofar as traditional metaphysics is understood as 
an attempt to give us such knowledge, Kant rejects it. This, however, does not mean he 
must reject all traditional metaphysical speculation, for such speculation may play an 
important role in moral reflection, in so far as it can provide us with a clearer 
understanding of an idea which has the power to determine our faculty of desire.  
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The intellect, the faculty of desire and the faculty of intuition 
 
The Leibnizian rationalists, such as Wolff, argued that there is only one basic human 
faculty, the faculty of representation. Kant, following Crusius, insists that the faculty of 
representation (or the theoretical faculty) is distinct from the will, or what he calls the 
faculty of desire.138 Understanding the distinction between the faculty of intuition and the 
faculty of desire, and the difference in the relationship of the intellect to these two 
faculties, is essential for understanding Kant’s project, and in particular for understanding 
the role of traditional metaphysical questions in Kant’s critical project. 
 
Kant wrote three Critiques and each is concerned with the relationship between the 
intellect (which he often calls ‘reason’ or the ‘understanding’) and a particular ‘faculty’. 
The Critique of Pure Reason deals with experience, which Kant believes involves the 
relationship of the intellect to the faculty of intuition, the Critique of Practical Reason is 
concerned with the relationship between the intellect and the will, or what Kant calls the 
faculty of desire, and the Critique of Judgment (or at least the first part, the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment) deals with the relationship between the intellect and our faculty of 
feeling (that is, the faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure). Kant’s account of the 
faculty of feeling is beyond the scope of my dissertation.  
 
                                                 
138 And, as we have already seen, Kant also disagrees with Leibniz and Wolff in that he posits two distinct 
types of representation: intuitions and concepts, and corresponding to these two distinct faculties of 
representation: the faculty of intuition and the intellect. 
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As Kant explains this tri-partite division of philosophy in his lectures on metaphysics 
from the mid-1780s: 
The faculty of knowledge, the faculty of feeling and the faculty of desire, 
are the three powers of the human soul. In all three, understanding and 
sense can come into play. If understanding is present, then the following 
sciences are possible: (1) Logic, in regard to the understanding; (2) 
aesthetic, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in the understanding, 
which is taste; (3) practical philosophy, the faculty of desire in relation to 
the understanding. (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:597) 
 
There are some problems with Kant’s terminology, for he is not particularly consistent. 
He often uses ‘reason’, ‘understanding’ and ‘intellect’ interchangeably to refer to the 
intellectual faculty as a whole. However, at other times he uses ‘reason’ and 
‘understanding’ in contrast to one another, using them to refer to particular aspects of the 
intellect. Thus, in the Critique of Pure Reason in particular, he often distinguishes 
between reason as the faculty of ideas and understanding as the faculty of concepts. 
Taken together they constitute the intellect. Wherever possible I will use the term 
‘intellect’ to refer to the faculty as a whole, as it is the least ambiguous of Kant’s terms. I 
am primarily interested in the relationship between the intellect and the faculty of desire. 
 
As we have seen, for Kant, the faculty of intuition is the faculty through which objects 
are given to us. The faculty of desire, in contrast, is the faculty of choice. As Kant defines 
it, “the faculty of desire is the faculty to be, by means of one’s representations, the 




Although Kant is committed to the position that the intellect (or pure reason) cannot 
provide us with cognition, he believes that it provides us with ideas. Amongst these ideas 
is the idea of a member of an intelligible world, and although this idea cannot be an 
object of our faculty of intuition it can be an object of our faculty of desire (or the 
will). Thus, although Kant believes that the ‘intelligible world’ is not a possible object of 
intuition (and as a result not a possible object of cognition), it is a possible object of 
choice, for we can choose to be a member of such a world. To make the idea of an 
intelligible world the object of our faculty of desire is to make the choice that such a 
world actually exists, for to claim that it is possible to make this idea an object of our 
faculty of desire is, by definition, to claim that we can be the cause of the object of the 
idea.139 As Sullivan (1989) explains, Kant believes that “moral reasoning has the unique 
power to bring into existence its own proper objects” (p.104). 
 
The notion that through our choice we choose that the objects of certain pure ideas 
actually exist lies behind Kant’s claim in the Critique of Practical Reason that, 
the upright man may well say: “I will that there be a God, that my 
existence in this world be also an existence in a pure world of the 
understanding, beyond natural connections, and finally that my duration 
be endless.” (5:143) 
  
The upright man, Kant believes, chooses that his pure ideas have existence. Or, to say 
this in other words, the upright man chooses to give these ideas what Kant calls 
‘objective reality’.  Thus, although it is impossible for us ever to experience anything as 
                                                 
139 For, “the faculty of desire is the faculty to be, by means of one’s representations, the cause of the objects 
of these representations”.  If it is possible for us to  make the idea of being a member of an intelligible 
world the object of our faculty of desire, then, by definition, by means of this representation (idea) of a 
member of an intelligible world, we can be the cause of the object of this idea. 
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an instantiation of the moral ideal, for an idea of pure reason is not a possible object of 
experience, it is possible for us to choose to be such an individual and in so doing to 
choose that an intelligible world actually exist.  This is a consequence of Kant’s 
definition of the faculty of desire as “the faculty to be, by means of one’s representations, 
the cause of the objects of these representations.” If we actually possess such a faculty 
and possess the idea of an intelligible world, to make this idea (or representation) the 
object of our faculty of desire would be, by definition, to be the cause of the object of this 
idea.  
 
Now, just as our faculty of intuition has a certain subjective, human form, so does our 
faculty of desire. The subjective form of our faculty of intuition is space/time.  This form 
is ‘subjective’ in that there is nothing contradictory in the thought of a being that intuits 
objects in some other, non-spatio-temporal, way. So we cannot say that it is a feature of a 
faculty of intuition, as such, that its form is to be able only to intuit objects in space and 
time, for we can still make some sense of the notion of a faculty of intuition even if we 
abstract from the spatio-temporal nature of our own intuition. The subjective form of our 
faculty of desire is to act on maxims.140 Ideas of pure reason, then, cannot be objects of 
our faculty of intuition because our subjective form of intuition is spatio-temporal and 
objects corresponding to our ideas cannot be given in space-time. They can, however, be 
objects of our faculty of desire because the subjective form of our faculty of desire is to 
                                                 
140 Kant defines it in the Groundwork,  “[a] maxim is the subjective principle of volition” (4:401 – see also: 
4:421), and I am suggesting that a maxim is a subjective principle of volition (i.e. a subjective principle of 
the faculty of desire) in a manner analogous to the way space and time are subjective forms of intuition.  
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act upon maxims, and an idea can be an object of a maxim, for I can make it my 
fundamental maxim to be a member of an intelligible world. 
 
Metaphysical enquiry as conceptual clarification 
 
Instead of providing us with knowledge, metaphysical speculation is ‘merely’ a process 
of concept-clarification. By asking questions about the nature of an intelligible world we 
are not discovering anything about being itself, but are merely drawing out and clarifying 
what is involved in our pure idea of a world. Now, if we believed that philosophy is 
solely concerned with providing us with knowledge, such conceptual clarification would 
seem to be a pretty pointless activity, at best a harmless conceptual game like building 
castles in the air. This is not, however, what Kant believes. For we are not merely 
spectators who take a purely theoretical interest in the world, but also actors who must 
make decisions about what to do and what type of person we want to be. And while our 
pure ideas cannot provide us with any theoretical knowledge, they can serve as ideals 
which can guide our actions and provide us with an ‘image’ of what we can choose to be. 
Kant is an ethical idealist and, as such, he believes that the choice to be moral is the 
choice to take a particular pure idea, namely that of ‘a member of the intelligible world’, 
as our practical ideal. In other words, Kant believes that we can make a pure idea the 
object our faculty of desire by making it the object of our fundamental practical maxim. 
He believes, then, that (pure theoretical) reason provides us with the idea of a particular 
kind of individual, namely the idea of ‘a member of an intelligible world’, or ‘spirit’. To 
be moral (a good will) is to instantiate this ideal.  In Kant’s terminology, ideas of pure 
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reason are not given objective reality by the faculty of intuition; objects corresponding to 
ideas of pure reason can never be given in our experience. Kant believes, however, that 
they can be provided with objective reality by the will or faculty of desire. Thus he 
argues in the Critique of Practical Reason that the moral law,  
must therefore be the idea of a nature not given empirically and yet 
possible through freedom, hence a supersensible nature to which we 
give objective reality at least in a practical respect, since we regard it as 
an object of our will as pure rational beings. (5:44 – my emphasis) 
 
The “idea of a nature not given empirically”, supersensible nature, is our pure idea of a 
world. And in this passage Kant makes it clear that we can give this idea objective reality 
by making it the object of our will (or what he elsewhere calls our faculty of desire).   
 
For Kant, then, to be moral is to take our pure idea of a world as the object of our faculty 
of desire. In so doing we can hope to give objective reality to the idea, and can hope to 
become a member of such a world. This is the point Kant is attempting to make in the 
Critique of Practical Reason when he argues that the moral law, 
is to furnish the sensible world, as a sensible nature. . ., with the form of a 
world of the understanding, that is of a supersensible nature. . . 
[S]upersensible nature, so far as we can make ourselves a concept of it, is 
nothing other than a nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason. 
The law of this autonomy, however, is the moral law, which is therefore 
the fundamental law of a supersensible nature and of a pure world of the 
understanding, the counterpart of which is to exist in the sensible world 
but without infringing upon its laws. The former could be called the 
archetypal world (natura archetypa) which we cognize only in reason, 
whereas the latter could be called the ectypal world (natura ectypa) 
because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former as the 
determining ground of the will. For the moral law in fact transfers us, in 
idea, into a nature in which pure reason, if it were accompanied with 
suitable physical power, would produce the highest good, and it 
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determines our will to confer on the sensible world the form of a whole of 
rational beings.” (5:43) 
 
 
Platonic idealism vs. ethical idealism 
 
Having examined the distinction between the faculty of intuition and the faculty of desire, 
I am now in a position to explain the distinction Kant himself draws in the Critique of 
Pure Reason between Plato’s theoretical idealism and his own practical/moral idealism. 
According to Kant the platonic idealist believes that our ideas are archetypes of which the 
objects we experience are copies. In Kantian terms, a platonic idealist believes that ideas 
can be objects of (or determine) our faculty of intuition, whereas a moral idealist, such as 
Kant, believes that such ideas can only be objects for (or determine) our faculty of desire. 
Another way of putting this would be to claim that the platonic idealist believes that ideas 
can be instantiated in experience, whereas the moral idealist believes that ideas can only 
be instantiated in practice, that is, that we can practically instantiate these ideas. 
Understanding this distinction helps us understand Kant’s distinction between the 
theoretical and the practical, and in particular Kant’s belief that practical reason (or more 
precisely: reason in its practical employment) is creative in a way theoretical reason is 
not. This ‘creativity’ of reason in its practical use is central to Kant’s ethical idealism.  
Reason is creative practically in the sense that through our faculty of desire an idea, that 
is the idea of a member of an intelligible world, or (what amounts to the same thing) the 
idea of an autonomous agent, can be made real.  The idea of an autonomous agent, then, 
is an idea of pure reason. As such nothing in experience can ever be adequate to it. That 
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is, we are unable to experience any object as an autonomous agent. We are, however, 
capable of choosing to be an autonomous agent and in making such a choice we can hope 
that we actually succeed in instantiating the idea. We have, Kant believes, the capacity to 
create a world, in the sense that the intelligible world can only exist if we (as its potential 
members) choose to create (or realize) it. In practice the choice we have is the choice to 
realize the potential laws that provide the world with its intelligible unity and have the 
capacity to make the world a world.  
 
Kant makes the distinction between his type of idealism and Plato’s in the section on the 
Ideal of Pure Reason in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he explains that, 
[W]e have to admit that human reason contains not only ideas but also 
ideals, which do not, to be sure, have creative power like the platonic idea, 
but still have practical power (as regulative principles) grounding the 
possibility of the perfection of certain actions. (A569/B597) 
 
Here Kant distinguishes between ideas and ideals and argues that whereas the platonic 
idealist thought that ideas have ‘creative power’ he believes that they only have ‘practical 
power’. What Kant means here is that whereas the platonic idealist believes that ideas can 
be creative theoretically, he believes that they can only be creative (or, I would suggest 
‘effective’) practically. The point Kant is trying to make here in distinguishing between 
platonic idealism and what I have called his ‘ethical idealism’ is the following. For the 
platonic idealist, ideas are creative in the sense that objects in the world (of experience) 
are (imperfect) copies or manifestations of ideas. According to platonic idealism ideas are 
understood as the ‘ground’ of the objects in the world of sense. For the platonic idealist, 
then, the objects we experience are copies (albeit imperfect copies) of ideas. Kant clearly 
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rejects this position. For Kant, ideas are (a) not the sort of things that could ever be 
experienced. And as a result of this fact, our ideas (b) cannot provide us with any 
theoretical knowledge. Although our pure a priori ideas cannot produce or create objects 
that can be experienced, these ideas can produce actions. And, more than this, our ideal 
of a good will can be practically effective in that we can choose to be a good will. The 
choice to be a good will would be an example of an ideal possessing creative practical 
power in a strong sense. For the existence of the idea (as an object of thought) is logically 
prior to (and a necessary condition for the existence of) the reality. Kant  explains this 
practical ‘power’ or efficaciousness’ of ideals. He writes, 
Thus just as the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a case [he has been 
talking about the Stoic ideal of the sage] serves as the original image for 
the thoroughgoing determination of the copy; and we have in us no other 
standard for our action than the conduct of this divine human being, with 
which we can compare ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby 
improving ourselves, even though we can never reach the standard. 
(A569/B597) 
 
This is not a chance remark, and the claim that the only standard of our actions is 
provided by an ideal is central to Kant’s ethics. Here Kant suggests that the moral ideal 
should be understood as the ‘original image’ which can ‘thoroughly determine’ the copy.  
The platonic idealist maintains that ideas can determine our faculty of intuition. Kant 
rejects ‘platonic idealism’, believing that ideas cannot determine our faculty of intuition 
since our intuition is spatio-temporal and ideas cannot be instantiated in space/time. A 
particular pure ideal, the ideal of an autonomous agent, can, however, determine our 
faculty of desire, which, if we truly choose to be autonomous, can become a copy of this 
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original image.141  That is, Kant believes that it is possible for us to choose to be 
autonomous. In choosing to be autonomous we take the pure idea of an autonomous 
agent as the object of our faculty of desire. Of course, from the theoretical perspective we 
have no way of knowing whether we are (or have succeeded in being) autonomous. We 
cannot know whether we have actually chosen to be autonomous. When I look at myself I 
experience myself as existing in time, making a series of particular choices. It is possible, 
however, to think of a single and simple choice laying behind this series of particular 
choices. Kant calls this idea of a simple choice laying behind our series of particular 
phenomenal choices our intelligible character or disposition.142 At any particular time the 
most we can do is to ensure that our particular choices are compatible with the choices an 
autonomous agent would make. There is nothing contradictory, however, in thinking of a 
particular simple choice of a ‘fundamental project’ as the ground or source of all of our 
particular choices and actions, and hoping that this choice is the choice to be an 
autonomous agent. 
 
                                                 
141 In fact Kant’s account is more subtle than this. He believes that a will (faculty of desire) that was full 
determined by such an idea would be a holy will. He believes that we should strive for holiness but the 
most we can hope to achieve is to become virtuous. In his later work Kant was pre-occupied with the 
relationship between virtue and holiness. This topic is beyond the scope of my dissertation, but it is an 
important one, for insofar as reason can be practical we must, in some sense, hope that it is possible for us 
to become holy. I suggest that Kant’s considered position was that a virtuous will is a will that is 
converging on holiness.  In the sense that the series ½, ¼, 1/8, 1/16. . . converges on one. We cannot 
complete the successive addition but we can ‘see’ that this series converges on one. Similarly, I believe, 
Kant believes that we can hope that there exists a divine intellect, which can see our virtuous striving for 
holiness as actually converging on holiness. Such an intellect, Kant hopes, would be able to take in the 
series of our actions in a ‘single glance’ and would see such a virtuous will as a holy one. We can, then, in 
this sense hope to instantiate the idea of a holy will. 
142 In Sartre’s terminology, one could call this ‘disposition’, or ‘intelligible character’, one’s basic or 
original project. 
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The moral ideal as an object of rational cosmology 
  
I have claimed that Kant is a moral idealist and have argued that the moral ideal is not the 
product of some distinct faculty of practical reason, but is an idea of theoretical reason. 
The question now is: upon which theoretical idea is our moral ideal based? In different 
contexts Kant uses different expressions to refer to this ideal. He talks, for example, of 
the idea of “a good will”, “an autonomous being”, “a member of the kingdom of ends” 
and “a divine human being”. All of these expressions refer to the same ideal, namely the 
idea of a member of the intelligible world. As such, the moral ideal must be understood 
as an idea of rational cosmology. 
 
To understand this claim it is helpful to understand something about how metaphysics as 
a discipline was structured in 18th century Germany.  Eighteenth century German 
metaphysics text-books divided metaphysics into general metaphysics (ontology) and 
special metaphysics. Special metaphysics was divided into three special sciences 
corresponding to the three objects of rational cognition, namely: rational psychology, 
rational cosmology and rational theology. Rational psychology was concerned with 
rational cognition of the soul; rational cosmology dealt with rational cognition of the 
world; and rational theology dealt with rational cognition of God. Although Kant 
rejected the possibility of rational cognition – that is cognition of objects through pure 
reason – the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason follows this traditional plan. Thus, 
although Kant rejects the possibility of ontology in the traditional sense, the first half of 
the Critique of Pure Reason can be understood as corresponding to the traditional role of 
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general metaphysics, although here, ontology, in the strict sense of the ‘science of being’, 
has been replaced by a ‘doctrine of elements’. For Kant believes that a science of being is 
not possible, for the intellect can give us no access to things in themselves.143 As Kant 
explains in his lectures on metaphysics, 
Ontology is a pure doctrine of all our a priori cognitions; or it contains the 
summation of all our pure concepts that we can have a priori of things. 
(Metaphysik L2, 28:541) 
 
According to the critical Kant, then, ontology cannot tell us anything about being or 
about things in themselves. Instead, it only provides us with information about our own 
cognitive capacities and faculties, and the contents of these faculties. In addition, 
although reason in its pure use cannot provide us with knowledge of objects, it can tell us 
something about its own limits. The Transcendental Dialectic, on the other hand, 
corresponds to the traditional disciplines of special metaphysics and is structured 
according to the traditional division of special metaphysics into three special sciences. 
Whereas traditional German metaphysicians understood these three special sciences as 
being concerned with three distinct types of object, which could be cognized by the 
human intellect, in Kant’s Dialectic these three ‘objects’ are merely objects of thought 
and can be examined purely as ideas. These ideas are possible as objects of our thought, 
but we have no way of knowing if there are, or even if there possibly could be, ‘real’ 
objects corresponding to them.144 
                                                 
143 For, having rejected the rationalist claim that non-contradiction is a sufficient criterion for real 
possibility, Kant believes that pure theoretical speculation can tell us nothing positive about the nature of 
being (or beings). 
144 As Kant explains in his lectures on metaphysics: “All intuition is sensible, and to cognise something 
without it would be, were it possible, supersensible cognition, which would also have to rest on 
supersensible intuition; all supersensible concepts [and here, I suggest, Kant is being imprecise for he is 
clearly talking about what he normally refers to as ‘ideas of pure reason’, and not to a priori concepts, such 
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Thus, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant identifies three ideas of pure reason: the 
thinking subject, which is the object of psychology, the world, which is the object of 
cosmology and God, which is the object of theology.145 The idea of a good will is an idea 
of pure reason and, as such, it must be identified with or derived from one of the three 
ideas of pure reason: the soul, the world or God.146 And I argue that the idea of a good 
will (or autonomous agent) is an idea of rational cosmology, for it is the idea of a member 
of a world. 
 
Evidence for this interpretation is provided by Kant’s discussion of the ideas of practical 
reason in the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason. Here Kant himself explicitly 
identifies the idea of autonomy (referring to it as ‘the idea of freedom in the positive 
sense’) as an object of rational cosmology. In sections VI and VII of the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Kant introduces three ideas ‘of practical reason’, corresponding to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
as the categories] are of the kind that even if otherwise one may well have grounds for thinking them, no 
intuitions can be given for them; thus they still lack an objective reality that would be connected with the 
concept, e.g., the concept of spirit” (Metaphysik Vigilantius , 29:967). 
145 And, as we have seen, these ideas are ‘pure’ in the sense that they have no sensible content. It is not 
merely that they have no empirical content  (which would make them merely a priori) but they are ideas of 
pure reason, and as such, by definition, have no content provided by the faculty of intuition. As Kant 
explains, “A pure concept is one that is not abstracted from experience but arises rather from the 
understanding even as to content.” (9:92) In addition, these ideas of pure reason, although they are possible 
objects of thought, are not possible objects of experience (or intuition) and as a consequence they are not 
possible objects of cognition. 
146 Ultimately I think that all three ideas play a role in our practical deliberation, for ultimately the three 
ideas involve each other. In fact one could say that there is ultimately only one (but complex) idea of pure 
reason: namely, the idea of a world (community) of individuals created by God.  To be moral is to choose 
to be a member or part of such a community. We cannot, for example, think of the idea of a world of agents 
without thinking of God as the cause of such a world, for our idea of a community of moral agents is, Kant 
believes, the idea of a community created by God. This relationship between the idea of God and the idea 
of a world is purely conceptual and analytic.  The choice to be moral is the choice to be ‘a member of a 
(non spatio-temporal) world of agents created by God’. This is why Kant claims that the “upright man” 
wills that God exists. For if, upon analysis, we work out that our idea of a world can only be the idea of a 
world created by God, then to choose that there be a world is to choose that there be God. A defense of this 
claim, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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three ideas of reason introduced in the Dialectic of the first Critique. These ideas are the 
ideas of ‘immortality’, ‘freedom’ and ‘God’. And, in this passage, when Kant talks of 
‘freedom’ what he really means in the idea of an autonomous agent. In section VII Kant 
is attempting to explain what is necessary “in order to extend pure cognition practically” 
and what he means is that he is attempting to explain what must be the case if pure reason 
is to have a practical application. He argues that the practical extension of pure cognition, 
is not possible without presupposing three theoretical concepts (for which, 
because they are only pure rational concepts, no corresponding intuition 
can be found and consequently, by the theoretical path, no objective 
reality): namely, freedom, immortality and God. (5:134) 
 
The first interesting point about this passage is that Kant calls these three ideas of 
practical reason theoretical concepts, identifying them with the three ideas of pure reason 
identified in the Critique of Pure Reason. They correspond to the three ideas introduced 
in the Critique of Pure Reason in the following terms: The practical idea of immortality 
is a object of rational psychology, the practical idea of freedom/autonomy is an object of 
rational cosmology and the practical idea of God is, obviously, an object of rational 
theology. A few pages later Kant makes this identification explicit. Here Kant is, once 
again, discussing these three practical ideas, but now he labels them differently, for here 
he identifies them as “these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of God), 
and of immortality” (5:137). The idea of ‘freedom’ seems to have been replaced by the 
idea of an ‘intelligible world’. Kant seems to be using the idea of ‘freedom’ and the idea 
of ‘an intelligible world’ interchangeably. I suggest that the reason for this is because he 
believes that the idea of a free (or autonomous) agent is the idea of a member of an 
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intelligible world. For the idea of the intelligible world can only be the idea of a world of 
autonomous agents. 
 
Indeed, Kant himself in this section defines “freedom considered positively” as “the 
causality of a being insofar as it belongs to the intelligible world” (5:132). We should 
take Kant literally here. The idea of freedom in the positive sense, that is, the idea of 
autonomy, is the idea of a being insofar as it belongs to the intelligible world. To be free 
in the positive sense is to be autonomous, is to be a member of an intelligible world. Kant 
makes it clear, then, that the idea of freedom or autonomy should be understood as an 
object of rational cosmology. 
 
At first sight this may seem a very strange claim to make, for one would think that the 
idea of a ‘spirit’ or of an autonomous agent would surely be an object of psychology 
rather than cosmology, corresponding to the concept of the soul rather than somehow 
being derived from the idea of a world. It is clear, however, that the idea of an 
‘autonomous agent’ or ‘good will’ is essentially the idea of a member of an intelligible 
world, and as a consequence an adequate understanding of what Kant means by a ‘good 
will’ requires an understanding of how Kant conceives of the idea of a ‘World’. Kant’s 
most detailed accounts of what is involved in the idea of a ‘world’ are to be found in his 
lectures on metaphysics, and in his pre-critical writings. Although the critical Kant 
radically changed his position on the status of the idea of the intelligible world, there is a 
continuity (although clearly also a development) between his pre-critical and post-critical 
understanding of the idea of the nature (or content) of the idea of the intelligible world. 
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For this reason I believe that paying attention to what Kant has to say about the nature of 
the intelligible world in his pre-critical writings can help us understand his critical 
position. A careful reading of these texts, then, is needed to fully understand Kant’s 
ethical writings. 
 
(5d) Kant's Account of the Phenomenal World  and the Conditioned 
Nature of All Objects of Experience 
 
The idea of an intelligible world and the idea of a member of an intelligible world, then, 
are ideas of pure reason. The (putative) objects of our ideas of pure reason are not 
possible objects of experience because they are not the sorts of things that we could ever 
come across in our experience. This is not a contingent, empirical claim but is based upon 
the difference in the intrinsic nature of a possible object of experience and an idea of pure 
reason, for ideas of pure reason are, by definition, objects of the pure intellect and they 
are unconditioned. Anything that is a possible object of experience, however, is 
conditioned. In this final section of the chapter I will briefly examine Kant’s account of 
the nature of our phenomenal experience, explaining why he maintains that all objects of 
experience are conditioned. This fact about objects of experience is the reason why 
nothing can be given in experience corresponding to our (unconditioned) pure ideas.  
 
The reason why all objects of experience are necessarily experienced as conditioned is 
because we can only experience objects as given in space and time, and an essential 
feature of the very structure of both space and time is that anything experienced in space 
and/or time is experienced as conditioned. Although Kant himself does not explicitly 
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present his argument in such general terms, I think the following type of argument lies 
behind his thought: The experience of the ‘presence’ of objects is a fundamental feature 
of temporal experience. To experience something in time, then, is to experience it as 
present, as existing now, in the present time. But a condition of experiencing something 
as present is the implicit awareness that there is a past, that is not experienced. This 
implicit awareness of a past that is not and cannot be experienced is a condition for 
experiencing anything present as present.  In other words, the experience that something 
is involves an awareness (or what Kant calls a ‘representation’) that there was something 
prior to what is now being experienced. Everything that is experienced as in time, then, is 
experienced as having a past. Thus, everything experienced in time is experienced as 
conditioned, for it implies or points to the existence of something existing in some prior 
time that is not-present, and not experienced, but that is its condition for being 
(experienced) in time. 
 
A similar argument can be made with regard to space. As Kant explains in his lectures on 
metaphysics, “No space, no time can be thought without at the same time thinking of a 
much larger space or time. . .” (Metaphysik Vigilantius, 29:977).147 When we experience 
something as occupying a particular space we experience the space as bounded, for we 
are always implicitly aware that what is given in our visual field is only a part of what 
there is. This is the sense in which the experience of an object as occupying a particular 
space is conditioned by the thought of the ‘larger space’ to which the particular space 
belongs. This ‘larger space’ is not immediately experienced but the thought of some 
                                                 
147 He makes a very similar point in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
 215 
‘larger space’ is a necessary condition for the experience of any particular space, and 
hence is a necessary condition for the experience of any object in space. Every space we 
experience is experienced as bounded, and we can only experience a space as bounded if 
we are somehow implicitly aware that there is a space beyond the boundary that is not 
experienced. This un-experienced surrounding space is a condition for the possibility of 
the experienced space (being a space). 
 
As a result of this every object of experience, being experienced as essentially in space 
and/or time, is experienced as pointing to something beyond itself that is not experienced. 
The awareness that there is something not experienced is a necessary condition of the 
experience of anything as in space or time. This awareness is an awareness that the 
immediate object of experience could not be (in space/time) if the non-experienced past 
time and surrounding space did not exist. The existence of past time and surrounding 
space, then, is a necessary condition for the existence of things in space/time. This is why 
every object of experience is experienced as conditioned. This, I believe, is the general 
structure of Kant's argument developed in the Transcendental Deduction and the 
Analogies. In the following two sub-sections I shall examine this argument in slightly 
more detail and attempt to justify my interpretation. 
 
The Transcendental Deduction: The productive imagination is the name of our 
capacity for representing what is not present 
 
 216 
Contained in every experience of objects, then, is a representation of something that is 
not experienced. In the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
names the capacity to represent something that is not present the imagination, stating 
that, “Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in 
intuition” (B151).148 And he argues that what he calls the productive imagination is 
necessarily involved in all experience. There is much disagreement about how to read the 
Deduction. On my interpretation, the productive imagination is necessarily involved in all 
spatio-temporal experience because such experience essentially involves the awareness 
(or representation) that there is something that is not experienced (for example, past time 
an surrounding space). The ‘productive imagination’, then, is just Kant’s name for the 
capacity we have to, amongst other things, represent the past while we are experiencing 
something as happening now, and to represent the surrounding space while we are 
experiencing something as within our visual field. Such a representation of the past is 
involved in all experience of presence, for to experience a happening as the state of an 
object involves being conscious that the object exists in time and that there was some 
state the object was in prior to the state it is in now. An awareness that the object ‘was’ in 
some state or other is part of our awareness that what we are now experiencing ‘is’ the 
state of an object. Time is not a series of unconnected nows; for something to be present 
is for it to be essentially related to some past; for something to be past involves an 
essential relation to some present, for what it is to be past is to be the past of some 
                                                 
148 “Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der 
Anschauung vorzustellen.” 
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present.149 To experience something in time, then, is to experience something present but 
to be aware that it has a past. Of course, we are not (necessarily) aware what past it had, 
but, insofar as we are something as the present state of an object, we must be aware that it 
had a past. Now, Kant believes that he can explain how this capacity to be aware of the 
past (which is one aspect of the productive imagination) actually works, arguing that this 
capacity is judgmental. In other words, Kant believes that the productive imagination has 
a conceptual structure, governed by the categories. This is the point Kant is trying to 
make when he claims that the imagination “depends on understanding for the unity of its 
intellectual synthesis” (B164). Now, as the awareness that the object we are experiencing 
now was, is an awareness that the currently experienced state of the object has some 
relation to a past state that we are not currently experiencing, Kant concludes that this 
capacity must have something to do with our categories of relation, and he will argue that 
our awareness that what is being experienced has a past can be explained as an implicit 
judgment that what is being experienced is an effect. Kant believes, then, that everything 
that is experienced as present, then, must be experienced as an effect, and this is the 
conclusion he argues for in the Second Analogy. The relation between present and past, 
then, is to be understood in terms of the second category of relation. 
 
The Second Analogy and temporal experience – to be experienced as happening in 
time is to be experienced as an effect 
 
                                                 
149 In this saying this I am suggesting that Kant would agree with Sartre (2001) that “the three so-called 
“elements” of time, past present and future, should not be considered as a collection of “givens” for us to 
sum up – for example, as an infinite series of “nows” in which some are not yet, and others no longer – but 
rather as the structured moments of an original synthesis” (p.83). 
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One way of representing that which is not present is through analogy and thus the 
capacity to make analogies is to be understood as a particular instance of the faculty of 
imagination.150 The Transcendental Deduction, then, provides a general account of the 
role of the (productive) imagination in experience whereas the Analogies should be read 
as examining in more detail the conceptual structure of the productive imagination. To 
illustrate this role of the imagination, and its conceptual structure, I will briefly examine 
Kant’s Second Analogy, which involves an account of the role of the hypothetical form of 
judgment and of the corresponding categories of cause and effect in our experience of 
time. The purpose of this discussion is to further clarify why Kant maintains that 
everything we experience is experienced as conditioned. 
 
In contrast to the Leibnizians, who argued that our experience of time is merely a 
confused representation of conceptual relations, Kant believes that there is something in 
the nature of our experience of time that is irreducibly non-conceptual. Thus, in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic Kant famously argues that time is “not a general concept, but a 
pure form of sensible intuition” (A31/B47).  Time, then, is not reducible to logical or 
conceptual relations, but this is not to say that it does not have a conceptual structure. The 
logical structure of time is that of a series. Thus Kant maintains that, 
                                                 
150 In his general introduction to the Analogies, Kant contrasts what ‘analogy’ signifies in mathematics with 
what it signifies in philosophy. He explains that, “in philosophy analogies signify something very different 
from what they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulas that assert identity of two relations 
of magnitude, and are always constitutive, so that if two members of the proportion are given the third is 
also thereby given, i.e., can be constructed. In philosophy, however, analogy is not the identity of two 
quantitative but of two qualitative relations, where from three given members I can give a priori only the 
relation to a fourth member but not this forth member itself, though I have a rule for seeking it in 
experience and a mark for discovering it there” (A179-80/B222). An analogy then has the form: a is to b as 
c is to d. In mathematics if a, b and c are given, d is also, in a sense, given, in that we are able to construct 
d. In philosophical analogies if a, b and c are given we have a certain representation of ‘d’ (its relation to 
‘c’), but ‘d’ itself is not given. We know that there must be a ‘d’ but we don’t know what it is. 
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Time is in itself a series. . . and hence in it, in regard to a given present the 
antecedentia are to be distinguished a priori as conditions (the past) from 
the consequentia (the future). (A413/B440) 
 
Time, then, has a structure; the past is related to the future as antecedent to consequent. 
Now if time were merely a series of points we would not have to postulate a separate 
faculty of intuition, for the antecedent-consequent relation is a logical relation. Kant, 
then, believes that time is a series or an order and that the notion of a series (or of an 
order) can be understood in terms of the hypothetical (if. . . then) form of judgment, for 
he believes that the before-after relation can be reduced to the cause-effect (antecedent-
consequent) relation. The notion of a series of points (that is, an order), then, can be fully 
grasped conceptually. Time, however, is not a series of points, but a series of times. 
These times have a relationship to one another that can (and must) be grasped 
conceptually by the understanding. However, although the relation between times is 
logical and can be fully grasped conceptually by the intellect, the experience of time 
cannot be reduced to the notion of an order of point-like time events, because what is 
ordered is not a series of (non-temporal) moments, but a series of times.151 The fact, 
however, that happenings in time are necessarily experienced as a series means that there 
is a conceptual relationship between these happenings. To perceive that something is 
happening now, is to be aware that something has happened before, which is to represent 
what is happening now as an effect. Kant makes this clear  in the Second Analogy, where 
he argues that, 
if I perceive that something happens, then the first thing contained in this 
representation is that something precedes. (A198/B244 – my emphasis)   
                                                 
151 One could make a similar point about space. Space does not consist of points (which Kant believes are 
limits of space rather than parts of it) but of spaces. 
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Here he makes it clear that it is not that I perceive something happening and then make a 
judgment that something precedes, but that the awareness that something precedes is 
contained in the perception of the happening. To recognize that something precedes what 
is happening now, however, is to recognize that what is happening now is part of a series 
of events. In other words, it is to recognize that 
there is an order among our representations, in which the present one (in 
so far as it has come to be) points to some preceding state as a correlate, 
to be sure still undetermined, of this event which is given, which is, 
however, determinately related to the latter as its consequence, and 
necessarily connected with it in the temporal series. (A198/9 – My 
emphasis) 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that any present happening points to and is determinately related 
to some preceding happening, and that the nature of this relation is that the present 
happening is (experienced as) a consequence of some past happening. The reason for this 
is because the way we experience something present as ‘pointing to’ some prior state, is 
to be aware of it as part of a series of events, and Kant believes that members of a series 
are ordered according to the ground/consequence relation. He makes this clear in his 
metaphysics lectures where he explains that, 
The relation of consequence to ground [which is derived from the hypothetical 
form of judgment] is a relation of subordination; and things which stand in such 
relation constitute a series. Thus this relation of ground to consequence is a 
principle of the series, and is valid merely of the contingent. (Metaphysic L2, 
28:551) 
 
To experience a happening as present (now), then, is to experience it as happening in 
time. This, however, involves experiencing it as a part of a time series. We experience a 
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present representation (or happening) as part of a time order or time series, by 
experiencing it as pointing to some preceding happening. And the way we do this is to 
experience it as an effect. Everything experienced in time, then, is experienced as an 
effect. This is one reason why everything experienced in time is necessarily conditioned. 
 
Kant sketches this argument, to be given in more detail in the Second Analogy, in section 
26 of the second edition Transcendental Deduction. Here he explains that, 
If. . . I perceive the freezing of water, I apprehend two states (of fluidity 
and solidity) as ones standing in a relation of time to each other. But in 
time. . . I represent necessary synthetic unity of the manifold, without 
which that relation could not be determinately given in an intuition (with 
regard to the temporal sequence.) But now this synthetic unity, as the a 
priori condition under which I combine the manifold of an intuition in 
general, if I abstract from the constant form of my inner intuition, time, is 
the category of cause, through which, if I apply it to my sensibility, I 
determine everything that happens in time in general as far as its relation 
is concerned. Thus the apprehension in such an occurrence, hence the 
occurrence itself, as far as possible perception is concerned, stands under 
the concept of the relation of effects and causes, and so in all other cases. 
(B163) 
 
In the Third Analogy, Kant offers a similar account of our experience of objects in space. 
For to experience something as here, in front of us, involves an awareness of a 
surrounding space which is not here in front of us. I am always aware that my visual field 
is bounded, and that there is space that is not present to me beyond my visual field. I am 
aware that there is space beyond my visual field, but I am not aware of the space. The 
way a present space is experienced as pointing to some absent space, by means of which 
the experienced-space is experienced as surrounded by non-experienced space (and hence 
as bounded), is by being experienced as subject to the category of community. Once 
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again, this awareness is explained in terms of an explicit judgment, for the category of 
community is derived from the disjunctive form of judgment. Now, we always 
experience ‘this’ space as a part (of one single space),152 and Kant believes that we 
represent ‘this’ space as a part in the same way that we represent a part of a disjunctive 
judgment as part of a disjunction. A disjunctive judgment has the form: “x is A, or x is B, 
or x is C”, with the ‘or’ being understood as an exclusive or and the concepts A, B and C 
exhausting the possibilities. The implicit awareness that the space given in my visual 
field is only part of space, is, Kant believes, an implicit judgment that it is a part in the 
same way that “x is A” is part of the disjunctive judgment: “x is A or x is not-A”. One 
could say that every experience of a particular space, as a particular space, involves the 
implicit disjunctive judgment: “Space is either this particular space or it is not this 
particular space”. This judgment captures, and makes possible, the logical relations 
between spaces. Once again, however, our experience of space cannot be reduced to our 
understanding of the (logical) relations between spaces, for what are related are not 
logical points, but spaces. To be aware of this space as a space involves more than 
experiencing it as a part, for it is experienced as a space that is itself a part of space. In 
other words, although Kant believes that the part-whole relationship between spaces can 
be fully grasped conceptually in terms of the disjunctive form of judgment, space cannot 
be reduced to this relationship. 
 
                                                 
152 As Kant explains in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the parts of space “cannot as it were precede the 
single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but 
rather are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of 
spaces in general, rests merely on limitations” (A25/B39). 
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To conclude: Everything given in experience, then, is conditioned. Everything 
experienced as happening in time points to some (past) time that is the condition of the 
time experienced. Every experience of something in space involves an awareness that the 
space experienced is bounded, which involves an implicit awareness that there is some 
space beyond the space immediately experienced which is the condition of the space 
immediately experienced.153 Experiencing the phenomenally given as conditioned 
involves the categories of relation, because to experience something as conditioned is to 
experience it as having a relation to something else. Such relations are not accidental. For 
something to be present it must have a past. If it there was no past there could be no 
present. The past, then, is a (logically) necessary condition of the present. “A single all 
encompassing space” is a (logically) necessary condition of this space being a space.  
 
Ideas of pure reason, on the other hand, are ideas of things that are not conditioned, and 
so nothing that can be given in experience can ever be experienced as instantiating an 
idea.  
                                                 
153 It is the condition of experiencing the experienced space as bounded. 
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Chapter Six 
Theories of Interaction: 





The development of Kant’s account of interaction has to be placed in its historical 
context. In eighteenth century German metaphysics textbooks, and in particular in 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysics (the textbook Kant used for his metaphysics lectures), the 
question of interaction was dealt with under two headings: Psychology and Cosmology. 
The psychological question is about a particular type of interaction, namely that between 
mind and body, and is more familiar to contemporary philosophers. It developed in 
response to Cartesian dualism. Descartes argues that mind and body are two radically 
different types of substance, and the psychological question has to do with understanding 
how two such radically different types of substance can interact with each other. The 
cosmological question, in contrast, is more general, and asks how substances in general, 
even substances of the same type, can interact with each other. The cosmological 
question, although not as prominent today, was a major topic of debate in the eighteenth 
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century and remained of central importance to Kant throughout his career. For example, 
he argues in his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 that,  
The hinge, then, upon which the question about the principle of the form 
of the intelligible world turns is this: to explain how it is possible that a 
plurality of substances should be in mutual interaction with each other, 
and in this way belong to the same whole which is called a world. (2:407) 
 
 
The critical Kant focuses almost exclusively on addressing the cosmological question, for 
by the 1780s he had come to see the psychological question as a non-question. By his 
critical period Kant had come to distinguish between inner and outer sense. Time is the 
form of inner sense, whereas both space and time are the form of outer sense.154  For the 
mature Kant, the (phenomenal) self is just the object of inner sense, whereas body is the 
object of outer sense. Hence we have no reason to believe that there are two ontologically 
distinct types of substance whose interaction needs to be accounted for.155 We merely 
have two types, or aspects, of sensibility. Kant’s transcendental idealism, then, led him to 
the conclusion that the everyday distinction we make between the mental and the 
physical is not a distinction between two distinct ontological spheres and two 
corresponding types of substance, but instead merely a distinction between two forms of 
sensibility, with the physical being understood as the object of outer sense and the mental 
                                                 
154 The claim that both space and time are the form of outer intuition is controversial, as Kant himself often 
seems to suggest that space alone is the form of outer sense.  I believe that it makes more sense to regard 
both space and time as the form of outer sense, because the objects of outer sense are objects in motion. 
Kant himself explains the difference in these terms in the Metaphysics of Morals, where he argues that, “In 
theoretical Philosophy it is said that only objects of outer sense are in space, whereas objects of outer as 
well of inner sense are in time since the representations of both are still representations, and as such belong 
together to inner sense” (6:220). 
155 Thus Kant could argue in his lectures on metaphysics as early as the mid-1770s that, “the separation of 
the soul from the body consists in the alteration of sensible intuition into spiritual intuition; and that is the 
other world. The other world remains the same with respect to its objects; it is not different with respect to 
the substances, but is intuited spiritually” (Metaphysik L2, 28:298). 
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the object of inner sense. The question as to whether these two types of sensibility 
provide access to two different types of substance is a question that is in principle 
unanswerable. As Kant explains in his Observations to the Paralogisms:  
Matter thus signifies not a species of substances quite different and 
heterogeneous from the object of inner sense (the soul), but rather only the 
heterogeneity of the appearances of substances (which in themselves are 
unknown to us), whose representations we call external in comparison 
with those that we ascribe to inner sense, even though they belong as 
much to the thinking subject as other thoughts do. . . Now the question is 
no longer about the community of the soul with other known but different 
substances outside us, but merely about conjunction of representations in 
inner sense with the modifications of our outer sensibility, and how these 
may be conjoined with one another according to constant laws, so that 
they are connected into one experience. (A385-6) 
 
Thus, by the time of the first Critique, Kant had come to conceptualize the mind and 
body, not in terms of two distinct types of substance whose interaction then had to be 
explained, but in terms of two forms of sensibility. Through outer sense we are aware of 
bodies; through inner sense we are aware of our own ‘mental’ states.  It would be a 
mistake, however, to conclude that these two different types of sensibility give us access 
to two ontologically distinct types of substance whose interaction then needs to be 
explained. 
 
By the 1780s, then, Kant had concluded that there is ultimately no compelling reason to 
attempt to answer the psychological question. However, his attempts to answer the 
cosmological question and to explain the possibility of conceptualizing how “a plurality 
of substances should be in mutual interaction with each other” lies at the center of his 
philosophical development and had an enormous impact on the development of not only 
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his theoretical philosophy, but also his moral philosophy. Indeed, understanding Kant’s 
final account of what is involved in the idea of ‘real’ interaction is the key to 
understanding much of his mature ethical writing, and in particular understanding the 
importance he places on the idea of autonomy. For he concludes that the only way we can 
conceive of a community of individuals really interacting is if we conceive of each 
individual member of the community as an autonomous agent. As a result, the decision to 
choose to interact really with others is the choice to be autonomous and vice versa. 
 
(6b) The Three Standard Accounts of Interaction: Occasionalism, Pre-
established Harmony, and Physical Influence. 
 
By the time Kant began his philosophical career, there were three standard answers to the 
‘cosmological’ question of interaction: pre-established harmony, occasionalism and 
physical influx or influence. This tri-partite division can be traced back to Leibniz. For 
example, in a letter to Basnage de Beauval (1696), Leibniz, in the context of a discussion 
about the psychological question of mind/body interaction, elucidates the three possible 
accounts of interaction by drawing an analogy with a pair of clocks.156 Leibniz writes, 
Consider two clocks or watches in perfect agreement. Now this can 
happen in three ways: the first is that of a natural influence . . . The second 
way to make two faulty clocks always agree would be to have them 
watched over by a competent workman, who would adjust them and get 
them to agree at every moment. The third way is to construct these two 
clocks from the start with so much skill and accuracy that one can be 
certain of their subsequent agreement. . . The way of influence is that of 
the common philosophy; . . The way of assistance is that of the system of 
occasional causes. But, I hold, that is to appeal to a Deus ex machina in a 
natural and ordinary matter, where, according to reason, God should 
                                                 
156Kant himself seems to have been aware of this passage and refers to this analogy while explaining 
Leibniz’s position in his lectures on metaphysics. See Metaphysic Mrongovius, 29:866-7.  
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intervene only in the sense that he concurs with all other natural things. 
Thus there remains only my hypothesis, that is, the way of pre-established 
harmony.157 
 
Bayle in his Historical and Critical Dictionary popularized this tripartite taxonomy of 
theories of interaction. There are various ways of characterizing the difference between 
these three positions. The simplest is to explain it in terms of a finite substance’s 
responsibility for (internal and external) change. Thus, the theory of (physical) influence 
asserts that individuals can cause changes both in themselves and in others – that is, they 
can cause both internal and external change. The theory of occasionalism denies that 
finite substances are the cause of change either in themselves or in others.158 The theory 
of pre-established harmony asserts that finite substances are the cause of changes in 
themselves, but not in others. In addition, it should be noted that in the early eighteenth 
century the dominant account of ‘physical influx’ involved (as the name suggests) the 
idea of the accidents of one substance ‘flowing into’ another substance.159 Following 
Kant I will refer to this position as the theory of crude physical influence. Kant, although 
                                                 
157 Leibniz (1989), pp.147-8. It should be noted that in this letter Leibniz is discussing the psychological 
question of mind-body interaction and not the cosmological question of interaction in general. Kant, in his 
lectures, however, appeals to this analogy during his discussion of the cosmological question. And Leibniz 
himself ultimately regards the psychological question as a special instance of the cosmological question. 
158 It is not clear if this reading is fair to Malebranche. In Germany in the eighteenth century it seems that 
the standard reading of Malebranche was that he denied all activity to finite substances. Malebranche 
himself seems to have believed that finite individuals do have wills in that they possess the capacity to 
assert or deny.  I think most of his readers in the post-Leibnizian tradition took this to mean that 
Malebranche denied that finite substances were active in any meaningful sense. 
159 Leibniz traces the crude theory of physical influence back to Suárez. Duarte (2001), however, argues 
that this attribution does not stand up to close scrutiny. Suárez does explain  action in terms of influence 
rather than dependence, however ‘influere’ is a transitive verb the direct object of which is ‘esse’ (being), 
with the patient being acted upon taken as the indirect object of this verb. Suárez does not, then, suggest 
that in interaction something (say an accident) is transferred from the agent to the patient. What, Suárez 
actually meant by the notion of the agent “flowing being into” the patient, is unclear. See Disputation 12 of 
his Metaphysical Disputations, De Causis Entis in Communi, masterfully translated by Shane Duarte 
(unpublished). 
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he rejects crude physical influx, can be understood as advocating a version of physical 
influx. 
 
Watkins (1995b) explains the trichotomy in the following terms: 
Physical influx asserts intersubstantial causation amongst finite 
substances. For instance, when I appear to kick a ball, I really am the 
cause of the ball’s motion. Pre-established Harmony denies 
intersubstantial causation, but affirms intrasubstantial causation. 
According to Pre-established Harmony, then, I am not the cause of the 
ball’s motion, but rather the ball is simply causing itself to move . . . 
Occasionalism, like Pre-established Harmony, denies intersubstantial 
causation, but, unlike Pre-established Harmony, it denies intrasubstantial 
causation as well. Occasionalism typically asserts that God alone, that is, 
an infinite substance, is the cause of all changes, and thus of the ball’s 
motion. (p.296) 
 
Watkins suggests that one advantage of these definitions is that the theories form an 
exhaustive disjunction, and he rightly points out that this is how the theories were 
generally understood in eighteenth century Germany. At this stage in my investigation I 
will suggest that these definitions provide a good starting-point, and that at least at the 
beginning of his career, this seems to be how Kant understood the distinction between the 
three positions.  
 
By the mid eighteenth century, at least in the German-speaking world, this exhaustive 
tripartite taxonomy was pretty much taken for granted. Thus, as Watkins (1995a) notes, 
by 1723 Bilfinger could claim that occasionalism, pre-established harmony and physical 
influence were the only three possible theories of interaction.160  And it seems fair to say 
that in the German milieu in which Kant developed philosophically, only two of these 
                                                 
160 See Watkins (1995a), p.285. 
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answers were regarded as serious contenders: pre-established harmony and physical 
influence. Following Leibniz, Wolff and his school tended to be defenders of pre-
established harmony.  On the other hand a number of important philosophers such as 
Gottsched, Crusius, and Knutzen (who was one of Kant’s teachers in Königsberg) had 
written tracts advocating physical influx.  Occasionalism was no longer taken 
seriously.161 Kant himself rejects occasionalism without much discussion and I suggest 
that this dismissal was motivated by the fact that he regarded individual substances as 
essentially active (or by the critical period as ‘agents’) which led him to see 
occasionalism, understood as a doctrine which denies the real agency of finite 
individuals, as essentially a denial of the possibility of finite individuality and hence as 
akin to Spinozism. 
 
(6c) Kant’s Rejection of Pre-established Harmony 
 
Kant’s rejection of pre-established harmony can be traced back to his first published 
work, the True Estimation of Living Forces of 1746. In this work he speaks approvingly 
of the “triumph” of physical influx over pre-established harmony (1:20), and Kant 
remained a committed opponent to pre-established harmony throughout his career. 
Despite his unwavering rejection of pre-established harmony, he consistently agreed with 
Leibniz that individuals (or monads) are ‘windowless’. And as a result of this he 
consistently rejected crude physical influx and the thesis that in cases of interaction 
                                                 
161 The reason for this seems to have been because following Leibniz most German metaphysicians of the 
period conceived of substances, even finite substances, as essentially active. Insofar as occasionalism was 
taken to deny the activity of finite substances it was taken to imply a contradiction. 
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something flows from one individual (‘through a window’) into another individual. He 
was, and remained, committed to the ‘windowless’ nature of individual substances 
because he was committed to what I shall call the Principle of Active Inherence. 
According to this principle, an accident, determination162 or state can only be an accident, 
determination or state of a particular individual if the individual itself is the ‘ground’ or 
‘cause’ of the state.  Kant, however, did not believe that accepting this principle implied 
rejecting the possibility of real interaction.  
 
Kant offers an interesting argument against pre-established harmony in the New 
Elucidation of 1755. In Section Three of this work he discusses the ‘principle of 
succession’ and attempts to justify the proposition that, “no change can happen to 
substances except in so far as they are connected with other substances” (1:410). The 
structure of his argument is simple. The defender of pre-established harmony believes 
that finite individual substances are isolated from each other but that they experience 
changes of states. Kant attempts to show that it is impossible to explain how changes of 
states are possible in an isolated substance. It is not clear, however, whether he offers 
three formulations of a single argument or three distinct arguments.  The initial 
(formulation of) the argument is as follows: 
[1] The inner determinations, which already belong to the substance, are 
posited in virtue of inner grounds which exclude the opposite. 
Accordingly, [2] if you want another determination to follow, you must 
also posit another ground. But since the opposite of this ground is internal 
to the substance, and since, in virtue of what we have presupposed, [3] no 
external ground is added to it, it is patently obvious that [4] the new 
                                                 
162 The term ‘determination’ is Kant’s own. An accident, property or state of a substance would all fall 
under the term ‘determination’. 
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determination cannot be introduced into the being. (1:140 - numbers 
added) 
 
The first premise is what I have named the Principle of Active Inherence, and Kant 
remained committed to it throughout his career. The crucial step in this argument is, Kant 
believes, the second one, which he rejects. For, he will argue that for a new determination 
to occur does not necessarily require the existence of a new ground, but it might be the 
consequence of a pre-existing ground that has not been able to actualize itself because of 
some external resistance. The easiest way of explaining this is in terms of an example. 
For the sake of the argument I will assume that motion is an inner determination. Kant 
would agree that the motion of an individual substance must be due to some inner 
ground, and calls the ground of a determination a force. Therefore, Kant would accept 
that there must be some force internal to the substance that is responsible for its motion. 
A change of motion, however, does not require the existence of some new internal 
ground or force. For the change of motion may be due to a withdrawal of resistance, 
which allows some already existing, but ineffective, internal ground to be become 
effective. 
 
Kant, then, in advocating the principle of active inherence, agrees with the Leibnizians 
that individual substances must be thought of as windowless. He agrees that the 
determinations (say, the motion) of a substance must be due to inner grounds. His 
position, however, diverges from Leibniz’ in that he believes that this does not imply that 
a change of determinations must also be due to grounds internal to an individual 
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substance. Indeed, he believes that the defender of pre-established harmony has no way 
of explaining how any change of states in a substance is possible.  
 
The defender of pre-established harmony, however, could reply that she doesn’t believe 
that that it is the ‘determinations’ or states of a substance that depend upon inner grounds, 
but, instead, that is the it is the change of states or determinations that must be the results 
of inner grounds or forces. If this is the case, then the defender of pre-established 
harmony has no problem explaining the possibility of change. And, indeed, this is 
precisely what Leibniz and Wolff argued. And, moreover, Kant himself recognizes this. 
Thus, he argues that although he is familiar with the arguments of the Leibnizians he is 
“convinced of their sterility”, because, 
once they have constructed an arbitrary definition of force so that it means 
that which contains the ground of changes, when one ought to declare that 
it contains the ground of determinations, they were bound to fall headlong 
into error. (1:411) 
 
Thus Kant recognizes that the Leibnizians define a substance’s force as the ground of its 
changes and not merely as the ground of its determinations or states. If we are willing to 
accept this conception of force, however, it would seem that Kant’s argument in the New 
Elucidation misses the mark, for if we understand the ‘force’ internal to a substance as 
the ground of its changes, we do not face any problem in explaining how change is 
possible in an isolated substance. This problem only arises if we accept Kant’s definition 
of (internal) force as the ground of substance’s determinations and not as the ground of 
its changes. And, unfortunately, Kant does not offer much in the way of arguments as to 
why we should regard the Wolffian definition of force as the ground of changes as any 
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more arbitrary than his own definition of force as the ground of a substance’s 
determinations.  
 
Although Kant’s arguments in the New Elucidation are not compelling, this discussion 
should at least establish that in 1755 Kant himself believed that he had a decisive 
argument against pre-established harmony. Indeed, he felt justified in claiming that this 
“proof utterly overthrows the Leibnizian pre-established harmony” (1:412). Kant 
remained remarkably consistent on this issue for the rest of his life. For, as we shall see, 
he consistently advocates the position that an individual substance must be the ground of 
its own determinations (or states), but this does not imply that it must be the ground of its 
changes of determinations (or states.) 
 
It is clear, then, that from the start of his career Kant believed that he had good reasons 
for rejecting pre-established harmony. It was only late in his career, however, that he 
developed a model of real interaction that was able to explain how the position he 
advocated can be meaningfully distinguished from that of pre-established harmony.  
 
(6d) Kant’s Attitude Towards Physical Influx  
 
As we have seen, Kant explicitly rejects pre-established harmony and occasionalism. His 
attitude towards physical influence is less clear. In the New Elucidation he suggests that 
his own account is “certainly somewhat superior to the popular system of physical 
influence” (1:416). Ameriks (1992) takes this to mean that Kant sees his position as “a 
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fourth alternative” (p.262).  Watkins (1995a), on the other hand, suggests that even in this 
paper Kant should be understood as proposing “a more sophisticated version of Physical 
Influx” (p.292). On Watkins’s interpretation, then, Kant is to be regarded merely as 
rejecting the ‘popular’ exposition of physical influx and not the theory of physical influx 
itself. In his later works, as both Watkins and Ameriks point out, Kant did often refer to 
his own account of interaction as a version of physical influence. Whatever he calls his 
position, he does offer a much more sophisticated theory of interaction than any of the 
three traditional alternatives, and as a result it is potentially misleading to refer to the 
position he advocates as physical influence. Although I agree with Watkins that, even in 
his earliest works, Kant understood himself to be providing a defense of physical 
influence broadly understood, I will generally refer to the position Kant advocates as a 
theory of real interaction. This is a phrase Kant often uses and it etymologically presents 
his mature position far more accurately than the expression ‘physical influence’. For the 
theory Kant wishes to defend is a theory of inter-action and not a theory of in-flowing. 
And the term ‘real’ in this context is used in a technical sense.  
 
Although it is potentially misleading to regard Kant as a defender of physical influence, 
Kant himself often calls the position he is advocating physical influence. The reason for 
this is that the mature Kant had no problem with adopting the terminology of his day for 
polemical purposes. In claiming to be a defender of physical influx, however, he is 
merely attempting to indicate to his audience that he rejects pre-established harmony and 
occasionalism. He recognizes, however, that his use of this expression is potentially 
misleading, for his account is neither ‘physical’ nor does it involve any ‘in-flowing’. On 
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the other hand, understanding Kant as offering a defense of ‘physical influx’ broadly 
understood does help us to understand where Kant located himself in the contemporary 
controversy. Although he does at times label the position he advocates ‘physical 
influence’, he is clearly unhappy with this choice of words. He makes this clear on a 
number of occasions. For example, he points out in his lectures on metaphysics that, 
“influence <influxus> is an unfitting expression, it implies that the accident migrated out 
of a substance.” (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:823) This unfittingness, as we have seen, 
does not stop Kant from at times using this terminology. The mature Kant, then, uses the 
phrases ‘physical influence’ and ‘real interaction’ interchangeably to refer to the same 
doctrine.163   
 
Like Leibniz, Kant can be thought of as developing a ‘monadology’ or an account of 
what it is to be an individual. However, whereas Leibniz thought that his monadology 
offered an account of the way the world really is, the critical Kant is merely concerned 
with examining what is conceptually involved in the pure idea of an individual.164 Such 
an account is not, however, a pointless exercise akin to building castles in the air because 
                                                 
163 I should point out at this point that Kant’s use of ideal, as an adjective and contrasted to ‘real’ should be 
clearly distinguished from his use of this word as a noun, as in when he talks of  ‘an ideal’. Although Kant 
uses the same word in both contexts the concepts are totally distinct and have nothing to do with each 
other. ‘Ideal’ in the phrase ‘Kant’s moral ideal’ has nothing in common with the ‘ideal’ in the phrase ‘ideal 
interaction’. 
164 The pre-critical Kant (before 1770) thought that his account of individuality (and hence his account of 
interaction between individuals) was an account of the way things are. The critical Kant, on the other hand, 
thought that the idea of an individual is an idea of pure reason and as such is not the sort of thing that can 
be an object of experience. That is, for the critical Kant, there are no real individuals to be found in the 
spatio-temporal phenomenal world. As he explains in the Critique of Practical Reason:  “[I]f this ideality 
of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but Spinozism, in which space and time are essential 
determinations of the original being itself, while the things dependent upon it (ourselves, therefore, 
included) are not [individual] substances but merely accidents inhering in it” (5:101-2 – my addition in 
square brackets). This passage clearly indicates that the critical Kant believes that there are no real 
individual substances to be found in the spatio-temporal phenomenal world.    
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the idea of what it is to be an individual plays an essential role in Kant’s ethics. While an 
individual substance can never be an object of possible experience, the idea of an 
individual monad (in interaction with other individuals) does offer us an ‘image’ of what 
we can (and should) choose to be. Thus, it is important to clarify what is involved in this 
idea.  Throughout his career Kant agreed with Leibniz that individuals are ‘windowless’. 
That is, he agreed that the notion of a ‘determination’ flowing from one individual into 
another is incoherent.  
 
One problem with the crude theory of physical influence is that it suggests that 
determinations (or in the traditional vocabulary ‘accidents’) are the sort of things that can 
‘float around’ and exist independently of individual substances. Both Leibniz and Kant 
have a problem with this notion. A defender of crude physical influence, however, might 
just bite the bullet and accept the coherency of the idea of accidents existing 
independently of substances. A more serious problem, however, with the doctrine of 
crude physical influx is that it is unclear in what sense a determination can really be 
though of as being a determination of either the agent or the patient. For if accidents or 
determinations are the sort of things that can detach themselves from individuals and 
float from one individual into another then we need some account of the way in which an 
accident can really ‘stick to’ or really belong to a particular individual in a way strong 
enough to make the accident an accident of that individual. If accidents are the sort of 
things that can be detached from an individual, we need to give some account of the real 
unity of accident and individual. Following Leibniz, Kant rejects the crude theory of 
physical influence, for he believes that the only way an accident can truly belong to (or 
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be unified with) a substance is if the substance is the (active) ground of the accident.165 
Kant's main criticism, then, is that the proponent of crude physical influx has no way of 
accounting for inherence.  
 
Although Kant agrees with Leibniz that individual substances must be ‘windowless’ he 
does not believe that this implies that we must conclude that we cannot conceive of ‘real’ 
interaction between individuals. It was not until the 1770s or early 80s, however, that 
Kant was in a position to explain what he means by ‘real’ interaction, and so until this 
point in his career he is not really able to explain how his account can be distinguished 
from pre-established harmony.  
 
The mature Kant reached the conclusion that individuals can only interact if they are 
members of a community, and that real interaction can be distinguished from ideal 
interaction in that in the case of real interaction the individuals constitute a real, as 
opposed to an ideal, community. The reasons he reached this conclusion will be the topic 
of the following two chapters. According to this position, the defender of pre-established 
harmony can be thought of as claiming that the community is ideal in the sense that its 
unity exists merely in the mind of God, whereas the defender of real interaction believes 
that  its unity is real, constituting some fact about the world. Kant himself often presents 
the distinction between a ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ community (or ‘totality’) in these mentalistic 
terms and I suspect that this is maybe how he first started to conceive of this distinction. 
It is, however, not a very informative way to explain the distinction, for the defender of 
                                                 
165 An interesting point to note here is that this seems to imply that the first category of relation 
(substance/accident/inherence) involves the second (ground/consequence). 
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pre-established harmony can always ask what is meant by the claim that in a ‘real’ 
community its unity constitutes a fact about the world. The defender of pre-established 
harmony could, quite justifiably, argue that the distinction between him and his opponent 
is merely verbal, for his opponent cannot explain what is meant by the term  ‘real’.  Early 
in his career this criticism can justifiably be made against Kant, and the distinction 
between his position and that of a defender of pre-established harmony is purely verbal. 
Ultimately, however, I believe Kant worked out how to explain the difference between a 
‘real’ and ‘ideal’ community in non-mentalistic terms. A ‘real’ community is to be 
distinguished from an ‘ideal’ community in that the unity of a real community is intrinsic 
to the community. What is meant by this is that the members of a real community must, 
by definition, themselves be the source of the relations (or laws) that provide the 
community with its unity. It is only once Kant has worked out how to explain the 
distinction between a real and ideal community in these terms that he is able to 
distinguish meaningfully his position on interaction from pre-established harmony. 
 
To conclude: Kant accepts the Leibnizian claim that (individual) substances must be 
thought of as ‘windowless’. He is committed to this because he is committed to what I 
have called the Principle of Active Inherence. According to this principle a 
‘determination’ can only be the determination of a particular substance if the substance 
itself is the (active) ground of the determination. If we accept the Principle of Active 
Inherence we must reject the crude theory of physical influx. According to this theory 
when individual A (the agent) affects individual B (the patient) a determination (say an 
‘accident’) “flows” from the agent into the patient, and so the patient is not the ground of 
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the determination. The problem with the crude theory of physical influx, then, is that it is 
difficult to understand in what sense the determination can really be a determination of 
the patient. Kant believes, however, that accepting the Principle of Active Inherence, 
although it rules out the intelligibility of crude physical influx, does not commit him to 
something like pre-established harmony.  
 
To understand how Kant can accept this principle and still meaningfully defend some 
version of real interaction, it is necessary to examine his account of action in more detail. 
Understanding his account of action will also help us understand why interaction pre-
supposes community, in the sense that individuals in interaction must be thought of as 




Kant’s Theory of Action 
 
 
In this chapter, I will attempt to explain and justify the claim that interaction is only 
possible between individuals that constitute a community. In the following chapter I shall 
examine Kant’s account of the idea of community in more detail, in particular examining 




As we saw in the previous chapter, Kant rejects the crude theory of physical influx, but 
does not believe that this means he must commit himself to either occasionalism or pre-
established harmony. According to the crude theory of physical influence a substance a is 
the cause of a ‘determination’ or accident in substance b if the accident ‘flows’ from 
substance a into substance b. Such a theory might sound like an implausible straw man, 
but it reflects how we often talk about interaction. For example, we talk of motion being 
‘transferred’ from one body to another. Similarly we talk of a property right being 
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transferred from one agent to another.166 Also, many people conceptualize what is 
involved in a good conversation or a good teacher-pupil relationship in these terms. I 
have an idea in my head and I wish to ‘convey’ it to my conversational partner or student. 
On this model, successful communication (or teaching) involves the transferal of ideas 
from one individual to another. The idea somehow flows from my mind ‘through a 
window’ into your mind. Rejecting the coherency of physical influx and the idea that 
individuals have ‘windows’ (through which, say, motion, property rights, or ideas could 
flow in) implies that we need to reconceptualize these cases of ‘action’. 
 
Kant rejects such a model of interaction because it is incompatible with his understanding 
of what it is for an accident to inhere in a substance. Given his rejection of crude physical 
influence, however, Kant needs to explain in what sense one substance can really act 
upon another.  
 
The idea of interaction clearly involves the idea of reciprocal causation. Individuals a and 
b interact if a has a causal influence on b and b has a causal influence on a. It cannot, 
however, be reduced to the notion of reciprocal causation, because interaction essentially 
involves action, and Kant believes that only way of making sense of the action of one 
individual upon another is in terms of the withdrawal of resistance. On this account an 
individual a can only act upon, and be the cause of a change in, another individual b if the 
change of state in individual b is the result of individual a ‘withdrawing resistance’. This 
                                                 
166 In Chapter 8 I will argue that a rejection of the coherency of crude physical influx implies that we are 
left with the task of cashing out what is involve in the ‘transferal’ of property rights in some other terms. I 
will argue that this is precisely what Kant is attempting to do in the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of 
Morals. 
 243 
account of interaction, however, presupposes that for interaction to be possible, the 
individuals interacting must somehow already be limiting or resisting one another. Kant 
believes that the concept of ‘resistance’ is a pure a prior concept, being what he calls a 
predicable of the category of community. So insofar as action presupposes action and 
action can only be understood as the withdrawal of resistance, interaction presupposes 
community. And this implies that interaction is only possible between individuals that 
already constitute a community.167  This, however, leaves Kant’s account with a problem. 
 
To understand this problem it is helpful to examine the problem Leibniz had explaining 
the possibility of composition. Leibniz believes that individual substances (monads) are 
isolated and cannot really interact. As a result of this he has a problem in explaining how 
a world of individuals is possible, for a world is a composite, and if individuals are really 
isolated it is difficult to explain their composition. Kant agrees with Leibniz that our idea 
of a world is the idea of a composite and he often argues that it is the fact that individuals 
interact that makes it possible for them to be members of a unified community. If this 
were the only account he could give of community membership then his argument would 
be viciously circular. For we cannot claim that individuals are members of a world by 
virtue of the fact that they interact if we believe, as Kant does, that individuals can only 
interact if they are members of a world. Given Kant's account of action, the 
conceivability of such a community must be the basis for the conceivability of real 
interaction, and not vice versa. Fortunately, although Kant frequently claims that it is the 
real interaction between individuals that is the basis for their belonging to a unified 
                                                 
167 This is because the concept of resistance is what Kant calls a ‘predicable’ of the category of community. 
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community or world, his analysis of the idea of community, which will be examined in 
the following chapter, explains how we can conceive of a multitude of individuals 
belonging to a unified community, without having to appeal to the fact that they are 
interacting. On this account, Individuals can form a community by willing a common set 
of juridical laws, and these laws are the basis of real, intelligible interaction for such laws 
(once they have been willed) are the source of real resistance between individuals. 
 
(7b) A Problem 
 
There are times when Kant seems to conceive of interaction merely as reciprocal 
causation. For example, in his metaphysic lectures he explains that, 
The relation of community is different from that of the consequence to the 
ground in this, that the cause and effect are reciprocal here, i.e., there is 
something in the effect <causato> which is the ground of the cause 
<causa> and something in the cause <causa> which is ground of the 
effect <causato> = each concurrently. (Metaphysik Vigilantius, 29:986) 
 
It is clear, however, that the concept of community involves more than the idea of 
reciprocal causation, for interaction involves not merely causation, but action.  
 
The problem with conceptualizing (reciprocal) action is fairly simple.  Following 
Leibniz, Kant thinks that the idea of an individual (substance) is the idea of something 
essentially active. There seems to be, however, a problem in conceiving of two 
essentially active beings mutually acting upon one another, and thus there is a problem in 
conceiving of a community of essentially active individuals. For in a community of 
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individuals in interaction individuals will not only act, but also be acted upon. The 
problem then is to give an account of how we can conceive of an essentially active 
substance as suffering or passive. Any account of interaction, then, must be able to 
explain how an agent can be a patient. Kant himself explicitly poses this question in his 
lectures on metaphysics. He explains that “that substance suffers (passive) whose 
accidents inhere through another power.” He then asks, 
How is this passion possible, since it was said earlier that it [i.e. the 
passive/suffering substance] is active insofar as its accidents inhere. 
(Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:823)  
 
The problem, then, is not merely that Kant conceives of individual substances as 
essentially active, but that following Leibniz he is committed to a particular conception of 
inherence. Namely, he is committed to the view that an accident (or what Kant refers to 
as a ‘determination’) can only truly inhere in or belong to a substance if the substance is 
the active cause or ground of the accident. A determination, then, is only the 
determination of a particular individual if the individual is somehow the ‘ground’ of the 
determination. I have named this doctrine the Principle of Active Inherence.168  If we 
accept the principle of active inherence, though, it is not clear how one individual can 
ever be the cause of any change in another individual. If a determination can only be a 
determination of individual b if b is the active ground or cause of the determination, how 
can another substance ever be the cause of a change in b? Leibniz’s solution was to admit 
defeat and conclude that one substance cannot be the cause of a change in another.  
 
                                                 
168 I suspect that Kant and Leibniz are drawn to such a doctrine because of their worries about unity. An 
individual must be essentially unified. Given this fact there must be something that accounts for the unity 
of a substance and its ‘determinations’. The principle of active inherence provides such an account.  
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(7c) Kant’s Solution 
 
Kant’s solution to this problem will be to claim that we can understand the idea of an 
individual being acted upon, without appealing to the untenable notion of accidents 
flowing into the individual, in terms of the agent “determining the active power of the 
substance being acted upon”  (29:823). This account of action does not violate the 
Principle of Active Inherence, because the patient’s determination inheres in the patient 
because it is a result of the patient’s power. This power, however, has been determined by 
the agent. It is not clear, however, what we should make of this notion of the agent 
“determining the power” of the patient.  
 
The model Kant introduces to clarify the notion of one individual determining the power 
of another is that of the withdrawal of resistance. Individuals, on this model, already 
resist one another. And one individual substance (the agent) is the ‘cause’ of a change in 
another individual substance (the patient) if the change in the patient is the result of the 
agent withdrawing its resistance. The patient remains, however, essentially active, for the 
determination is the result of its power. Thus each individual is essentially active in that 
everything that happens to a particular individual (everything a particular individual 
suffers) is the result of its own power or potentiality. But much of what we do 
(everything that ‘happens’ to us) only occurs when other individuals remove 
impediments. One could say that I am, in a certain sense, the ground of the possibility of 
all of my determinations, but am not the sole ground of all of their actuality.  
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Thus Kant explains in his lectures on metaphysics from 1782-3, 
We can never be merely passive, but rather every passion is at the same 
time action. . . Every substance is self-active, otherwise it could not be 
substance;. . . The substance being acted upon <substantia patiens> is 
acting in itself <eoipso agens>, for the accident would not inhere if the 
substance had no power through which it inhered in it, hence it also 
acts; influence <influxus> is therefore an unfitting expression, as it implies 
that the accident migrated out of a substance.  What then is genuine 
passivity? The acting substance <substantia agens> determines the power 
of the substance being acted upon <substantiae patientis> in order to 
produce this accident, therefore all passivity <passio> is nothing more 
than the determination of the power of the suffering substance by an outer 
power. (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:823 – My emphasis.) 
 
Here Kant spells out his commitment to what I have called the principle of active 
inherence: “an accident would not inhere if the substance had no power through which it 
inhered in it.” And he believes that commitment to this principle rules out the possibility 
of crude physical influence. However, he does not believe that it rules out any 
commitment to real interaction, for it still allows for some account of passivity. An 
individual can be a patient, that is, it can be acted upon, if another individual “determines 
the power of the substance being acted upon in order to produce the accident”.  
 
He continues his discussion by giving a more detailed account of how one individual can 
determine the power of another. This discussion is very similar to the account he gives in 
the course of his discussion of the question “what is acting?”, in his lectures on 
metaphysics of 1790-1. And as this later account is more compact I will move to a 
discussion of these later passages. Here Kant makes it clear that one individual 
‘determines the power’ of another when it removes an impediment which allows a ‘dead’ 
power to become a living power. In this discussion, the language of which seems to have 
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been influenced by Leibniz’s Specimen of Dynamics, he clarifies the distinction between 
a ‘faculty’ and a ‘power’ and explains the difference between a ‘living’ and a ‘dead’ 
power. He explains: 
With a faculty we imagine only the possibility of power. Between faculty 
and power lies the concept of endeavor <conatus; Bestrebung>. When the 
determining ground for an effect is internally sufficient, then it is a dead 
power. But when it is internally and externally sufficient, then it is a living 
power. Power which is merely internally sufficient, without being able 
to produce the effect, is always opposed to an opposing power which 
hinders its effect, an impediment <impedimentum>. Thus as soon as 
the impediment <impedimentum> is removed, the dead power 
becomes living. (Metaphysik L2, 28:565) 
 
Here Kant distinguishes between the idea of a ‘faculty’ and the idea of a power. A faculty 
is a mere capacity whereas a power is already a striving or endeavor. ‘Conatus’ is a term 
that Kant has borrowed from the calculus. Imagine a ball at rest. It has the faculty or 
capacity to move in a straight line. Now, imagine a ball being swung attached to a rope 
and swinging round a fixed point (or better, imagine the moon attracted to the earth by 
the force of gravity and circling it). At each particular moment the ball ‘wants’ to move 
in a straight line, at a tangent to the circle it is describing. This is what Leibniz termed 
‘conatus’ and what Kant refers to in German as ‘endeavor’ (Bestrebung). Thus, although 
the ball is actually moving in a circle, at any particular moment it is ‘endeavoring’ to 
move in a straight line along the tangent. At any particular moment it would move along 
the tangent if all external forces were removed. Kant calls this ‘endeavor’ to move along 
the tangent a ‘power’; it is more than what Kant calls a capacity or faculty, for even an 
object at rest has the capacity to move along a straight line. We can, however, distinguish 
between a ‘dead’ power and a ‘living’ power.  The power of the ball (to move along the 
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tangent) will remain a ‘dead power’ unless the rope is cut. If the rope is cut, the 
impediment is removed, and the ball will move off along the tangent. Upon the cutting of 
the rope the dead power becomes a living power. The cutting of the rope ‘causes’ the ball 
to fly off in a straight line – but this cutting merely allows for the actualization of the 
ball’s dead power. So the motion of the ball along the tangent really is the ball’s motion.  
 
Thus, a static point has the capacity or faculty to move along a straight line. If it is 
moving in a circle around a center of gravity at every moment it is ‘striving’ to move 
along the tangent. In such situations, at each moment it has a dead power to move along 
the tangent. If the force of gravity is removed it will move along the tangent along a 
straight line. In moving along a straight line it is exercising a living power. Although the 
movement along the straight line is due to its own power, the removal of the force of 
gravity is the cause of its motion in a straight line.  
 
Kant suggests that all interaction between substances can be understood as analogous to 
this. Of course, the example of the ball I have just given is a spatio-temporal one. The 
analogy, however, can be stripped of its spatio-temporal elements and be applied to 
intelligible individuals, that is to individuals insofar as they are thought as not subject to 
the spatio-temporal conditions of our form of intuition. Thus, one individual (the agent) 
acts upon another (the patient) when the agent is the ‘cause’ of a dead power in the 
patient becoming a living power. The agent can only be the cause of such a change by 
removing an impediment, which allows a dead power to change into an active power. In 
so doing, the agent causes a change of determination in the patient. The (new) 
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determination, however, belongs to the patient because it is a result of the patient’s dead 
power or ‘endeavor’. The agent only ‘causes’ the determination by removing some 
impediment. This explains how an essentially active individual can be acted upon and 
hence how reciprocal causation is possible, and why the notion of interaction involves the 
concept of community, for only individuals that are (already) members of a community 
can impede one another.169  
 
As I have argued that, for Kant, the only type of individuals that can really interact are 
moral (autonomous) agents, it is worth examining how this model of action can be 
applied to moral agency. In particular it allows us to draw the distinction between 
someone’s being the cause of an action and someone’s being responsible for an action. 
Suppose that my next door neighbor is a rich art dealer. Every evening I walk past his 
house on the way back from the pub. I see a Picasso above his mantelpiece, and want it. 
Occasionally I try his front door, but it is locked. One day the art dealer forgets to lack 
the door, or perhaps he decides that he should be more trusting and decides to leave the 
door unlocked. I steal the painting. If the art dealer had not left the door unlocked, I 
would not have stolen the painting.  In such a case I think that we would be tempted to 
say that the fact that the art dealer unlocked his door was, at least in one sense, the cause 
of my stealing the painting. At the same time we do not want to hold the art dealer 
                                                 
169 It is interesting to apply this analogy and terminology to Kant’s ethical writings.  We could say that 
consciousness of the moral law shows that we have the capacity to be autonomous, that we possess the 
faculty of practical reason. To be moral is to endeavor to follow the moral law. The most we can achieve 
alone, however, is a dead power. What we must hope for is that the dead power the endeavor to follow the 
law creates is allowed to become a living power. A moral world is a world in which each individual 
follows his or her own course without impeding others or being impeded. In a kingdom of ends there 
would, so to speak, be no dead power. An individual is happy when she realizes her goals – in this language 
we could say that she would be totally happy only if all of her power were living power. This is only 
possible, however, in a world in which all individual submit themselves to the same laws. 
 251 
responsible for my action. His action may have caused the theft, but he is not responsible 
for the theft. I am responsible for stealing the painting, Kant would argue, because of my 
character; perhaps one of my maxims is to “take anything I desire if I believe I will not 
get in to trouble”. The action of the art dealer does not cause a change in my character. I 
will only take the painting if I am already pre-disposed to behave in such a way if the 
opportunity arises. The decision of the art dealer, however, is the cause of some change in 
me. I have gone from wanting to possess the painting to actually possessing it, from 
being a ‘law abiding citizen’ to being a thief. We could say that the act of the art dealer in 
unlocking the door is the cause of my change of state (say, from being a non-thief to 
being a thief) but he is not responsible for my being a thief. The action of others, then, 
allows my character to reveal itself in certain ways (both to the world at large and to 
myself) but what is being revealed is my character or disposition.  
 
(7d) Leibniz’ Problem with Explaining the Possibility of Composite 
Substances 
 
Unlike Leibniz, then, Kant believes that he can explain how individuals can be thought of 
as interacting without violating the Principle of Active Inherence. He also believes that 
the fact that we can conceive of individuals as interaction allows us to understand how 
individuals can be members of a unified world or community. For our idea of a world is 
the idea of a composite whole consisting of individuals, and Kant maintains that it is the 
fact that individuals are thought of as interacting that allows us to conceive of them as 
members of a whole. Thus, in his lectures on metaphysics, in the course of discussing our 
idea of an intelligible world, he explains that, 
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The world is composite because it has a multitude of substances, and 
whole <totum> because all of these stand in interaction <commercio>. 
(Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:852) 
 
Here, then, Kant suggests that it is the fact that individuals interact that explains how they 
can be members of a whole.  Similarly in his lectures from the early 1790s he argues that, 
The aggregation of the substances in which there is no community still 
does not constitute a world. Reciprocal determination, the form of the 
world as a composite <compositum> rests upon interaction <commercio>. 
(Metaphysik L2, 28:196) 
 
Similar passages are not hard to find.170 Unfortunately, Kant’s position is inconsistent. 
Kant’s argument here is circular, for as we have seen his account of action presupposes 
that individuals in interaction must be members of a whole. If there was not some 
connection between individuals, how could individuals be impeding one another? So the 
fact that they are thought of as interacting cannot be used to explain how we can think of 
them as members of a composite whole. In the following chapter, I will argue that Kant is 
able to explain how individuals can be thought of as members of a whole (as members of 
a community) without appealing to their interaction. Before moving on to this topic, 
however, I will spend the remainder of this chapter examining why a philosopher 
working in the Leibnizian tradition has problems with explaining the possibility of 
composition and why Kant’s own account of action means that the fact that individuals 
interact cannot account for the unity of the whole they are part of, for interaction between 
individuals presupposes that they are members of a unified whole, and so cannot be the 
basis of the unity of the whole. In the following chapter I will explain how Kant believes 
                                                 
170 This type of claim can be traced back to the Inaugural Dissertation, where Kant argues that the problem 
he  wishes to examine is, “How it is possible that a plurality of substances should be in mutual interaction 
with each other, and in this way belong to the same whole which is called a world” (2:407 – my emphasis). 
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it is possible to conceive of such a unified composite whole of individuals through the 
category of community. And it is only because we can think of individuals as members of 
a (real) community, conceived of in these terms, that we can think of them as interacting 
and not vice versa. 
 
Leibniz himself recognized that his commitment to pre-established harmony made it very 
difficult, if not impossible, for him to explain mind/body unity, and the problems he 
finally recognized with his account of mind/body unity are equally telling against the 
unity of a world of Leibnizian monads. For if pre-established harmony cannot account for 
the union of mind and body, it is equally incapable for accounting for the unity of a 
‘world’ of monads. And Kant believes that if we are to make any sense of the idea of a 
world of monads we must think of such a world as unified, for the idea of a world is not 
merely the idea of a multitude, but the idea of a whole. It is, then, worth looking briefly at 
Leibniz’ problems with mind/body unity to understand what is at stake here. 
 
It is well known that Leibniz believes that everything that really exists must be one, in the 
sense of being essentially unified. He is, however, also committed to the possibility of 
composite substances, with the composite being, “nothing but an accumulation or 
aggregate of simples” (Monadology, #2). The postulation of composite substances, 
however, presents Leibniz with a problem. For it is not clear how, given his own account 
of the nature of substance, something composite can really be an individual. For, it is not 
clear in what sense a composite of Leibnizian monads can be essentially unified. Many of 
Leibniz’ contemporaries were committed to the coherency of the notion of composite 
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substance, because they believed that a human being is such a substance, being a 
substantial union, consisting of both mind and body. Of particular concern to Leibniz, 
and his contemporaries, then, was the attempt to give an account of the union of mind and 
body. It is not clear, however, whether Leibniz possesses the conceptual tools to explain 
the possibility of such a union. For Leibniz, or at least for the mature Leibniz, this 
question is no longer a question of the relationship between two distinct types of 
substance but the relationship between a single monad and a multitude of monads, for my 
mind is a monad, and my body also consists of monads. Leibniz’ account of the unity of 
mind and body is to argue that my mind is ‘dominant’ over the monads that constitute my 
body and it is this relation of dominance that constitutes the (unifying) relation between 
my mind and (the monads that constitute) my body.171 Leibniz, however, denies the 
existence of real relations between monads, and so this dominance can only be explained 
in terms of the harmony between the individuals. 
 
At least up until the late 1690s, Leibniz believed that the union between mind and body 
could be accounted for in terms of the harmony that existed between them. Thus, in his 
New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances, and of the Union of Soul 
and Body of 1695, Leibniz expounds his account of the nature of individual substances, 
and argues that, 
There will be a perfect agreement among all of these substances, 
producing the same effect that would be noticed if they communicated 
through the transmission of species or qualities, as the common 
philosophers imagine they do. In addition, the organized mass, in which 
the point of view of the soul lies, being expressed more closely by the 
                                                 
171 This is why it makes sense to deal with Leibniz’ account of the mind-body question in a Chapter on 
action. For the mind is dominant over the (monads that constitute) body by its action upon them. 
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soul, is in turn ready to act by itself, following the law of the corporeal 
machine, at the moment when the soul wills it to act; without disturbing 
the laws of the other – the spirits and blood then having exactly the 
motions that they need to respond to the passions and perceptions of the 
soul. It is this mutual relation, regulated in advance in each substance 
of the universe, which produces what we call their communication, 
and which alone brings about the union of soul and body.172 
 
Here, then, Leibniz argues that the unity of mind and body can be explained in terms of 
the harmony between them. However, as René Joseph de Tournemine pointed out in his 
Conjectures on the Union of the Soul and the Body, a work sympathetic to Leibniz and 
written in response to his New System, pre-established harmony does not seem strong 
enough to account for the union between mind and body. De Tournemine begins his 
article with a recounting of Leibniz’s attack upon Descartes and the occasionalists. The 
Cartesians, de Tournemine argues, will tell you that, 
the soul and the body. . . are united because to each change in the body 
there corresponds a change in the soul, and in the same way to each 
change in the soul there corresponds a change in the body.173  
 
And Tournemine praises Leibniz for pointing out that the mere correspondence between 
changes in the mind and changes in the body is not sufficient to account for real unity. He 
argues, however, that Leibniz’s own position is subject to similar criticisms. Thus, he 
argues that Leibniz, 
makes against the Cartesians an objection which entirely destroys their 
theory of the union of the soul and the body. Neither the law which God 
lays down for himself to act in parallel on the soul and on the body, nor 
the correspondence between the changes in the one and the changes in the 
other, can produce any genuine union between the soul and the body. 
There is, if you like, a perfect correspondence; but there is no real 
connection, any more than there would be between two clocks [the 
                                                 
172 Ariew & Garber (1989), pp.143-4 – my emphasis. 
173 Woolhouse (1997), p.247. 
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motions of which are perfectly matched]. There is no answer to this 
objection; but unfortunately, it destroys M. Leibniz’s theory as well as that 
of the Cartesians. For after all, correspondence, or harmony, does not 
make a union, or essential connection. Whatever parallels we imagine 
between two clocks, even if the relation between them were perfectly 
exact, we could never say that these clocks were united just because the 
movements of the one corresponded to the movements of the other with 
perfect symmetry.174 
 
Leibniz himself accepts this criticism, and in a commentary on de Tournemine’s article 
he recognizes that, 
I have to admit that I would be greatly mistaken if I objected against the 
Cartesians that the agreement which, according to them, God maintains 
immediately between the soul and the body, does not create a genuine 
unity, because most certainly my pre-established harmony could not do 
any better.175 
 
Leibniz continues by suggesting that in offering his theory of pre-established harmony he 
“attempted only to give an explanation of the phenomena, that is to say, of the relation we 
perceive between the soul and the body” (ibid.). The metaphysical union between mind 
and body, however, is not phenomenal, and so Leibniz claims that he has “not taken it 
upon [himself] to look for an explanation of it” (ibid.). Leibniz’s reaction here seems 
pretty disingenuous. For, it seems clear to me that Leibniz’s monadology, of which his 
doctrine of pre-established harmony is an essential component, is clearly more than an 
attempt to ‘explain the phenomena’. However, I am not primarily concerned here with 
providing an interpretation of Leibniz. Rather I am interested in drawing out a problem in 
Leibniz’ metaphysics, a problem Kant attempts to solve. The problem Leibniz faces is 
that if the relationship between monads is merely that of harmony, it is difficult to see 
                                                 
174 Woolhouse (1997), pp. 248-9 – my emphasis. 
175 Woolhouse (1997), p.250. 
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how a multitude of monads could possibly be unified. If we make the assumption that a 
‘world’ must somehow be unified it is difficult to see how we can make any sense of a 
‘world’ (or even ‘a possible world’) of monads. Some account of real interaction is 
required, then, if we are to make any sense of the idea of a world of individuals. 
 
Although, as we have seen, Kant was not particularly concerned with explaining the 
relationship between mind and body because believed that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ were not 
two ontologically distinct entities, he was concerned with the problems involved in 
conceptualizing  composite individuals, for our idea of a world, or community, is the idea 
of something individual which is composed of individuals.   
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Chapter Eight 




I have argued that, for Kant, our idea of an intelligible world is the idea of a real 
community and that real interaction is only possible between individuals that constitute a 
real community. In this chapter I will examine in more detail what is involved in the idea 
of a real community and explain how it is related to the disjunctive form of judgment and 
the corresponding category of community. The main aim of this chapter will be to 
explain and justify the claim that, for Kant, the idea of a real community can be defined 
as the idea of a real whole, the parts (or members) of which are simple and logically 
prior to the whole and which mutually limit or resist one another. In the following 
three sections of this chapter I will examine Kant’s analysis of the idea of community in 
more depth.  
 
In (8a), I will examine his account of the concept of community, introduced in the table 
of categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. I will explain how this category is related to 
the disjunctive form of judgment and will argue that the category of community is the 
concept of a whole the parts (or members) of which mutually exclude one another.  
 259 
In addition I will explain what Kant means in claiming that the concept of resistance is a 
predicable of the category of community. This claim, that Kant makes in passing, is often 
overlooked by commentators. However, given the role the concept of resistance plays in 
his model of action, this claim is highly significant, for it explains why and how Kant 
believes that action (and interaction) is intelligible. 
 
In (8b), I will explain how the idea of community is to be distinguished from the 
concept. I will begin by examining his general account of the distinction between 
concepts and ideas and I will argue that the idea of community is distinguishable from the 
category of community in, at least, three ways: in the case of the idea of a community: 
(i) its parts/members must be logically prior to the whole, (ii) its parts/members 
must be simple (i.e. they cannot themselves have parts) and, (iii) it must an absolute 
whole, in the sense of being a whole that is not itself part of any other whole. I will 
also explain why, given this definition of ‘community’, phenomenal objects cannot be 
experienced as members of such a community. In other words I will explain why nothing 
given in experience can be experienced as an object corresponding to our idea of a 
member of (such) a community.  
 
In (8c), I will explain the distinction between the idea of an ideal community and that of 
a real community. Our idea of a real community is the idea of a real as opposed to an 
ideal whole. This distinction has to do with the nature of the unity of the whole. The 
distinction can be expressed in mentalistic terms. An ideal whole is a whole whose unity 
exists merely in the mind of the observer, say God. A real whole, on the other hand, is a 
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whole whose unity is intrinsic to the whole, in the sense that the whole itself is the source 
of its unity. For Kant, a community is unified by inter-substantial laws, where laws are 
thought of as intelligible relations that bind the members of the community together. In 
the case of an ideal community there will be a harmony between the change of state of 
one substance and that of another. An ideal observer could recognize regularities between 
the change of state of one substance and that of another and could formulate inter-
substantial laws to capture these regularities. The individual substances themselves, 
however, are not governed by these laws, nor are they the source of the laws, for the laws 
only exist in the mind of the observer, and so although the observer experiences the 
individuals as a whole they are not, in themselves, a whole as there is nothing that unifies 
them. In a real community, on the other hand, the community itself must be the source of 
the laws. Now, as the community just is its members, then the members of the 
community themselves must be the source of the laws that provide the community with 
its unity. This is why a real community must consist of autonomous agents. For an 
autonomous agent is, by definition, an individual that gives (i.e. is the source of) laws.  
 
(8a) The Category of Community 
 
In this section I will argue that, for Kant, the concept of community is the concept of (a) a 
whole, (b) the parts/members of which mutually exclude one another. I will explain how 
Kant believed that this concept is derived from the disjunctive form of judgment. 
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces the category of community as the third 
category of relation.  The structure of the table of categories is derived from the table of 
judgments, and this table is divided into four classes, into judgments of quantity, of 
quality, of relation and of modality. The categories of the third class, then, are derived 
from the judgments of relation. According to Kant there are three types of relational 
judgment: categorical judgments (A is B), hypothetical judgments (if p then q) and 
disjunctive judgments (p or q or r). The categories of substance and accident are derived 
from the categorical form of judgment. The categories of cause and effect are derived 
from the hypothetical form of judgment and the category of community is derived from 
the disjunctive form of judgment. The table of categories leads to a table of principles, 
with the principles being, “nothing other than rules of the objective use of the categories” 
(A161/B200). Thus, the principles can be thought of as rules for the application of the 
categories to (empirical) objects. The analogies of experience are the third set of 
principles and correspond to the categories of relation – with each of the analogies being 
presented as an account of why one of the categories must necessarily be applied to 
objects of experience. Thus the first analogy concerns the application of the category of 
substance, the second that of causality and the third that of community.  
 
Kant believes that the category of community (and as a result the notion of interaction) is 
to be sharply distinguished from that of cause and effect, for they are derived from 
different forms of judgment. We understand the importance of this claim by considering 
an alternative way of conceptualizing interaction. Defenders of such an alternative 
conception of interaction would argue that we can fully capture what is involved in 
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interaction in the following terms: when two entities, say x and y, interact x has a causal 
relation to y and y has a causal relation to x. Kant does not deny that this partially 
captures what is involved in the relation of interaction176, but he does not believe that it is 
the full story177, for he believes that when a number of entities interact they (a) constitute 
a whole and (b) mutually exclude one another. These two factors are essential to the 
relation of interaction and cannot be captured by appealing to the ideas of ground and 
consequence or to the hypothetical form of judgment. Thus, in his commentary to the 
table of categories in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant compares the causal relation to 
the relation of interaction/community and points out that in the case of simple causation 
the relation is one of subordination, whereas in the case of interaction the relation is one 
of coordination (B112). What he means by this is that is that in a causal relation the 
consequence is subordinated to the ground. For this reason the ground-consequence 
relation is the principle of the series, for the relation of ground and consequence can 
provide us with a well ordered chain of causes and effects. The relation of community, on 
the other hand, cannot be understood in terms of the idea of subordination, for when a 
number of entities are members of a community they are not subordinated to one another 
but are coordinated with one another. The concept of co-ordination cannot be understood 
in terms of mutual subordination. When entities are coordinated with one another they are 
parts of a whole and mutually exclude one another.  
                                                 
176 “[T]he third category always arises from the combination of the first two in its class” (B110). In the case 
of the category of relation, which is the third category of relation, the first and second categories are 
substance and causation. So community involves substances in causal relations, but cannot be reduced to 
the notion of mutual causation. 
177 “But one should not think that the third category is therefore a merely derivative one and not an 
ancestral concept of pure understanding.  For the combination of the first and second in order to bring forth 
the third concept requires a special act of the understanding, which is not identical with that act performed 
in the first and second” (B111). 
 263 
 
Thus Kant explains that the relation of community/interaction, 
Is an entirely different kind of connection from that which is to be found 
in the mere relation of cause to effect (of ground to consequence), in 
which the consequence does not reciprocally determine the ground and 
therefore does not constitute a whole with the latter (as the world-creator 
with the world). The understanding follows the same procedure when it 
represents the divided sphere of a concept as when it thinks of a thing as 
divisible, and just as in the first case the members of the division exclude 
each other and yet are connected in one sphere, so in the later case the 
parts are represented as ones to which existence (as substances) pertains to 
each exclusively of the others, and which are yet connected in one whole. 
(B113) 
 
In the first sentence of this passage Kant distinguishes the concept of causation from that 
of interaction, and focuses on the fact that in the case of interaction the entities in 
interaction “constitute a whole”. This is not the case in the ground-consequence relation. 
He appeals to the example of God, the “world-creator”. God is the ground or cause of the 
world, but God and the world do not constitute a whole. If God were thought of as 
interacting with the world, however, God and the would constitute a whole.  
 
To understand the second sentence of this passage it is necessary to have a closer look at 
Kant’s account of the disjunctive form of judgment. A disjunctive judgment has the form: 
‘x is A or B or C’.178 Kant explains this form of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason 
in the following terms: “in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the multitude of 
everything that is contained under it) is represented as a whole divided into parts (the 
subordinate concepts)” (B112). He makes his point a little more clearly in his logic 
lectures.  In his Jäsche Logic, for example, he give the following explanation: 
                                                 
178 Or perhaps more accurately: “x is A or x is B or x is C”. 
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disjunctive judgments represent various judgments as in the community of 
a sphere and produce each judgment only through the restriction of the 
others in regard to the whole sphere. (9:107) 
 
A disjunctive judgment, then, is judgment in which a number of judgments somehow 
restrict one another and fill up a (logical) sphere.  To understand what Kant means by this 
it is instructive to look at an example. In his Jäsche Logic Kant himself gives the 
following example of a disjunctive judgment: “A learned man is learned either 
historically or in matters of reason.” (9:108) Here the concept ‘learnedness’ is divided 
into ‘parts’. The concept ‘learnedness’ is in this case the logical ‘sphere’ that is to be 
divided into parts. The parts of this sphere are ‘learned historically’ and ‘learned in 
matters of reason’. These parts mutually exclude one another in the sense that in so far as 
one is ‘learned historically’ one is not ‘learned in matters of reason’ and, Kant believes, 
taken together they completely ‘fill the sphere’ of the concept of learnedness in the sense 
that they exhaust the concept. In other words, Kant maintains that the ‘or’ in a disjunctive 
judgment is an exclusive ‘or’, and that in such a judgment the members of the disjunction 
exhaust the concept. In the disjunctive judgment, then, we find a number of judgments 
mutually excluding one another and completely filling a logical space. This conception of 
a logical ‘space’ allows us to think of a ‘space’ that has parts but which is not, unlike the 
space of intuition, infinitely divisible. This allows us to think of a whole the parts of 
which are simple. This will be important when we turn to the idea of community.  
 
It is, then, from the disjunctive form of judgment that we get the concept of ‘exclusion’. 
Kant makes this clear in his commentary to the table of categories. In this section he 
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compares the disjunctive form of judgment with the hypothetical (if. . . then) form of 
judgment, and asks us to, 
note that in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the multitude of 
everything that is contained under it) is represented as a whole divided 
into parts (the subordinate concepts), and since none of these can be 
contained under any other, they are thought of as coordinated with one 
another, not subordinated, so that they do not determine each other 
unilaterally, as in a series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate (if one 
member of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded, and vice versa. 
(B112) 
 
Earlier in his commentary on the table of categories, Kant explains that the categories he 
has listed do not provide a complete list of the a priori concepts of the understanding, for 
there are also derivative concepts, which Kant calls “predicables”, which can be derived 
from the categories. Thus, Kant explains that  
For the sake of the primary concepts it is therefore still necessary to 
remark that the categories, as the true ancestral concepts of pure 
understanding, also have their equally pure derivative concepts, which 
could by no means be passed over in a complete system of transcendental 
philosophy, but with the mere mention of which I can be satisfied in a 
merely critical essay. (A81-2/B107) 
  
Under the category of community Kant lists two “derivative concepts” or predicaments: 
presence and resistance (A82/B108). The reason why resistance is a predicable of the 
category of community is because our (pure, unschematized) concept of resistance is to 
be understood in terms of exclusion, and we understand the notion of exclusion a priori 
through our grasp of the disjunctive form of judgment. What we mean if we claim that 




In the previous chapter I explained Kant’s theory of action. On this account, one 
individual acts upon another if the agent withdraws some resistance which allows a dead 
power (conatus) in the patient to become a living power. The possibility of action, then, 
presupposes resistance, and I claimed that Kant believes that individuals can only resist 
one another if they are members of a community. We are now in a better position to 
understand this claim for Kant believes that resistance is a pure concept parasitic upon 
the category of community. One individual resists another individual by excluding it 
from a “space”. The metaphor I have just used is spatial, and if our conceptualization of 
resistance/exclusion necessarily relied upon such spatial metaphors then the concept of 
resistance would not be a pure concept. Kant’s whole point, however, in arguing that 
resistance is a predicable of the category of community, is that the notion of  mutual 
exclusion, and the related notions of resistance (and impenetrability) although they can be 
applied to phenomenal objects in space, are pure concepts derived from the disjunctive 
form of judgment, and as such can be thought independently of their conditions of 
application to objects given in intuition. In other words, Kant believes that we understand 
the notion of one individual excluding another from a ‘space’ without any appeal to 
intuitive space, for our understanding of the notion of the ‘space’ or ‘sphere’ of a concept 
is logical and not intuitive. The category of community, then, allows us understand the 
notion of a number of impenetrable individuals (concepts) filling a conceptual space 
(another concept) and excluding other individuals (concepts) from their bit of the 
conceptual space, without any appeal to the space of intuition. This is the basis for our 




(8b) - The Distinction Between the Category of Community and the Idea 
of a Community (or ‘World’) 
 
In this section I will examine Kant’s distinction between the category of community and 
the idea. Kant argues that whereas our categories are always conditioned our ideas are 
concepts which are unconditioned. The concept of a community is the concept of a 
whole, the parts/members of which mutually exclude one another. The idea of a 
community is unconditioned in the sense that its parts/members must be (a) simple and 
(b) logically prior to the whole. And the whole must be (c) absolute, in that it must be a 
whole that is not part of any other whole. These three facts about the idea of community 
are the reason why nothing in experience can be experienced as a member of a 
community. For, given the spatio-temporal nature of our experience, nothing that is 
experienced can be experienced as simple, and in every experience the whole (of space) 
is logically prior to part. As I am primarily concerned with Kant’s understanding of the 
idea of a member of a community, I am not, at least in the context of this dissertation, 
particularly interested in Kant’s claim that a community must be an absolute whole, and 
so, in what follows I shall focus exclusively on his claim that the members of a 
community (corresponding to our idea as opposed to our mere concept of a community) 
must be simple (i.e. individuals) and logically prior to the whole.179 
                                                 
179 Kant makes it clear that our idea of a world (which is the idea of a community) must be the idea of an 
absolute whole in his metaphysics lectures. Thus he explains that, “A composite <compositum> can be 
either a relative <respective> or an absolute whole <absolute totum>. It is a relative whole <totum 
respective> insofar as it is not a part of a whole of the same kind, but an absolute whole insofar as it is a 
part neither of the same nor of another kind, e.g., a house is a relative whole insofar as it is a whole of 
its kind; but it is not an absolute whole, for it is a part of another kind, namely of a street. // The world is 
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As our pure idea of a ‘world’ (the ‘intelligible world’) is the idea of a community in this 
sense, in the following sections I will treat the expressions ‘idea of a community’ and 
‘idea of a world’ as synonyms. 
 
Categories and ideas 
 
I have argued that, for Kant, the intelligible world is the pure idea of a community, the 
members of which must be simple and logically prior to the whole. To understand why 
the idea of a member of a community must have these features we must understand how 
Kant distinguishes between concepts and ideas in general. Kant’s most famous account of 
the distinction is to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason. Here Kant offers two 
accounts of the distinction between concepts and ideas. First, he distinguishes between 
the understanding, as the source of concepts and reason as the source of ideas. The 
understanding is the faculty of judgments, whereas reason is the faculty of syllogisms. 
Second, he argues that whereas concepts are conditioned, ideas are always 
unconditioned. In addition, in his lectures he offers a third account of this distinction, 
arguing that ideas “come about when one enlarges a concept of the understanding to 
infinity” (29:848). I believe that the second and third accounts of the distinction are the 
most useful. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
no relative whole, but rather an absolute whole in the metaphysical sense” (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 
29:851 – my emphasis). 
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In his lectures on metaphysics Kant explains the distinction between concepts of the 
understanding (concepts/categories) and concepts of reason (ideas) in the following 
terms: 
We have now two sorts of concepts in our soul: concepts of understanding 
and of reason. Concepts of reason [i.e. ideas] come about when one 
enlarges a concept of the understanding to infinity. (Metaphysik 
Mrongovius. 29:848) 
 
To understand what Kant might mean by ‘enlarging a concept to infinity’, we must 
understand what Kant means by infinity. Kant consistently distinguishes between ‘real 
infinity’ and ‘mathematical infinity’. Mathematical infinity “arises through the successive 
addition of one to one” (28:569). Given Kant’s understanding of the nature of 
mathematics a pure concept of the understanding is not the sort of thing that could be 
‘enlarged to infinity’ in the mathematical sense. For numbers, Kant believes, are 
constructed in intuition, and so are not pure. Mathematical notions, such as the notion of 
mathematical infinity, then, cannot be applied to pure concepts.180 This is not the only 
way to understand ‘infinity’, for Kant explains that, 
Infinite can actually be taken in two senses. In the first the concept of the 
infinite is a pure concept of the understanding, and then it is called: real 
infinity <infinitum reale>, i.e., in which there are no negations. (28:569. 
Metaphysik L2) 
 
When Kant talks of ‘enlarging a concept to infinity’ he must mean ‘infinity’ in this sense. 
So we can say that an idea, being a category “enlarged to infinity”, is “a concept in which 
there are no negations”.  
                                                 
180 In addition, Kant believes that there is no mathematical infinite. He agrees that it is true that “beyond 
every number I can add a higher one”, but denies that there is such an thing as “the largest number” (ibid.). 
To claim that space, for example, is (mathematically) infinite is merely to claim that, “the concept of the 
magnitude of space is never total” (ibid.). 
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An idea must be ‘infinite’, in the sense that it must be based upon what I shall call a 
perfect judgment. A perfect judgment is a judgment that contains nothing negative. 
Examining Kant’s account of the real, as opposed to the mathematical, infinite we can 
understand why a concept enlarged to infinity, that is one representing a perfect 
judgment, must  contain nothing negative. For in a perfect disjunctive judgment each 
member of the disjunction must itself be a positive judgment. Now the category that 
corresponds to the positive judgment is the category of reality. Thus, as a result, each 
member of a community (corresponding to a perfect disjunctive judgment) must be 
real.181  
 
Both the category and the idea of a world are ultimately derived from the disjunctive 
form of judgment. A disjunctive judgment can, in principle, contain negative judgments. 
For example, ‘A is x or A is not-x’. A disjunctive judgment ‘enlarged to infinity’ would 
be a disjunctive judgment which contains no negations. A perfect disjunctive judgment, 
then, would have the form ‘A is x or A is y or A is z’. In such a judgment the quality of 
each member of the disjunction is affirmative. Now the category which is derived from 
the affirmative form of judgment is that of reality. Thus, the claim that the idea of a world 
must be derived from a perfect disjunctive judgment implies that in the idea of a world 
each member (or part) of the community must be ‘real’. 
 
The simplicity of members of a world 
                                                 
181 And this is one reason why in our idea of a world, the members must be logically prior to the whole, for 
in a perfect judgment each element of the judgment must be real and logically precede the judgment. 
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The fact that Kant believes that the idea of a member of a world must be simple is not 
difficult to demonstrate. I suggest that Kant offers at least two distinct arguments for the 
claim that in our pure idea of a community its members (or parts) must be thought of as 
simple. The first argument is based upon the assumption that the idea of a community is 
the idea of a real composite. The second is based upon the claim that “reason demands 
completeness” and anything divisible is not complete. The fact that our idea of member 
of community must be the idea of something simple is one reason why Kant believes that 
no object of experience can be experiences as a member of (such) a community. 
 
In his lectures Kant distinguishes between the notions of an ideal and a real composite, 
explaining that, 
The concept of a composite presupposes parts. When the parts of a 
composite can be given prior to the composition, then it is a real 
composite. But when they cannot be given prior to the composition, then it 
is an ideal composite. (Metaphysik L2, 28:565) 
 
Elsewhere,  he argues that, 
Simple substance is called a monad. . . Considered as noumenon, the 
world certainly consists of simples, for composition is just mere relation. 
But in the world of appearances, there are no simple parts. Only the 
intelligible world, noumenal world, is of monads, but we do not at all 
cognize it. (Metaphysik Dohna. 1792-3. 28:663-4) 
 
The argument he provides here is based on the fact that our idea of a world is the idea of 
a composite, and composition requires (simple) things that are composed. He repeated 
this argument frequently. For example, in his lectures from the early 1780s he argues 
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that, “The world, considered as noumenon, must consist of simple parts, because 
otherwise it cannot be composed” (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:859). Similar passages 
are not hard to find.182 This argument is very similar to Leibniz’s (1989) argument at the 
start of the Monadology that, “there must be simple substances, since there are 
composites; for the composite is nothing more than a collection, or aggregate, of simples” 
(p.215). Unfortunately, it is not clear how this follows from the fact that our idea of the 
intelligible world is the idea of community, for the category of community does not 
involve the notion of composition183, and so if this argument is to be successful Kant 
must explain why our idea of community (as opposed to the concept) must be the idea of 
a composite. Although Kant himself doesn’t explicitly offer an argument it is clear that 
he believes that our idea of a community is necessarily the idea of a real composite. This 
is not the case with the category of community, which can equally well be applied to 
non-composite wholes, such as space. For space, Kant argues in the third analogy, is to 
be thought of as a community, space however is not a real composite, for it is not 
composed of spaces; rather, (particular) spaced are introduced by introducing limitations 
into space. 
 
One reason for this is provided by the fact that he believes that an idea “is a concept 
enlarged to infinity”, and we have seen that what this means is that an idea can contain 
nothing negative. As a result of this our idea of a part cannot be introduced by 
                                                 
182 For example: “Now the question arises: can one say of every substantial composite <compositum 
substantiale> that it consists of simple substances, i.e., it is a whole consisting of monads <monadatum>? 
Yes, insofar as it is noumenon, for all connection is nothing other than relation. Since the substances by 
definition <ex definitione> are privy to outer existence for themselves, one can remove all relation and the 
substances remain and are simple” (Metaphysik Mrongovius. 1782-3. 29: 827). 
183 We think of space as subject to the category of community, but space is not a composite of spaces. 
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introducing limitations into a whole, for to introduce limitations is to introduce something 
negative. If in our idea of a community the parts cannot be introduced by introducing 
limitations into a whole, then the parts must be logically prior to the whole, and so in our 
idea (as opposes to mere concept) of a whole the whole must be thought of as composed 
of parts, rather than the parts being thought of as being introduced into a pre-existing 
whole through the introduction of limits. 
 
Although Kant believes that the fact that a world must be thought of as a real composite 
implies that its parts must be thought of as simple, his argument is not compelling, for the 
most he can show is that in a real composite the parts must be logically prior to the 
whole. However, just because the parts of a real composite cannot be introduced by 
introducing limitations or divisions into the whole, we cannot draw the conclusion that 
the parts themselves can’t be thought of as divided. 
 
Elsewhere Kant offers what seems to be an independent argument for the claim that in 
our idea of a community the parts of the community must be simple (in the sense of being 
indivisible). The crux of this argument is that ideas are the product of reason, and reason 
demands completeness. Thus, for example, he argues in his logic lectures that, 
The concept of a part is a conceptus purus intellectualis, seu notio. But the 
concept of a part that is not composite is a notio rationis, idea. As long as 
my reason represents something divisible, that can always be divided 
further. But my reason finally demands the ultimate part, which cannot be 
further divided into parts, i.e., is simple. This concept cannot be shown in 
experience, and this is a concept a priori, or idea. (Vienna Logic. 907) 
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Here he argues that the concept of a part is a pure concept, and the concept of a simple 
part is an idea (notio rationis). Reason demands completeness, and the idea of a 
community whose members (or parts) were not simple would not be complete. It is also 
arbitrary, for there is no reason for reason to stop the division at this particular point. It 
seems to me that this argument is the real basis for Kant's claim that the members of an 
intelligible world must be thought of as simple (indivisible) individuals. 
 
Phenomenal community and the third analogy 
 
This explains why Kant believes that no object of experience can be experienced as a 
member of a world. The reason for this is that it is an essential feature of phenomenal 
space that the whole of space is logically prior to the parts of space. For a part of space is 
always thought of as being ‘in’ a greater space. The reason for this is because the parts of 
space are only bought into existence by introducing limitations into this greater space. 
Thus the concept of a ‘part’ of space logically presupposes a greater space. Thus, Kant 
argues in the Transcendental Aesthetic that it is a defining characteristic of space that the 
whole precedes the parts. As Kant explains:  
One can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, 
one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And 
these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as 
its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather 
are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also 
the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations 
(A25)184   
 
                                                 
184 Here Kant makes it clear that in the case of space the whole logically precedes the parts, for the parts 
rest upon limitations of the whole. The recognition of this feature of space is what motivates Kant’s claim 
that  our representation of space cannot be conceptual and must as a consequence rest upon pure intuition. 
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The idea of a community is based upon the idea of a perfect disjunctive judgment. A 
perfect disjunctive judgment (which is the basis of our idea of community) is infinite in 
the sense that each term in the disjunction is (transcendentally) affirmative.   In an 
imperfect disjunctive judgment (the basis of our category of community) some of the 
terms are (transcendentally) negative. The judgment “x is either mortal or not-mortal’ is 
imperfect in this sense. This helps us understand why although everything in space is 
subject to the category of community, nothing appearing in space can be experienced as 
being a member of an intelligible world (community). We never experience space itself, 
but always only a part of space. All spatial experience, then, involves an awareness that 
there is some space that is not being experienced, that the space we are experiencing is a 
particular space. Whenever we experience anything in space we are aware that there is 
some (surrounding) space that we are not experiencing that limits the space we are 
experiencing. We do this, Kant believes, by thinking of the space we are experiencing as 
a member of a community of spaces, for the relation between spaces is a logical relation. 
However, this judgment is always imperfect, for it is an irreducible aspect of spatial 
experience that we judge that: “the whole of space is either present to me or not present 
to me”. We are aware that the part of space we are intuiting is part of space as a whole 
through such an imperfect disjunctive judgment. This is what lies behind Kant's claim 
that “the general concept of spaces in general rests merely on limitations”, for a limitation 




(8c) The Distinction Between the Ideas of a Real and an Ideal 
Community 
 
The idea of a community is the idea of a whole, the parts (or members) of which are 
simple and logically prior to the whole and which mutually limit or resist one another. 
We can, however, distinguish between our ideas of a real and an ideal community. This 
difference can be explained in terms of the distinction Kant draws between a real and an 
ideal whole. The difference between these two types of whole has to do with the nature of 
the unity of the whole. A real whole is, in scholastic terminology, a unum per se, whereas 
an ideal whole is merely a unum per accidens. Kant believes that a composite individual 
can only be a real whole if the individuals that constitute the whole are the source of the 
unity of the whole. Our idea of a real community, then, is the idea of a real whole, the 
parts (or members) of which are simple and logically prior to the whole and which 
mutually limit or resist one another. 
 
Thus, Kant explains in his lectures on metaphysics of 1790-1 that, 
Substances are the matter of the world, the formal aspect of the world 
consists in their connection <nexu> and indeed in a real connection <nexu 
reali>. The world is thus a real whole <totum reale>, not ideal. 
(Metaphysik L2. 28:581) 
 
Our idea of a world is the idea of a real as opposed to an ideal whole. Elsewhere 
in the same lectures, Kant is a bit more explicit about this distinction. He argues 
that, 
The connection <nexus> is ideal if I merely think the substances together, 
and real if the substances actually stand in interaction <commercio>. // 
The form of the world is a real connection <nexus realis> because it is a 
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real whole <totum reale>. For if we have a multitude of substances, then 
these must also stand together in a connection, otherwise they would be 
isolated. Isolated substances, however, never constitute a whole <totum>, 
then they must also be a real whole <totum reale>. For were they ideal, 
then surely they could be represented in thought as a whole <totum>, or 
the representations of them would constitute a whole <totum>; but things 
in themselves would still not constitute a whole on this account. 
(Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:851) 
 
An ideal whole is a whole that can be “represented in thought” as a whole. In such a 
whole the unity only exists in the mind of the observer. In a real whole, in contrast, the 
unity must be intrinsic to the whole. Although Kant himself does not explicitly make this 
claim, I suggest that what this means is that the individuals that constitute the whole must 
be responsible for the unity of the whole. In the case of a community, what unifies the 
whole are laws, and so the individuals must be thought of a the source of these laws 
which provide the community with its unity. In the following chapter I shall examine the 




To summarize: The idea of a community is the idea of a whole, the parts (or members) of 
which are simple and logically prior to the whole and which mutually limit or resist one 
another. We can, however, distinguish between our ideas of a real and an ideal 
community. This difference can be explained in terms of the distinction Kant draws 
between a real and an ideal whole. Our idea of a real community, then, is the idea of a 
real whole, the parts (or members of which are simple and logically prior to the whole 
and which mutually limit or resist one another.  
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A real community is a is a real whole whose parts are simple but connected. As a real 
whole it is an individual (in the sense of being a unum per se) whose parts/members are 
individuals. As a result something might fail to be a real community if: (a) It is an 
individual but its parts are not themselves really individuals. Or: (b) Its parts/members are 
really individuals but it is not itself really an individual. The phenomenal ‘world’ fails to 
be a real community (or world) for the first reason. The idea of a ‘world’ of isolated 







 The Civil Condition as a Real Community: 
An Analysis of Kant’s Ontology of Property in the 
Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals 
 
In this concluding chapter I will attempt to bring together a number of claims made in the 
two halves of this dissertation. In the first part of the dissertation I argued that the idea of 
a good will or autonomous individual is the idea of a member of an ideal community, and 
that to be virtuous is to strive to be such an individual. In the second part I argued that for 
Kant the pure idea of a community is the idea of a real whole the members (or parts) of 
which are simple and logically prior to the whole and which mutually limit or resist one 
another. I also argued that such resistance is necessary for interaction between 
individuals. In this chapter I will argue that Kant believes that our idea of a political 
community governed by juridical laws (or what Kant often calls the “civil condition”) is 
the idea of a community in this sense. Indeed, I suggest that Kant believes that the only 
way we can conceive of a real community is as a political community. If I am right then 
Kant believes that the idea of a kingdom of ends is the idea of an ideal political 




The bulk of this chapter is devoted to examining Kant's arguments in the Doctrine of 
Right of the Metaphysics of Morals. This is a long and complicated text, and so at most 
all I can offer in such a short space is the outline of a strategy for reading it. I should note 
at this point that I believe that in the Doctrine of Right Kant is attempting to do two very 
different things. On the one hand he is attempting to describe the principles of an ideal 
political community. On the other hand he believes that we should not only strive to be 
potential members of such a ideal (holy) community but that we should strive, in so far as 
it is possible, to bring the societies we live in closer to this ideal. As a result of this, his 
second goal in the Doctrine of Right is to examine to what degree, and how, human 
communities can be brought closer to this ideal, for Kant believes that it is impossible for 
human societies to instantiate this ideal (at least without divine intervention). In other 
words, I suggest that Kant often shifts between attempting to describe the principles of an 
ideal political community as such, and the principles of an ‘ideal’ human community. 
Kant is working in the natural law tradition185, and one could say that he believes that an 
ideal community of rational beings would be governed by natural law, whereas an ‘ideal’ 
human community can only be governed by positive law, and that because of the 
imperfections of our natures positive law is necessarily distinct from natural law. 
Although a thorough discussion of the relationship between natural law and positive law 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worth pointing out at this juncture. For it lays 
behind my general strategy for reading the Doctrine of Right. In what follows I attempt to 
explain Kant's account of an ideal political community, that is a community governed by 
principles of natural right and law and my general strategy for explaining those passages 
                                                 
185 For a convincing illustration of this see Gregor (1993). 
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that seem to contradict my interpretation would be to argue that in these passages Kant is 
talking about an (ideal) human society, a society governed by positive statutory, as 




I have argued that Kant argues: (a) An individual a acts upon another individual b if a 
withdraws some impediments which allows a change to occur in b. According to this 
model of action, the patient is the ground of both determinations, but the agent is the 
ground of the change of determinations. (b) Real interaction is only possible between 
members of a real community. And, (c) a real community is only possible if each 
individual member of the community has ‘given’ the laws that unify the community.  
 
This account of interaction is highly abstract. In this chapter I will offer a concrete 
illustration. Kant's account of property in the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysical of 
Morals is based upon an analysis of the ideal of “the civil condition” and I will show that 
Kant conceives of the ideal of a “civil condition” as community understood in these 
terms, and that his account of property (and in particular his account of the transferal of 
property) has to be read in the context of his metaphysical analysis of interaction and the 
idea of community. 
 
Showing that Kant believes that our idea of the civil condition is based upon the idea of a 
community is the weak thesis of this chapter. Even if I only manage to convince the 
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reader of this, I believe I would have demonstrated something interesting. Ultimately, 
however, in this chapter I wish to argue for a much stronger thesis. Namely, the claim 
that Kant believes that our pure idea of community is the idea of an ideal civil condition. 
In other words, I will argue that Kant believes that the only way we can conceive of a 
community is as a civil community. In arguing this I am rejecting Korsgaard’s influential 
interpretation of Kant's project. For, in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends she argues that 
Kant conceives of the kingdom of ends as a non-political community, analogous to an 
ideal community of friends. I argue, in contrast, that the idea of a kingdom of ends is the 
pure idea of a community and that Kant believes that the only pure idea of a community 
we possess is the idea of a civil condition, and that this is the idea of a political 
community governed by juridical laws. Juridical laws are laws that assign rights and 
corresponding duties. Such laws are coercive, Kant believes, in that the possession of a 
right always implies duties in others. If I have a legitimate right to something I can 
legitimately demand that others do not interfere with my possession of it. In other words, 
juridical laws are coercive, in that that they permit individuals to legitimately resist one 
another, for juridical laws assign legitimate rights, and to have a legitimate right is to be 
empowered by a law to resist another individual in their use of an object. Now, given 
Kant's belief that the only way one individual can act upon another is by withdrawing 
resistance, the only type of laws that can be the basis of interaction are juridical laws. 
Only such laws, then, can be the basis of a community in which there could be any 
interaction. In addition juridical laws are the only type of laws that create reciprocal 
relations between individuals, and a community can only be unified if the relations 
 283 
between the members of the community are reciprocal. As a result, we cannot even 
conceive of a community of individuals in interaction that is not a civil community.  
 
In contrast to Korsgaard, and to Swedenborg, who conceived of heaven as a community 
of spirits governed by laws of love, Kant, at least by the 1780s, maintains that it is 
impossible for us to even conceive of a community governed solely by laws of 
benevolence or laws of love. This is not to say that Kant denies that we have a duty of 
benevolence, it is just that he believes that benevolence itself is only possible in the 
context of a civil condition.186 The reason he believes this is because he does not believe 
in any natural property, instead he believes that property is only intelligible in the context 
of a system of juridical laws and corresponding legitimate rights, and as a consequence of 
this he believes that without such a system of laws no one would be able to possess 
anything that they were capable of giving. Thus he claims in his lectures that that, “If all 
men were willing to act from benevolence merely, there would be no ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ 
at all, and the world would be a stage, not of reason, but of inclination”  (Ethik Collins, 
27:416). The idea of a community governed purely by laws of benevolence with no laws 
determining rightful ownership, then, is not an idea of reason. The idea of such a 
community is self-contradictory, because no one would have anything they could 
legitimately give187 and no one would be able to act intelligibly upon anyone else because 
there would be no intelligible resistance to withdraw.  
 
                                                 
186 This claim will be modified later in this chapter. But it will do for now. 
187 And no one would be able to receive. 
 284 
If my interpretation is correct it implies a radical re-evaluation of the relationship 
between the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. On the standard reading of 
Kant's moral philosophy his ethics is more basic than his ‘political philosophy’. Thus 
Rosen (1993) remarks that, “for a long time it was fashionable to regard Kant's political 
writings as minor works” (p.1). If I am correct, however, Kant's political philosophy 
stands at the heart of his ethics because the idea of a kingdom of ends is, and can only be, 
conceived of as a political community governed by juridical laws.188 For this reason 
Kant's ethics is based upon his so called ‘political philosophy’, for his doctrine of rights 
provides his ethics with its content. This is why the Doctrine of Right precedes the 
Doctrine of Virtue, for to be virtuous is to strive to be a member of an ideal political 
community governed by laws of right. 
 
In chapter one I explained Kant's distinction between virtue and holiness and argued that 
although (the possibility of) virtue is the ratio cognoscendi of holiness, holiness is the 
ratio essendi of virtue, for what it is to be virtuous is to strive for holiness. In this chapter 
I will argue that Kant believes that the principle of right should be regarded as a principle 
of holiness. What I mean by this is that the principle of right, unlike the principle of 
virtue, is a principle that can govern rational beings as such (including holy beings), and 
not merely beings such as us who have a sensuous nature.189 As a result of this the 
                                                 
188 Kant's political philosophy provides his ethics with its content, or, at least, with most of its content. 
Later in this chapter I shall discuss the duty of benevolence, which, Kant believes is a purely ethical duty.  
189 Thus Kant explains in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, that the concept of (ethical) duty is the 
concept of “necessitation” or “constraint” and that “such constraint. . . does not apply to rational beings as 
such (there could also be holy ones) but rather to human beings, rational natural beings, who are unholy 
enough that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law even though they recognize its authority; and 
even when they do obey the law, they do it reluctantly (in the face of opposition from their inclinations), 
and it is in this that such constraint properly consists” (6:379-80). But he adds in a footnote that, “as a 
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principle of right should be regarded as the ratio essendi of the principle (or, as we shall 
see, principles) of virtue.190  
 
In the Groundwork Kant begins by examining our everyday understanding is what it is to 
be virtuous in order to discover what it is the virtuous person is striving to be, and he 
reaches the conclusion that the virtuous person is striving to be a member of an ideal 
kingdom of ends. In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant goes in the other direction, starting 
by examining the principle of right before examining the principle of virtue. The 
principle of virtue is a principle that is not applicable to holy beings, for to be virtuous is 
to strive towards holiness and so, by definition, a holy being could not be virtuous. The 
Doctrine of Virtue (and the principles and duties of virtue), then, are only applicable to 
sensuous agents, such as human beings. In the Doctrine of Right, however, Kant is not 
(primarily) attempting to describe an ideal human community, but an ideal civil 
condition; the principle of right, then, is supposed to presents us with a principle of 
morality that is valid for all rational beings. The doctrine of virtue, on the other hand, 
examines how this moral ideal presents itself to imperfect beings such as we are: beings 
with needs, who can only experience ourselves as existing in space and time.  
 
Thus, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains that, “for finite holy beings (who 
could never be tempted to violate duty) there would be no doctrine of virtue but only a 
                                                                                                                                                 
moral being [a human being] is also holy enough to break the moral law reluctantly” (ibid. – my bolding 
throughout). 
190 The principle of right can be called a principle of holiness, for it is a principle that could govern an ideal 
community of holy beings. The principle of virtue, in contrast, is a principle only applicable to imperfect 
beings such as we are, beings who can, at the most, only strive towards holiness. 
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doctrine of morals” (6:383). As Kant normally contrasts the doctrine of virtue with the 
doctrine of right, this passage suggests that he regards the doctrine of right as a doctrine 
of morals that is applicable to rational beings as such, including “finite holy beings”. I 
argue, then, that the doctrine of right should be regarded as providing an account of the 
nature of the laws that could govern a (political) community of finite holy beings. We 
have a duty to become a member of such a (political) community, and the doctrine of 
virtue is an account of what is involved in striving to be a member of such a community 
for creatures such as we are. Kant makes it clear that he conceives of the kingdom of ends 
as an ideal state in the Religion, where he claims that, 
The teacher of the Gospel manifested the Kingdom of God on earth to his 
disciples only from its glorious, edifying and moral side, namely in terms 
of the merit of being citizens of a divine state; and he instructed them as 
to what they had to do, not only that they attain to it themselves, but that 
they be united in it with others of like mind, and if possible with the whole 
human race. (6:135 – my emphasis) 
 
Kant is conceiving of the kingdom of ends in terms of a divine state, and the principle of 
right is the principle that governs such a state. The principle of virtue tells us what 
creatures like ourselves need to do to be worthy of being members of such a state.191 In 
this chapter I will attempt to justify these claims.  
 
                                                 
191 In fact I think things are slightly more complicated than this, for the doctrine of right has both a pure and 
a impure part. The pure part of the doctrine of right examines the general principle of right. This is a 
principle that would govern an ideal civil condition. The impure part examines how we can attempt to 
make this world we live in closer to the ideal civil condition. The doctrine of virtue, then, has to do with 
what we have to do to become worthy of becoming members of such a state ourselves. The impure part of 
the doctrine of right has to do with how we can go about uniting the whole human race into such a state. 
That is, with what is involved in attempting to bring our actual political condition closer to the ideal. A 
virtuous man will strive for this. So we have a particular duty to try to improve the political situation here 
and now. So the impure part of the doctrine of right is subordinated to the doctrine of virtue; It only has to 
do with morality because we have a duty to try and do this.     
 287 
(9b) – The Ontology of Property  
 
Two types of interaction involving property 
  
Recognizing that Kant conceives of the ideal of a civil condition as the idea of a real 
community, derived from the category of community, helps us understand Kant's account 
of property. In particular, it helps us to understand Kant's account of interactions between 
individuals involving property. At first sight it looks as if individuals can interact in two 
ways with regard to property: they can assert rights against one another, and property 
rights can be transferred from one individual to another. Ultimately, however, both of 
these types of property interaction are to be analyzed in similar terms. In the course of his 
discussion of property, then, Kant seems to describe  two types of interaction, both of 
which are to be understood as conforming to the model of interaction Kant developed in 
his metaphysical work. 
 
First, the mere fact of ownership is the basis of a form of interaction. Asserting a right 
against another person is to act upon her intelligibly. The fact that I own a particular 
object allows me to act upon you, for it permits me to legitimately demand that you desist 
from using it. Kant argues that property rights, and hence ownership as opposed to mere 
possession, are only possible in a civil condition. In other words, Kant believes that 
ownership is only possible in a community governed by laws. He makes it clear that 
when he talks of the civil condition he is not talking about some actually existing political 
community, but to an ideal of a community governed by laws. These laws are the basis of 
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legitimate rights and they have to be given (in the sense of being consented to) by each 
member of the community. Every time one claims a right and demands that it be 
recognized and respected by others, one is implicitly asserting the existence and validity 
of such a system of laws.  It is only the existence of an (ideal) system of juridical laws, 
consented to by each member of the community, that allows one individual to act upon 
another by asserting her right against the other.192  
 
Second, when two individuals engage in a property transaction, they interact. In everyday 
language we talk of the ‘transferal’ of property rights, and this language seems to rest 
upon a crude influctionist conception of interaction, for it suggests that a property right is 
the sort of thing that can ‘flow’ from one individual into another.  When I buy a painting 
from you it looks like a right that used to be yours becomes mine, as if a right is the sort 
of thing that can be transferred. If, however, like Kant, we reject the coherency of the 
crude influctionist conception of interaction we have to reconceptualize what is involved 
in such a ‘transferal’; we must be able to cash out what is involved in the ‘transferal’ in 
non-influctionist terms.  One must read Kant's account of the ‘transferal’ of property with 
his rejection of a crude influctionist model of interaction in mind. Kant's alternative 
account of property transfers is based upon his account of action and interaction 
developed in his metaphysical works. He will argue that the ‘transferal’ of property rights 
is only possible if both parties constitute a community (or common will) and the ‘giver’ 
withdraws resistance to a claim that the recipient is actively asserting.  
                                                 
192 Although Kant argues that human positive laws are legitimate if they could be consented to, in an ideal 
community the members of the community must actually will the laws. When Kant claims that the criterion 




Kant stresses the importance of simultaneity in property transactions. He rejects the idea 
that in the transferal of property there is first an offer followed by an acceptance of the 
offer. Instead Kant argues that the offer and acceptance must be simultaneous.193 In 
arguing that offer and acceptance must be ‘simultaneous’ Kant is arguing that at the 
moment of ‘transferal’ the two parties must have a common [Gemeinsam] will.194 If a 
transferal of property is to occur the giver and recipient must consent to a common set of 
laws governing property rights, and the recipient must actively assert a claim to the 
property while the giver must withdraw her resistance to this claim by simultaneously 
alienating her right.   
 
Kant maintains, then, that in all property exchanges the giver merely withdraws 
resistance to a claim of the receiver. This suggests that, in some sense, Kant believes that 
giving is impossible, for the most we can do is allow others to take; we cannot give to 
others in the sense of filling them with something. This may seem problematic if we 
believe that ethics demand that we truly give to others. And Kant himself, as we shall see, 
believes that ethics, as opposed to the doctrine of right, demands that we give. Kant, 
however, does offer an account of what is involved in real giving. He believes that 
sometimes we have a (legal) duty to withdraw our resistance to the claim of others to an 
object. In such cases we are not really giving. We can, however, act beneficently if, 
                                                 
193 Thus Kant explains that in a legitimate property exchange, “both acts, promise and acceptance, are 
represented not as following upon one another but. . . as proceeding from a single common will (this is 
expressed by the word simultaneously.)” (6:273 – my emphasis). 
194 These claims should be read in the context of his theoretical analysis of simultaneity, for in the Third 
Analogy of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that the category of community is the basis of 
judgments of simultaneity. 
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without having a duty to do so, we withdraw our rightful claim to the use of an object, 




Kant would argue that many people’s political beliefs are based upon a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what is involved in the idea of property. Because we own ‘things’ it 
seems natural to assume that ownership is to be understood as a relationship between an 
individual and an object.  This is a fundamentally misguided way of conceptualizing 
ownership. For it does not explain what it is for someone to actually own something. To 
own something is to have a (legitimate) right to it. And to have a legitimate right to 
something is not to be understood in terms of the relationship between an individual and 
a thing owned, but instead is to be understood in terms of the ‘owner’s’ relation to other 
agents. To claim a right is to claim that others should recognize your possession and not 
interfere with your use of the object. It is to claim that others should not resist your use, 
and Kant believes that such a claim can be made against others who consent to the same 
set of property laws. 
 
Before we can explain what is involved in the transferal of property, we must understand 
what it is to actually possess property. Kant distinguishes between empirical possession 
and intelligible possession. To have a property right ultimately involves an intelligible 
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relationship.195 Such intelligible rights, however, are only possible in the civil condition, 
thus Kant claims that, “only in a civil condition can something external be mine or yours” 
(6:256).196 
 
Kant conceives of the (idea of a) civil condition in terms of the idea of community. It is 
the existence of laws (governing property for example) which make us members of a 
community. It is these laws which ‘bind us’ together and make the community a 
community. The community is only a community if the laws are given (or consented to) 
by all members of the community. This, Kant believes is the case in an (ideal) civil 
condition. Each member of the community consents to the laws of the community and it 
is the existence of these laws that makes property rights possible.  So, to begin with, the 
transferal of property assumes the existence of laws of property. In the Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant uses extremely Rousseauian language; he argues that, 
the rational title of acquisition can lie only in the idea of a will of all 
united a priori (necessarily to be united), which is here tacitly assumed as 
a necessary condition (conditio sine qua non); for a unilateral will cannot 
put others under an obligation they would not otherwise have. – But the 
condition in which the will of all is actually united for giving law is the 
civil condition. (6:264)  
 
                                                 
195 Thus Kant talks of “intelligible possession (possessio noumenon)”, and explains that property relations 
are “purely intellectual” (6:273). 
196 As the idea of a civil condition is an ideal that cannot be realized naturally (as it requires a belief in 
divine assistance) a consequence of this position is that in actually existing necessarily imperfect human 
communities property is also an ideal. Kant, however, believes that in such a communities we do have an 
(ethical) duty to respect the positive property rights that actually exist. His reasons for this are complicated, 
and his arguments not totally convincing. There seems no compelling reason why someone who buys into 
Kant's ontology of property should respect property rights in a society where many individuals do not have 
their needs met. Indeed, as we shall see, Kant himself believes that in such a society those in need have a 
right to demand assistance from the rich.   
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A few pages later Kant suggests that the possibility of ‘acting’ on another is dependent 
upon the existence of these system of laws. He argues that: 
My possession of another’s choice, in the sense of my capacity 
[Vermogen] to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed in 
accordance with laws of freedom (what is externally mine or yours with 
respect to the causality of another), is a right (of which I can have several 
against the same person or against others); but there is only a single sum 
(system of laws), contract right, in accordance with which I can be in this 
sort of possession. (6:271) 
 
The language here is very similar to the language he uses to explain action in his 
metaphysics lectures. There he argued that the agent must have a capacity to 
“determining the active power” of the patient. Here he claims that to have a right is to 
possess “a capacity to determine the choice of another”. And he argues that an individual 
can only possess such a capacity if there is a system of juridical laws and others (a) 
recognize and (b) affirm these laws. These laws are not physical laws but moral laws, the 
existence of which depends upon them being freely taken up by each individual member 
of the community. Kant explains that “my capacity to determine another’s choice by my 
own choices” is called a right and that it is the existence of juridical laws that makes 
rights possible and, as a consequence, allows one individual to act upon (“determine the 
choice of”) another. Laws that assign rights are called juridical (or coercive) laws. Such 
laws make interaction possible because they are the basis of resistance between 
individuals. In his ethical writings Kant repeatedly stresses that relation between such 
laws and the notion of resistance. For example, in his ethics lectures he argues that, 
The universal law of reason can alone be the determining ground of 
action, but this is the law of universal freedom; everyone has the right to 
promote this, even though he effects it by resisting the opposing freedom 
of another, in such a way that he seeks to prevent an obstruction, and thus 
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to further an intent.. . . The other, however, obstructs the action by his 
freedom; the latter I can curtail and offer resistance to, insofar as this is in 
accordance with the laws of coercion; so eo ipso I must thereby obstruct 
universal freedom by the use of my own. From this it follows that. . . the 
right to coerce the other consists in restricting his use of freedom, insofar 
as it cannot co-exist with universal freedom according to universal law; 
and this is the right of coercion. . . // Since nobody can exercise a right to 
coerce, who has not obtained a right thereto from a higher ground, which 
consists, however, in one’s own freedom and its congruence with the 
freedom of everyone according to universal law, it is clear that the right to 
coerce can only be derived from the Idea of law itself. // Within this 
universal moral law are comprehended both legal and ethical laws. . . 
(Ethik Vigilantius, 27:523 – my emphasis) 
 
We should read such passages bearing in mind Kant's account of action in his 
metaphysical work, for he believes that all action should be understood in terms of the 
withdrawal of resistance. Here Kant argues that that the right to coerce “consists in” 
(legitimately) resisting the freedom of others, and that such a right (i.e. the possibility of 
resistance) can only be derived from the “idea of law itself”. In other words in this 
passage Kant is suggesting that it is juridical laws that make resistance, and hence 
interaction, possible.  
 
Kant believes that such a system of laws is only possible in the civil condition, a 
condition in which, “the will of all is actually united for giving law” (6:264). Kant 
believes that we are duty bound to (attempt to) enter such a condition. It is only in the 
context of such a system of laws I can legitimately demand that another withdraws her 
resistance to my claim to an object, for without such system of laws there will be no 
resistance, but also no possession. For, as Kant claims, possession is intelligible and 
involves an “intellectual title, and,  
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this intellectual title is the basis of the proposition: “what I bring under my 
control in accordance with the laws of outer freedom and will to become 
mine becomes mine”. (6:274) 
 
Transferal of property 
 
Only if such a community (or civil condition) exists can an individual really own 
property and ‘transfer’ her property to another. In so doing individuals are able to act 
upon one another through mutual consent. The activity of the agent (giver) is the 
withdrawal of an impediment, the activity of the patient (receiver) is an active uptaking. 
In the transferal of property, then, a property right does not flow from the giver to the 
receiver. Rather, in the context of a commonly willed set of property laws, one party 
renounces a right while the other party simultaneously actively uptakes the right. Kant is 
very careful to make it clear that in the transferal of property there has to be more than 
merely the ‘abandoning’ or ‘renouncing’ of a right by the giver, and Kant’s reason for 
stressing this is his commitment to the principle of active inherence. For the receiver to 
really possess a right she has to be the active ground of the right. Thus Kant explains that 
transferal of property,  
is only possible [and I suggest that by ‘possible’ here Kant means 
‘conceivable’] through a common will by means of which the object is 
always under the control of one or the other, since as one gives up his 
share in the common undertaking [Gemeinschaft] the object becomes the 
other’s through his acceptance of it (and so by a positive act of choice.) 
Transfer of the property of one to another is alienation. An act of the 
united choice of two persons by which anything at all that belongs to one 
passes to the other is a contract. (6:271) 
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Just as, in general, a determination can only belong to a substance if the substance is the 
active ground of the determination, property can only belong to an individual if the 
individual is the active ground of the right. Acquiring a right to something is not 
something that can occur passively, instead one must actively asserting a claim, even in 
the case of receiving a gift. In an act of exchange, then, it is not as if the donor actively 
gives and the recipient passively receives. Instead, the receiver must be actively asserting 
a claim to an object and the donor merely withdraws her (legitimate) claim to it, 
withdrawing resistance to the recipient’s claim. This is why Kant stresses that the 
recipient must accept the property “by a positive act of choice”. 
 
We can now see how we can explain Kant's account of the transferal of property in terms 
of the language of his account of action in his metaphysics lectures. In chapter six I 
explained that (1) an object at rest has a mere capacity for motion; A ball being spun 
around a fixed point is moving in a circle. However at every particular moment it is 
striving to move in a straight line along a tangent; at every particular moment it (2) has a 
dead power to move in a straight line. If the sting is cut, the ball flies off along the 
tangent; the dead power has been allowed to (3) become a living power. 
 
Applying this terminology to Kant's account of property, we can say that (1) the existence 
of a system of juridical laws makes possible the existence of a capacity to own an object, 
that (2) a mere claim on the part of an individual is like a dead power, and that (3) a right 
is like a living power. In alienating her right the giver withdraws resistance to the 
recipient’s claim to be allowed legitimate use of an object, in so doing the giver allows a 
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dead power in the recipient (the claim) to become a living power (a right). If, however, 
there was no assertion of a claim by the recipient there would be nothing the giver to do 
to make an object in her possession the property of anyone else. 
 
In the legal sense all commissive acts are really omissive 
 
Such considerations lie behind Kant’s claim that in the legal sense, strictly speaking all 
commissive acts are really omissive. Kant explains this in his lectures on ethics. He 
argues that, 
It must be noted. . . that all coercive or juridical laws are prohibitive, and 
rely on the principle of not withholding from the other what belongs to 
him (neminem laede). (For the fact that both commissive and omissive 
actions are equally necessary for the performance of actions in a physical 
sense, makes no difference, since all commissive actions are omissive, in 
sensu juris.) (Ethik Vigilantius, 27:512) 
 
Thus although on the phenomenal level an act, such a paying a debt, may appear to be an 
action on the part of the debtor197, on the legal level all that is happening is that the debtor 
is allowing his creditor to use what is legally hers. In paying back the loan, the debtor has 
not really given his creditor anything. Kant believes that such an analysis can be applied 
to all property transactions and not merely to cases of repaying a debt. Thus he explains 
that, 
I cannot give the other anything – he already has what belongs to him; . . . 
you are to leave the other his own, take nothing, abstain from all actions 
whereby you would detract from his rights. (27:512)  
 
                                                 
197 “In terms of physical forces [i.e. on the phenomenal level], the payment of a debt is nothing else but an 
action commissiva” (27:512). 
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From the legal (juridical) perspective, then, Kant believes that it is impossible to really 
“give” anything to anyone. It is easy to see how such an analysis can be applied to 
repayments of debts and to exchanges of property, but what about acts of charity?  In 
what sense can the giving of a gift be thought of as act of omission?  To understand 
Kant’s attitude towards the gift, we need to look at his account of beneficence and his 
distinction between right and ethics. For Kant believes that while all obligations “founded 
on  [the] principle [juris] are negative. Right, however, differs from ethics, which tells us 
to give” (27:512). 
 
Kant’s ultimate opinion will be that even gift-giving must also be understood as omissive, 
and that such benevolent behavior is only possible in the context of a juridical 
community. For gift-giving is only possible within a political community in which there 
exists legally defined property rights. If such a community did not exist I would not be 
able to give anything (as nothing would be rightfully mine to give) and the recipient of 
the gift would not be able to receive anything (nothing could ever become rightfully 
hers). I can only ‘give’ the recipient something that the laws of this community says is 
rightfully mine, and something the laws say that the recipient can potentially have a right 
to. The recipient of the gift must assert his potential right and I must renounce my actual 
right. The difference between repaying a debt and giving a gift is not that debt-repaying is 
omissive whereas gift giving is commissive,  but that in the case of repaying a debt the 
debtor has a (strict) duty to renounce his right whereas in the case of beneficence the gift-
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giver does not have a duty (or at least does not have a strict duty) to renounce his right.198 
Beneficence, then, is only possible in the context of a civil condition. Thus, although we 
have an ethical duty to be beneficent, Kant believes that it is only possible to exercise 
such a duty in the context of a civil condition governed by juridical laws. Thus he claims 
that, “If all men were willing to act from benevolence merely, there would be no ‘mine’ 
and ‘thine’ at all, and the world would be a stage, not of reason, but of inclination”  
(Ethik Collins, 27:416).199 
 
(9c) – The Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue 
 
The principium juris and principium ethicum 
 
The Metaphysics of Morals is divided into a Doctrine of Virtue and a Doctrine of Right. 
And this may suggest that Kant postulates two distinct kinds of obligation: juridical 
obligations and ethical obligations. Further support for such a distinction is provided by 
the fact that Kant often distinguishes between ethical duties and legal duties (or duties of 
right).200 And, especially in his lectures, he makes a distinction between juridical laws 
and ethical laws. This suggests that we have two distinct ideas of community: the idea of 
                                                 
198 Kant is not always consistent about this. For example, Vigilantius writes in his lecture notes that, 
“professor Kant maintains that in the state, a poor man has gained the right to demand support from the 
wealthy; for if it were left to his unrestricted choice, it would be perfectly open to him to earn so much for 
himself that he could make provisions for hard times” (Ethik Vigilantius, 27:540). This suggests that the 
poor have a right to be supported by the rich in a state, and so that in a state the rich have a coercive duty to 
show beneficence towards the poor.  
199 The only gift I can really give the other is the gift of consenting to a community in which such rights are 
possible. In other words, the only gift I can really give is my own autonomy which is the basis of the 
political community. 
200 Explaining in his ethics lectures that, “law is the totality of all our compulsory duties (leges strictae). 
Ethics, the totality of all non-compulsory duties” (Ethik Mrongovius, 29:620). 
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a political community governed by juridical laws and the idea of an ethical community 
governed by ethical/moral laws. Although there are passages that support such an 
interpretation, ultimately Kant does not think that the difference between the juridical and 
the ethical has to do with content, for he believes that the idea of a purely ethical (as 
opposed to juridical) community is unintelligible.  
 
In saying this I disagree with commentators such as Rosen (1993), who argues that 
“juridical duties are a proper subset of ethical duties” (p.88); I also reject the position that 
‘ethical duties’ and ‘juridical duties’ should be understood as two species of a single 
genus. Instead, I argue that juridical duties and ethical duties are radically different types 
of things; the word ‘duty’ is being used in a different sense in these two phrases.201 
Juridical duties are merely the correlative of juridical rights. To have a juridical duty is 
merely to recognize that another individual has a legitimate right. Juridical duties are not 
to be understood in terms of necessitation. There is nothing contradictory in the idea of a 
holy being (that is a being not subject to necessitation) recognizing and respecting the 
rights of others. The notion of juridical duty has nothing to do with motivation. Ethical 
duty, on the other hand, essentially has to do with motivation. To do ones duty, in the 
ethical sense, is to be motivated in a certain way. Ethical obligations are only possible for 
beings such as ourselves whose sensuous nature means that our inclinations sometimes 
conflict with what we recognize as right. To be juridically obligated is not defined in 
terms of being (ethically) necessitated to do something, although for sensuous beings 
such as ourselves juridical duties are (ethical) obligations that often conflict with our 
                                                 
201 In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant himself at times seems to try to draw a distinction between (juridical) 
duties and (ethical) obligation. See, for example, 6:383. 
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sensuous needs. Although Kant often talks of ethical duties in the plural, ultimately there 
is only one ethical duty, the categorical imperative, and particular ethical duties are 
merely aspects of this single duty. There is, however, a real plurality of juridical duties, 
for every right asserted implies a corresponding duty in others. Our ethical duty is to 
strive to be a (potential) member of a kingdom of ends. This pure idea is our ethical ideal, 
and ethical duties are an aspect of the schematization of this ideal.202 In other words, 
Kant's taxonomy of ethical duties (plural) is an attempt to describe how the ideal of being 
a member of a kingdom of ends imposes itself on beings with sensuous natures such as 
we are. The idea of a kingdom of ends is the idea of a community of individuals that have 
rights and respect each others rights. As such it is the idea of a community of individuals 
who have juridical duties, although, as we have seen, it is not the idea of a community 
whose members are ethically obligated. 
 
To understand Kant’s account of the relationship between the ethical and the juridical we 
need to look at how he explains the distinction between the principium juris and the 
principum ethicum.  Vigilantius writes in his lecture notes that,  
professor Kant locates the supreme principum juris in the limitation of 
anyone’s freedom, through reason, to the condition that the freedom 
of each concur with the freedom of everyone, according to universal 
law. He deduces from this, as a corollarium, the authorization to resist, or 
a right of coercion, insofar as the freedom of the other’s action would 
violate the supreme principle of right, i.e., that the other’s freedom would 
                                                 
202 I am suggesting here that pure ideas, like categories, can be schematized, although ideas can only be 
schematized practically, whereas categories can be schematized theoretically. Categories can be applied a 
priori to intuition because our faculty of intuition has an a priori form: space-time. A schematized category 
is the rule for the production of an image in pure intuition. Ideas can be applied a priori to desire (or 
willing) because our faculty of desire has an a priori form: to act upon maxims. A schematized idea is a rule 
for the production of a maxim. 
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infringe upon your freedom, which coincides with the freedom of 
everyone according to universal law.  (Ethik Vigilantius, 27:539) 
 
The principle of right, then, demands that we respect the legitimate rights of others, and 
that they respect our rights. Such rights can only exist in the context of a system of 
juridical laws. The ideal of a civil community is the idea of a community that is based 
upon juridical, or coercive, laws. This is not to say that it is the idea (à la Hobbes) of a 
community in which there must be some supreme coercive power. Rather, civil or 
juridical laws are coercive in the sense that they specify rights, and these rights “obligate 
others to a duty”.  In claiming this I am disagreeing with a common, if not the standard, 
account of the essential distinction between ethical and juridical laws. According to this 
approach, exemplified by Rosen (1993), who has written one of the few recent book-
length studies on Kant's theory of justice, is that, “what essentially distinguishes a duty of 
justice from an ethical duty is that the former are enforceable but the latter are not” 
(p.110).203 While it is true that Kant believes that ethical duties are not enforceable, 
enforceability cannot be the distinguishing feature of distinctly juridical duties (and 
rights) for Kant himself recognizes a class of juridical rights that are not enforceable, 
namely what he calls rights of equity. Rosen recognizes the problem this causes for his 
account, but the only solution he can provide is to suggest that Kant must be mistaken to 
include duties of equity amongst juridical duties. Rosen explains the problem in the 
following terms: 
Assuming that enforceable duties must correspond to enforceable rights, 
and that unenforceable duties must likewise correspond to enforceable 
rights, then all juridical rights should be enforceable, and hence narrow, 
                                                 
203 On this interpretation, juridical laws are coercive in that they are, or at least could be, enforced by a 
coercive power. 
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whereas all ethical rights should be unenforceable, and hence wide. // This 
conclusion is unavoidable. But it makes wide, unenforceable juridical 
rights impossible. (p.110) 
 
However, as Rosen acknowledges, the fact that Kant seems to draw the conclusion that 
unenforceable juridical rights are, by definition, impossible, this does “not prevent him 
from asserting their existence in the Rechtslehre” (ibid.). Kant then seems to contradict 
himself, and Rosen ultimately believes that the most charitable interpretation of Kant’s 
position is that he actually does contradict himself.204  
 
Rosen argues that Kant seems to allow for the possibility of unenforceable juridical rights 
in the Doctrine of Right, and what he has in mind are Kant's claims about equity and the, 
so called, right of necessity. Thus Kant argues that,  
An authorization to use coercion is connected with any right in the narrow 
sense (ius strictum). But people also think of a right in a wider sense (ius 
latium), in which there is no law by which an authorization to use coercion 
can be determined. There are two such true or alleged rights, equity and 
the right of necessity. (6:233-4) 
 
Although it can be argued that Kant rejects, as spurious, the so called right of 
necessity205, it seems clear that he regards rights of equity as genuine rights, albeit rights 
that cannot be enforced. Thus Kant continues by arguing that equity “admits right without 
coercion” (6:234) and he recognizes that this seems to contradict his own position, but he 
believes that the conflict is merely apparent and that the “ambiguity really arises from the 
                                                 
204 From Rosen’s perspective, one could avoid the contradiction either by arguing that equity rights are 
enforceable, or by arguing that they are not really juridical rights. 
205 Although I’m not sure he does actually regard the ‘right of necessity’ as spurious. He does argue that 
positive law cannot accept the right of necessity, but I believe that there are reasons to think that from the 
perspective of natural law we have a right to what we need. A discussion of this topic is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. 
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fact that there are cases in which a right is in question but for which no judge can be 
appointed to render a decision” (6:234). 
 
Kant, then, seems to suggest that equity provides us with examples of genuinely juridical 
rights that, in principle, cannot be enforced because it is impossible to appoint a judge 
who could legitimately enforce them. If Kant is serious about this commitment, then 
enforceability cannot be the defining characteristic of juridical laws and duties. I believe 
that Kant is serious here, and, as an alternative to the position that the distinguishing 
feature of juridical laws is that they are enforceable, I suggest that the essential difference 
between justice (Recht) and ethics is that justice has to do with rights, whereas ethics 
does not. In other words I agree with Fletcher (1987), who argues that in the strict sense 
there are no ethical rights. On this interpretation, the defining characteristic of a 
juridical (as opposed to an ethical) law is that a juridical law assigns rights. A right gives 
one a moral claim against another. Such claims are recognizable by reason, in the sense 
that they can be recognized by the court of conscience as legitimate, but they are not, 
however, necessarily enforceable by an externally appointed judge.   
 
There are textual problems for this interpretation, for there are passages in which Kant 
seems to explicitly define the defining characteristic in terms of enforceability. My 
general strategy for dealing with such passages is to argue that in such passages Kant is 
giving an account of the defining characteristic of positive juridical law, and not of 
juridical law as such. In other words, I suggest that Kant believes that, although it is a 
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defining feature of human justice (and positive juridical laws) that rights must be 
enforceable by an (external) judge, this is not a defining feature of justice as such. 
 
 
On my interpretation, then, a juridical law is a law that specifies rights, and as Kant 
explains in his ethics lectures, 
the right to coerce the other consists in restricting his use of freedom, 
insofar as it cannot co-exist with universal freedom according to universal 
law; and this is the right of coercion. (Ethik Vigilantius, 7:521)  
 
All rights are coercive because to claim a legal right implies some duties in others. For 
me to claim a right is to demand that others respect my right and not interfere with (or 
resist) my use of an object. The only basis for this demand can be an appeal to a common 
set of shared juridical laws. These laws must be such that they impose duties upon us as a 
result of granting legitimate rights to others. For each legitimate right granted implies a 
duty in others to respect the right.206 Juridical duties, then, are duties that are based upon 
the (asserted) rights of others. Juridical laws specify in what situations I may legitimately 
assert a right, and if I choose to assert such a right I create a juridical duty in others. This 
is one reason why such laws can serve as the basis of real interaction, for through 
asserting a (legitimate) right to an object one produces an intelligible change in others. 
 
Kant contrasts the principium juris with the principum ethicum. The principle of ethics 
has both a formal and a material  aspect. Formally, the principle of ethics is to:  
                                                 
206 This is why only juridical duties are enforceable through coercion. For a law is only enforceable through 
coercion if it implies specific duties in others. 
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Act according to law for the law’s sake, or do your duty from duty. Act, 
that is, not only according to the law’s imperative, but perform the act 
also, merely because the motive of the action is the law itself. (Ethik 
Vigilantius, 27:541) 
  
This formal principle allows us to distinguish (conceptually) between the legality and the 
morality of an action. An action may be in conformity to the law, but will not be a moral 
or virtuous action if it is done for the wrong reasons. Only an action performed by 
someone who has a principled character can be moral as well as legally correct. Kant, 
however, argues that in addition to this purely formal principum ethicum, there is a 
principium ethices, “which is material, since it itself determines the action that is to be 
done” (ibid.). This material principle is material in the sense that it allows us to 
distinguish between the ethical and the juridical not merely in terms of the motivation of 
the agent, but also in terms of content of the action. This material principle, then, seems 
to imply a distinct set of purely ethical (as opposed to juridical) duties. In his lectures, 
Kant explains that this principle runs: “Act so towards other men, that you can will that 
the maxim of your action might become a universal law” (ibid.), and he adds: 
Here, then, the object is not universal freedom, but will in relation to the 
universal will. The universal will consists in the universal end of all men, 
and is called love for others, the principle of well-wishing, directed to the 
universal end of happiness. (ibid.)  
 
Ethically, then, we have a duty to care for the well-being and happiness of all men. Kant 
calls this the duty of beneficence.207 The juridical principle, then, is merely negative, it 
merely tells us that we are to “leave the other his own, take nothing, [and] abstain from 
                                                 
207 In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant explains that the duty of beneficence is not a duty to love others in 
the sense of having a certain feeling towards them (a duty to have a feeling is, Kant believes, “absurd”), 
rather it is a duty to love others practically: “To do good to other human beings insofar as we can is a duty, 
whether one loves them or not” (6:402). 
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all actions whereby you would detract from his rights” (27:512). This principle tells us to 
renounce a claim to an object only if another individual has a legitimate right to it. The 
(material) ethical principle tells us to renounce our claims to some objects even if another 
individual does not have a legitimate claim to them. As we shall see, however, Kant 
believes that all such ethical duties (of benevolence) can, or at least should, be reduced to 
juridical duties. The reason this is possible is that from the perspective of natural law 
individuals have a right to what they need, although no system of human, positive laws 
can accept such rights. Although the right of necessity cannot be incorporated into a 
system of positive laws and be enforced by an external court, it is recognized by the court 
of conscience as a genuine right. The person in need cannot, Kant believes, appeal to a 
public court to alleviate his need. He can, however, appeal to the court of conscience, and 
this court can recognize that he has a genuine right, although a right that cannot be 
recognized, in principle, by positive law. Although, from the perspective of positive law, 
acting benevolently towards others is not to be understood in terms of respecting their 
rights, from the perspective of natural law, the law that governs the court of conscience, it 
is to be understood in terms of the recognition of rights. 
 
(9d) The Idea of a Kingdom of Ends is the Idea of a Political 
State and Not the Idea of a ‘Community of Friends’. 
 
Introduction – disagreements with Korsgaard and Hart. 
 
When I first read Kant I believed that Kant distinguished between the idea of an ethical 
community and that of a juridical (or political) community and I thought that the idea of 
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an ethical community was more basic, in the sense that ideally the juridical community 
would wither away and that, for Kant, an ideal state would be governed by purely ethical 
relations. In other words, I used to think that Kant's moral ideal was something like a 
community of friends. In her influential book, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Korsgaard 
(1996) seems to be conceiving of the kingdom of ends in such terms, arguing that the 
idea of a kingdom of ends is analogous to a community of friends as opposed to a 
political state. I now believe that Kant’s considered opinion is that the only conceivable 
type of community is a juridical or civil community, and that there are no distinct 
intelligible ethical rights or relations, although there are distinctly ethical duties. These 
purely ethical duties, however, are not intelligible, because they are not pure, for only 
impure sensuous beings with needs can have such duties, and so in our pure idea of a 
kingdom of ends there can be no notion of such ethical duties.  
 
To be virtuous is to take a certain attitude towards this ideal of a juridical community (or 
what Kant calls the civil condition), and the ethical duties Kant enumerates in the 
Doctrine of Virtue are duties that only apply to virtuous beings and not holy beings. As 
our idea of the kingdom of ends is the idea of a community of holy beings we do not (and 
cannot) think of ethical duties (or laws) as existing within such a kingdom, for we can 
only have ethical duties towards creatures with needs, and our ideal of a kingdom of ends 
is the intelligible idea of a kingdom of holy beings. In a kingdom of ends, then, there 
would be justice, but there could be no beneficence. The reason for this is that in such a 
kingdom there would be no need for beneficence, for our idea of such a kingdom is of a 
society in which every individual would be doing their duty gladly, and this is only 
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possible if all of their needs are met. However, we cannot be beneficent to beings who 
have no unmet needs. This is not to say that Kant regards beneficence as ethically 
unimportant, it is merely to make it clear why it is important. Beneficence is a virtue, and 
a, if not the, central virtue. But as a virtue it is only important for beings like ourselves 
who can only strive to be members of a community of rational beings, it is not part of our  
notion of what such an ideal rational community would be like, for our ideal of a rational 
community is the idea of a community the members of which are fully rational and in 
whom there can be no tension between their rationality and their needs. Acting, and being 
treated, beneficently is only important for imperfect beings such as ourselves who are 
subject to (apparently) non-rational needs.   
 
Although Kant believes that the only way we can think of a community is as one 
governed by juridical laws and that we cannot conceive of a community governed by 
purely ethical laws, he does believe that there are duties, the content of which is distinctly 
ethical. In claiming this I disagree with commentators such as Hart, who argues that 
Kant's distinction between justice and ethics can be explained solely in terms of 
motivation.  Thus Hart (1984) argues that the distinction Kant draws between “legal 
rules” and “morals” can be explained purely in terms of the fact that 
while legal rules only require “external” behavior and are indifferent to 
motives, intentions, or other “internal” accompaniments of conduct, 
morals on the other hand do not require any specific external actions but 
only a good will or proper intentions or motive. (p.252) 
 
On such an approach the principle of right (the principle that governs legal rules) tell us 
what to do, whereas the principle of ethics merely tells us how to it. The principle of right 
 309 
tells us to respect the rights of others in our actions; the principle of ethics, in contrast, 
tells merely that we should respect the rights of others out of duty (and not, say, merely 
out of rear of punishment).  This account of the distinction, however, fails to account for 
the distinction Kant draws between the purely formal principle of ethics, and what he 
calls the material principle of ethics. The formal principle of ethics has to do with one’s 
motive for obeying the law. The material principle, however, as we have seen, does 
require (specific) external actions that are not, and cannot, be mandated by juridical laws, 
for it demands that we act beneficently towards others. This duty of beneficence is, Kant 
believes, a purely ethical, rather than a juridical duty. The reason for this is because the 
duty of beneficence is not mandated by the rights of others. However, although we have a 
duty of beneficence, Kant believes that this duty is not intelligible, in the sense that it is a 
duty that would not, and could not, exist in an intelligible world or kingdom of ends.   
 
In the remainder of this chapter I will begin by examining and rejecting Korsgaard’s 
interpretation of the kingdom of ends as an non-political community, before moving on to 
the discuss in more detail Kant's distinction between the ethical and political (juridical), 
paying particular attention to the role of beneficence in his ethics. 
 
Korsgaard’s Position  
 
In chapter three we saw that Swedenborg conceives of heaven as an intelligible 
community governed by laws of love, or benevolence. Korsgaard seems to attribute a 
similar position to the mature Kant, arguing that he is conceiving of the kingdom of ends 
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as an “association created by love” rather than being based upon “the narrow relation of 
political justice”. In contrast, I have argued that the idea of a kingdom of ends should be 
understood as a juridical (or political) community, governed by laws of justice that allow 
individuals to assert rights which implicitly demand the respect of others. Although Kant 
believes that there are distinctly ethical duties he does not believe that the idea of a 
community or “association” based upon such duties is intelligible. Thus Kant would 
object to Korsgaard’s (1996) interpretation of his position.208 Korsgaard argues that, 
Kant thinks that justice is reciprocal coercion under a general will209, made 
necessary by geographic and economic association. . . When we share a 
territory we may have a dispute about rights. But I may enforce my rights 
against you only on the understanding that you may enforce your rights 
against me, and in this way we make a social contract and constitute 
ourselves a state. . . Friendship is a free and uninstitutionalized form of 
justice, where the association is created by love rather than geographical 
necessity, and regulated by mutual respect rather than reciprocal coercion. 
// But it is not merely the narrow relation of political justice, but rather the 
moral relation generally, that friendship mirrors. (p.192) 
 
Korsgaard continues by suggesting that the kingdom of ends should be regarded as an 
ethical community analogous to a community of friends, whose association is created by 
love rather than justice.  Korsgaard, then, maintains that justice is merely a requirement 
for beings subject to geographical necessity. Her reading of Kant, then, is diametrically 
                                                 
208 Kant makes his attitude towards the idea of friendship clear in his lectures on ethics. He explains that 
friendship is an idea not an ideal. (It should be noted that here Kant is not using ‘idea’ in its usual sense of 
“an idea of pure reason). And argues that, “so far as [a] maximum is a measure in regard to other, lesser 
qualities, such a measure is an idea; but in so far as it is a pattern for them, it is an ideal. If we now compare 
the affectionate inclination of people to one another, we find many degrees and proportions in regard to 
those who share out their love between themselves and others. . . The greatest love I can have for another is 
to love him as myself, for I cannot love anybody more than that. . . The idea of friendship enables us to 
measure friendship” (Ethik Collins, 27:423-4). Morality, in contrast, demands an ideal. Kant is insistent 
that the moral ideal is a pattern or archetype we can strive towards, it is not the idea of a maximum. The 
idea of a kingdom of ends, then, must be an ideal, and so cannot be the idea of a community of friends, for 
the idea of such a community is a maximum and not an ideal. 
209 Up until this point I believe Korsgaard is right, although I’m not sure that we would agree about what is 
meant by ‘coercion’ in this context.  
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opposed to mine, for she maintains, in effect, that the laws of love are intelligible whereas 
laws of justice are not, because the existence of such laws is (empirically) conditioned. 
They are empirically conditioned, Korsgaard suggests, because they can only exist given 
the empirical fact of scarcity of land. Korsgaard’s position implies that laws of justice, 
being dependent upon facts about geography, can only exist for (phenomenal) 
beings that are conceived of as essentially existing in space, for they are dependent upon 
irreducibly spatial features of the earth. In contrast, I argue that juridical duties are 
intelligible (we can understand them by appealing to our pure idea of community) 
whereas duties of benevolence are not intelligible, for we can only have such duties 
towards sensuous beings, towards individuals who have needs, and for whom ethics is a 
matter of necessitation. 
 
What is probably motivating Korsgaard’s reading here are Kant's remarks about 
possession of land in section 13 and onwards of the Doctrine of Right.210 Here Kant 
suggests that if the surface of the earth “were an unbounded plane, people could be so 
dispersed on it that they would not come into any community with one another, and 
community would not then be a necessary result of their existence on the earth” (6:263). 
Here Kant seems to suggest that property relations, and hence the laws of justice, are 
merely the consequence of a contingent geographical fact, namely that the earth is finite. 
Elsewhere in the Metaphysics of Morals, however, he argues that we have a duty to enter 
into a political state governed by laws of justice, and this implies that he believes that 
laws of justice are not necessary because of some contingent empirical fact, but are 
                                                 
210 Korsgaard herself points to 6:322 & 6:256 to justify her reading, but these passages make no mention of 
geography. She obviously has in mind Kant's remarks about possession of land. 
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necessitated by reason. Thus, for example, he argues that, “by the well-being of a state is 
understood. . . . that condition in which its constitution conforms most fully to principles 
of right [i.e., what Korsgaard calls “the narrow relation of political justice”]; it is that 
condition which reason, by a categorical imperative, makes it obligatory to strive 
after” (6:318 – my emphasis). This claim, which is clearly something Kant is committed 
to, suggests that laws of justice are not necessitated by contingent geographical facts, as 
Korsgaard suggests, but are demanded by reason. We have an ethical duty to enter into 
such a political state, and so the laws of justice are not necessitated by geographical facts, 
but by the categorical imperative.  
 
Kant's remarks about land are merely an attempt to show what is involved in the 
possession of phenomenal object, and are not a pure part of his account of intelligible 
possession.211 In other words, in making his claims about geography, Kant is trying to 
explain how our idea of a juridical community, and the corresponding idea of intelligible 
possession, can (and must) be applied to the phenomenal world.  The idea of property, 
however, is not merely applicable to possession of phenomenal, spatio-temporal objects; 
intelligible possession is to be understood in terms of possession of objects in general and 
is not limited to possession of objects considered phenomenally. Of course, we can have 
no positive contentful notion of a non-spatio-temporal object, but there is nothing 
contradictory in the concept of such an object, and so there is nothing contradictory in the 
                                                 
211 It should be pointed out that work needs to be done on the relationship between Kant's account of 
possession and his attempt to apply this to phenomenal possession. Any satisfactory reading of Kant's 
ethics must explain the relationship between our ideal of a civil condition and actually existing states and 
systems of laws. What is the relationship between the fact that ethics demands that we strive to be potential 
citizens in an ideal intelligible state, and the fact that we actually are members of (imperfect, phenomenal) 
states? A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
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idea of possession of such (non-spatio-temporal) objects. The fact that land is the sort of 
thing that can be owned is, Kant believed, due to the contingent fact that the surface of 
the earth is finite. If the earth were not finite, there could, and would, be no (juridical) 
laws governing the possession of land. This, however, does not imply that there could be 
no laws of justice if the surface of the earth were infinite. It merely implies that there 
would be no juridical laws governing the possession of land, not that there could be no 
justice.  
 
To conclude: morality is only a matter of virtue for beings like us who have a sensuous 
nature. As a consequence of this, duties of virtue, such as the duty of benevolence, are 
only duties for beings such as us and are not duties for what Kant calls rational beings as 
such. A community of holy beings cannot be conceive as subject to laws of benevolence 
or love. As Kant explains, 
Vices like virtues remain always human, and the maximum of evil, and 
of good, in devil and angel is merely an unattainable ideal. . . we are 
indebted to it for the picture of heaven and hell. (Ethik Vigilantius, 27:691 
– my emphasis) 
 
The idea of a kingdom of ends, however, is also an ideal; it is not the idea of a perfect 
human community. It is, Kant argues at the end of the Groundwork, “the idea of a pure 
world of the understanding as a whole of all intelligences, to which we ourselves belong 
as rational beings (though on the other side we are also members of the world of sense)” 
(4:463). As such an ideal, our idea of the kingdom of ends has to be such that 
membership is not limited to beings such as ourselves. We must be able to think of all 
conceivable “intelligences” as potential members of such a kingdom. Thus our idea of a 
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kingdom of ends must be one that makes it possible for us to conceive of a kingdom of 
holy beings as a kingdom of ends. However, holy beings can not be thought of as subject 
to laws of benevolence, for duties of benevolence (and hence laws of benevolence) are 
duties of virtue, and as a consequence are only duties for beings such as us who 
experience morality as necessitation, so we cannot conceive of the kingdom of ends as 
essentially governed by laws of benevolence or love. We can, however, conceive of holy 
beings as governed by laws of justice.212 Indeed, Kant seems to suggest that insofar as we 
think of ourselves as autonomous and members of a kingdom of ends we must think of 
ourselves as holy beings. Thus, in the Groundwork, he argues that the “better person” is 
“conscious of a good will” that “constitutes the law for his evil will as a member of the 
world of sense” (4:454-5). For such a person, “the moral “ought” is then his own 
necessary “will” as a member of an intelligible world [=kingdom of ends], and is thought 
by him as “ought” only insofar as he regards himself at the same time as a member of the 
world of sense” (4:455). Our will, insofar as we think of ourselves as a member of the 
kingdom of ends, then, is not subject to necessitation, and so cannot be thought of as 
subject to duties of virtue. Kant makes essentially the same point a page earlier. Here he 
explains the possibility of categorical imperatives in the following terms: 
Categorical imperatives are possible by this: that the idea of freedom 
[=autonomy] makes me a member of an intelligible world [=a pure world 
of the understanding = a kingdom of ends] and consequently, if I were 
only this, all my actions would always be in conformity with the 
autonomy of the will [i.e. I would be a holy being]213; but since at the 
                                                 
212 The idea of a (finite) holy being is the idea of a being who cannot be thought of as acting from duty. 
Such a being is not necessitated by morality. We can think of such a being as having duties, in the sense of 
recognizing the rights of others. We cannot, however, think of such a being as having duties of virtue, for 
such duties are only possible for beings that are necessitated..  
213 As Kant explains: “A will whose maxims necessarily harmonize with the laws of autonomy is a holy, 
absolutely good will.” (4:439).  He adds that, The dependence upon the principle of autonomy of the will 
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same time I intuit myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought to 
be in conformity with it. (4:454 – my bolding) 
 
Here Kant makes it clear that insofar as I think of myself as a member of a kingdom of 
ends (an intelligible world) I think of myself as holy, for I think of myself as always and 
necessarily acting autonomously. The idea of virtue, and hence all duties of virtue, are 
only possible because I intuit myself as a member of the world of sense. A being that is 
not thought of as a member of the world of sense cannot be thought of as governed by 
laws of virtue. This is why Kant maintains that, 
All moralists and teachers should . . . see to it that, so far as possible they 
represent acts of benevolence to be acts of obligation, and reduce them to 
a matter of right. (27:417) 
 
The reason for this is because the moralist should present the ethical ideal in all of its 
purity, and benevolence is only an ethical matter for beings like us who have an impure 
dual nature. This is not so say that the ethical human being should not be benevolent, but 
benevolence is a result of striving to be a potential member of an ideal juridical 
community.  In the imperfect political communities we live in, communities that are 
striving to instantiate the ideal of a civil condition, but whose laws are necessarily 
imperfect, we, as individuals, have an ethical duty to act benevolently. In an ideal civil 
condition, however, there would be no need of benevolence, or private acts of charity, for 
in such a society there would be a just distribution of property, indeed, for Kant, an ideal 
                                                                                                                                                 
that is not absolutely good (moral necessitation) is obligation. This, accordingly, cannot be attributed to a 
holy being” (ibid.). 
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society is one in which everyone has their needs met.214 Benevolence is, and can, only be 
necessary in an imperfect political society, and we should not understand our acts of 
benevolence as supererogatory, but as acts that would be legally required if the society 
were really perfect, for in such a society everyone would have a right to what they needed 
and such rights would always be respected. Giving to those in need is not required by our 
imperfect laws governing property, but is an attempt to bring our societies closer to an 
ideal civil condition. Acting out of charity is not to respect an empirical right, but should 
be regarded as an attempt to bring our imperfect system of empirical rights closer to an 
ideal society governed solely by respect for rights. Such a society, however, could only 
exist if everyone has their needs met. Acting benevolently, then, involves respecting the 
rights people should have, not the rights they are actually assigned by our imperfect laws. 
The only basis we have for recognizing actual property rights are the rights assigned by 
human laws we live in. The need for benevolence is based upon the imperfections of 
human nature and the societies we live in and the laws that govern them. The need for 
benevolence, then, comes about as a result of the divergence between the laws that would 
govern an ideal state and actual human laws. A part of this divergence is contingent, and 
we recognize that most human laws could be improved. So we have a duty to attempt to 
improve the laws of the societies we live in. Another part of this divergence, however, is 
a necessary consequence of the fact that we are sensuous being, who have seemingly 
conflicting needs and who experience the world phenomenally. Kant himself gives a 
number of examples of how examples of benevolence can be represented as acts of 
                                                 
214 Guyer (2000) makes a similar point in Kantian Foundations for Liberalism, when he argues that, “since 
there can be no rightful “unilateral acquisition” of property, there can be a rightful claim to property only 
within a system of “distributive justice”” (p.239). 
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obligation, and reduced to a matter of rights, and these examples make it clear that he 
regards the need for benevolence as a result of the imperfection of human societies and 
laws. Kant makes this clear in his treatment of equity. 
 
At first glance, Kant's treatment of equity seems to be incompatible with his claim that 
(legitimate) rights necessarily imply duties in others. For he argues, in his lectures on 
ethics, that 
Equity is a right, but one which gives no authority to compel the other. It 
is a right, but not a compulsive right. If anyone has worked for me, for 
example, for agreed payment, but has done more than I required, then he 
has, indeed, a right to demand payment for his extra work, but he cannot 
compel me to do it. (27:433)  
 
The reason for this is that an external judge can only make judgments concerning the 
external actions of individuals and not their motivation. As a result of this our positive 
laws can only govern external actions and not internal choices. An ideal set of laws, 
however, would assign rights and govern the relations between individuals based upon 
their internal motivation and not upon their external behavior. There is no way, however, 
that purely human laws could ever satisfy this requirement.  Kant makes this clear 
elsewhere when he argues that strict (positive) right can only govern explicit agreement 
and not implicit ones, although right itself governs both explicit and implicit agreements. 
Thus Kant explains that, 
The laws of right rest either on jus strictum (strict right), i.e. all the laws of 
coercion, or fairness, aequitas. The latter is a subtle concept, not yet 
sufficiently developed. It consists in the right to compel another, insofar as 
the latter is implicated in an undeveloped condition. The condition for 
coercion is therefore present only insofar and under such circumstances as 
have not been outwardly acknowledged, but which if they were so, would 
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establish the right to coerce; for example, the wage of a servant has been 
settled, but during his period of service the real worth of the currency is 
devalued, and we cannot defray his expenses with the amount in question 
(27:532-3) 
 
Ideally our laws would regulate not merely explicit agreements, but also implicit ones. 
Kant, however, believes that it is impossible for an external (human) judge or set of 
positive laws to govern implicit agreements, for such laws can only govern what is 
external and hence what is explicit. This, however, is merely a limitation of human 
societies and not a limitation of justice itself. For, Kant believes, we are quite capable of 
recognizing that it would be unjust, according to the perspective of natural law, not to pay 
our servant enough to defray his expenses in times of inflation, for in hiring him we have 
implicitly agreed to pay him enough to live on. The judge of our conscience, unlike an 
external judge, is capable of recognizing implicit agreements as legally binding, and tells 
us that it would be unjust not to honor any such implicit contract. No statutory law can be 
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